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> You're confused because you're unfamiliar with the concepts being discussed. That's not the same thing as being confused because the parent comment's argument
by Someone1234 10y ago
> You're confused because you're unfamiliar with the concepts being discussed. That's not the same thing as being confused because the parent comment's argument is flawed.
That's very unnecessarily condescending. You then go on to criticise RSA, which is fine, but fails to address the point I made which was that they criticised RSA's implementation, not its inherent design flaws, while promoting a newer scheme with a less time-tested implementation.
This is verbatim what I was responding to:
> As RSA and finite-field DH aren't broken
>> No, but their implementations often are.
PS - I strongly suspect your tone is a result of another thread of discussion we had in this topic[0]. I'd suggest you make snide remarks there rather than carrying it over into this thread.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11909436 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11909436
- tptacek 10y agoNone of this is responsive to the comment I just wrote. I'm pretty happy to leave this part of the thread where it is, though.
- CiPHPerCoder 10y agoLet me clarify a bit then: My criticisms of RSA stem from studying how people implement it in cryptography libraries. More people implement PKCS1v1.5 padding than implement RSAES-OAEP in their application-layer crypto, and that's a problem. Conversely, most of the applications I've analyzed that wanted ECDSA/ECDH used OpenSSL or libsodium. Guess which ones were broken with chosen-ciphertext attacks. If you want a theoretical concern: Index calculus attacks. If you want a practical concern: Look at the traps that cause implementations to be comically insecure.