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Zombies Must Be Dualists: Zombies and Our Philosophy of Mind
- shkkmo 10y agoI've long been what the author calls as "poetic naturalist" simply due to the argument that if we are talking about qualia, then qualia must have an effect on the physical world. If there are elements of consciousness that are completely separate from the physical world (in that they have no effect on it), we cannot talk about them, nor even think about them. I do find that trying to conceptualize p-zombies is a useful tool try to pull apart the strength of the effects of these qualia. To take let's say we somehow duplicate the universe at the very instant I started writing this post, but with the potential for qualia removed. Since my brain had already done the processing, I would continue to write about an experience I would no longer have. I suspect everyone would continue to talk about qualia for quite a long time. However, if the potential for qualia were removed prior to the formation of the earth, I think we have to image we would not be talking about it now. (Because otherwise we are talking about nothing.) I personally suspect that things would have developed very differently and the human race would have been far less successful. My suspect that we tend to over attribute consciousness to others and to ourselves. I suspect we spend a fair amount of our lives in p-zombie mode and then project the experience of consciousness backwards onto our memories of those time.
- Almaviva 10y ago> If there are elements of consciousness that are completely separate from the physical world (in that they have no effect on it), we cannot talk about them, nor even think about them. Yet here we are, doing both, talking as well as thinking, right? If I talk about a universe where you'd never "woken up" as a subjective individual, and the present time was just like (to both of us) the previous 13.7 billion years, you know exactly the concept I mean, whether it's expressible in terms that have meaning beyond a single reader who knows (in the Cartesian sense) that their (subjective) existence is something special that only they can observe.
- shkkmo 10y agoMy speaking about my cartesian knowledge of my own subject experience is proof (to me) that my subject experience has physical effects. If there are any properties that do not have physical effects, that makes them unspeakable, unknowable, and unthinkable. We can have a conceptual category for these properties, but we can't place anything in that category, not even from our own subjective experiences. Type A Categories (that we can place things in): Physical Causes & Effects: Our reality. No Physical Causes but Physical Effect: True randomness Type B Categories (that we can talk about but not place anything in): Physical Causes but no Physical Effects: The Afterlife, The Future, Non-physical Elements of Consciousness Neither Physical Causes nor Physical Effects: Completely separate realities If we say that anything from Type B categories exists, then existence becomes a meaninglessly broad category. We can be wrong about whether something is Type B (say if we discover time travel), but nothing that is Type B exists.
- js8 10y agoAhh, qualia is such an useless concept! Here I am, a philosophical zombie. I don't have any subjective experiences, as far as I can tell. I challenge anybody to show that I am not!
- putzdown 10y agoI think the author is confusing two different issues: the problem of disproving solipsism and the problem of proving or disproving dualism. It is not true that we must think of zombies as being absolutely identical to "real people" in order for them to be useful in thinking about dualism. They do not have to do exactly what real people do in a given situation. For example, a civilization of zombies might have speech, might even have philosophy, but would probably not talk about consciousness in any form. The author is right that you can't think of zombies as acting exactly the same as the corresponding human and yet not being conscious, because consciousness is surely a cause as well as an effect (else we wouldn't talk about it, for example). He's wrong that you need to think of them that way in order to bear fruit for dualism. I can postulate a universe in which my molecules and everyone else's have been precisely duplicated from this universe in physical terms. I can postulate that in that universe there is no such thing as conscious experience; no qualia or whatnot. I can imagine that universe continuing from the moment of duplication onward, proceeding as dictated by the laws of physics. My duplicate in that universe would probably not act exactly as I will, but will certainly act in some way. Simply the act of postulating, of conceiving, of that kind of zombie universe is enough to strongly suggest that consciousness is something outside of the physical. The zombie universe doesn't have to be identical in behavior, only identical physically. Because what you've now done is to recognize that a universe in which physical objects and laws are the only elements is a universe in which mental (experiential) phenomena are unaccounted for. You can imagine that those mental phenomena magically, mysteriously re-emerge from the physical, but have given absolutely no reason why they should. Therefore you can equally imagine that they don't re-emerge. So whether zombies behave identically with real people or are merely constituted identically with real people, their conceived existence is enough to show that the mental universe—so to speak—is conceptually detached from the physical and therefore a separate domain.
- freshhawk 10y agoA very useful link for more on this subject is at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[1], which is a fantastic resource for overviews of philosophical subjects. [1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/