3 ms·
http://doc.tm.uka.de/SKademlia_2007.pdf http://doc.tm.uka.de/SKademlia_2007.pdf Combine that with using the global overlay only for bootstrapping of common-int
by the8472 10y ago
http://doc.tm.uka.de/SKademlia_2007.pdf http://doc.tm.uka.de/SKademlia_2007.pdf
Combine that with using the global overlay only for bootstrapping of common-interest sub-networks and you'll limit the incentives that an attacker will have to attack the global overlay while also reducing the effectiveness because a single non-fake contact will be sufficient to join the subnetwork.
It's not an absolute defense (sybil-resistance without central authority is hard) but in practice it won't be worth it for attackers.
- ralala 10y agoI think it's still important to find a good balance for the computational cost of the crypto puzzle. Attackers will probably have a lot of computational resources (think of AWS, botnets, GPU computations), while typical users don't (mobile phones). I haven't had time yet to look into the IPFS details yet, but thanks for the reference.