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> How does it prevent password reuse? It does not prevent password reuse, it mitigates the risks of password reuse in that it adds the requirement of having ph
by pfg 10y ago
> How does it prevent password reuse?
It does not prevent password reuse, it mitigates the risks of password reuse in that it adds the requirement of having physical access to a device, which is a show-stopper for most attackers.
If you're using a password manager with sufficiently complex passphrases, the biggest remaining risk factor are targeted malware attacks (something like a keylogger), which is something that typical SMS- or TOTP-App-based 2FA implementions won't help you with, fair enough. Implementations where certain security-sensitive activities require separate confirmation and where the details are transmitted through a separate channel would mitigate this attack to a certain degree as well. As an example, some banks in Europe provide their customers with card readers with a PIN pad that shows transaction details on a separate display. Banks routinely include transaction details in SMS-based TAN mechanisms, which works as well, but is obviously not quite as good.
> You could even argue it increases the attack surface.
How?
- a_imho 10y agoMeant in the general sense. More complexity, more opportunity for attacks and/or implementation bugs. For starters you have a phone number associated with an account already. I would wager losing your phone is nearly impossible to prevent, while picking your passphrase is up to you. Losing your phone could alone compromise your security, but the very least SMS leaks the info where you bank. I'm aware I am a minority with this opinion, but I would be really grateful if I could at least opt out from phone based 2FA.