> They do not have to do exactly what real people do in a given situation. But, by definition, they do have to do exactly what real people do. If they did not

> They do not have to do exactly what real people do in a given situation. But, by definition, they do have to do exactly what real people do. If they did not then there is no argument, everyone agrees this kind of zombie is very possible. The disagreement comes when Chalmers says they could exist and be indistinguishable (including asking about their inner experiences) from normal people. > I can postulate a universe in which my molecules and everyone else's have been precisely duplicated from this universe in physical terms. I can postulate that in that universe there is no such thing as conscious experience; no qualia or whatnot. This is actually quite a concise definition of the dualist position, the material argument is basically that being identical physically is to have identical qualia.