4 ms·
For most of the P2P overlays there are multiple serious attack possibilities (Sybil attack, routing table poisoning). Some years ago in the university I wrote
by ralala 10y ago
For most of the P2P overlays there are multiple serious attack possibilities (Sybil attack, routing table poisoning).
Some years ago in the university I wrote a paper about that in a seminar to summarize the possible counter meassures, but from what I remember, there were no really practical solutions. I think the most promising one is the use of a centralized certificate authority, which reintroduces some of the problems p2p wanted to solve. Does anyone know if new ideas have come up in the last years?
- the8472 10y agohttp://doc.tm.uka.de/SKademlia_2007.pdf http://doc.tm.uka.de/SKademlia_2007.pdf Combine that with using the global overlay only for bootstrapping of common-interest sub-networks and you'll limit the incentives that an attacker will have to attack the global overlay while also reducing the effectiveness because a single non-fake contact will be sufficient to join the subnetwork. It's not an absolute defense (sybil-resistance without central authority is hard) but in practice it won't be worth it for attackers.
- ralala 10y agoI think it's still important to find a good balance for the computational cost of the crypto puzzle. Attackers will probably have a lot of computational resources (think of AWS, botnets, GPU computations), while typical users don't (mobile phones). I haven't had time yet to look into the IPFS details yet, but thanks for the reference.
- pdimitar 10y agoYou should read about the implementation of IPFS and how it tackles this exact problem. Look it up, it's readily accessible from the first few results in Google. I believe their system will work. Or require only minor tweaks.