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I agree with some of the arguments against online voting. However, it isn't really realistic to do re-counts right now, nor do people do them regularly. If the

I agree with some of the arguments against online voting. However, it isn't really realistic to do re-counts right now, nor do people do them regularly. If the people doing the counting are bought then that is an issue too. Both ways suck right now. One thing that I would like to see is an open source, standardized system though. There was/is an effort towards this right now. http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/our_solution http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/our_solution Stops Secrecy in Vote Tabulation: OVC has a team of scientists ready to program computer software for voting machines and electoral tabulation that would be publicly owned or open source. Open source software could be checked by any party or group by hiring a capable computer programmer. Provides Paper Trail: The OVC recommended procedure for tabulating elections relies on a paper ballot that is then fed through a scanner into a locked ballot box so that all originals are saved in case of the need for a recount or audit (See Sample Ballot). Scientifically Verifiable: In addition to open source voting machine and tabulation software, the Open Voting Consortium is also working on a database checklist for standard practices in vote tabulation that would assure transparency and accountability. Some aspects of the OVC concept will soon be enfolded into California legislation. Saves Money: Typical voting machines cost between $2,000 and $3,000, but OVC open source software could be run on any personal computer (PC) and ballots could be printed on a normal printer. OVC envisions PCs with tamper-proof cases as the new voting terminals at a savings of hundreds or thousands of dollars per terminal.(See page on OVC Cost Analysis). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8CSKdMTARY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8CSKdMTARY OVC at LinuxWorld 2008

vacri 10y ago
> However, it isn't really realistic to do re-counts right now, nor do people do them regularly. Australia uses paper ballots, and every election there's a seat or two somewhere that there's a recount. The major parties get their volunteers[0] to scrutinise the officials as they count as well, so you have multiple opposing interests scrutinising the actual count. Every vote basically gets at least three pairs of eyeballs on it. The officials and the watchers observe the ballot boxes all the way from the booths to the counting areas. It's difficult to come up with a more robust way of doing an actual public election, though there are some minor drawbacks. And as far as I'm aware, this system is actually cheaper (per capita) than the US electronic systems. I imagine the 'low tech' nature is where a lot of savings happen - little need for technical skills. [0]'Scrutineering' is boring as hell, but parties already lean heavily on their volunteers, what's one more thing?
- sgnelson 10y ago
  The US has been down that road, and I forgive you for not knowing this (as you're Australian). But let me introduce you to Hanging Chad. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chad_(paper) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chad_(paper) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_election_recount https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_election_recount Although, calling this system a "Paper ballot" is not quite the truth. While it uses paper as the medium, the hole punching method is non-traditional in relation to basic written checks/X's or even scantron selection (which also has issues). But my point is that even "simple" and "low tech" methods can still have unexpected issues, such as the infamous Florida case.
  - IanCal 10y ago
    UK here, it's just a cross on a box. Nothing as complicated as these hole punching machines.
- pmontra 10y ago
  Italy here, it works in the same way. Parties have their watchers. I expect this to happen in every country, unless there is only one real party and the others are there just for the show. In every paper based system problems can arise outside the voting site: parties can buy votes but that's the same with internet voting. With the internet and computers an attacker has the benefit of changing a vote every 1,000, on the client or on the server or on the network (MITM). That's enough to win many close elections. I wonder how parties could watch against that. Are we going to end up with computers with rootkits for every major party fighting each other for the right to vote on our behalf?
  - frobozz 10y ago
    The paper based system guards against vote buying through the guarantee of secrecy. I go into a booth on my own, make my mark(s) fold my paper, and put it in a locked box. No one but me knows how I voted. If I go in with someone else, the officials will take action. You can try to buy my vote, but I can just take your money and vote however I want. If I can vote from wherever I like, then someone can stand over my shoulder and watch me vote, then only pay for it if I do as I'm told.
pdkl95 10y ago
> However, it isn't really realistic to do re-counts right now, nor do people do them regularly. About half of the states require by law a recount by hand at a random selection of voting locations. > If the people doing the counting are bought then that is an issue too. That's why you have hostile observers from opposing parties present. > open source software So you have the source. Now prove that it is installed at both the client and server. Then prove that the operating system, bootloader, and every other part of the computer you need to trust is actually loading and running your software properly. Difficulty: Volkswagen showed it's easy evade inspections, and good luck proving anything on a system with Intel ME. Do you know that there isn't an extra core or ROM hidden inside one of the chips?
- TeMPOraL 10y ago
  > > If the people doing the counting are bought then that is an issue too. > That's why you have hostile observers from opposing parties present. That's probably why GP wrote "bought", not "asked nicely to miscount in their party's favour". That said, it's probably a game neither party would like to play too much, as it seems it could spiral out of control and turn into a race to bottom, sucking out more and more party money.
  - frobozz 10y ago
    >> That's why you have hostile observers from opposing parties present. Even though observers are supposed to behave in an impartial and accurate way, partisan observers help ensure accuracy by their partisanship. If an individual counter is bought by Party A, observers from Parties B and C are there. When the teller puts some of Party C's votes in Party A's pile, Party C is there to bring it to the attention of officials. If it is likely to be close between A and B, and a teller puts a spoiled, party D, or independent paper in A's pile, then B will note it. Once these things have been raised, they are recorded and read by more officials and observers. That increases the number of people you need to buy off in order to effect a change in the result, which in turn increases the chance of being caught or having to buy off someone who cannot be bought in your favour.
matt4077 10y ago
I don't get the complexity the US creates around voting. I live in a fairly large city (Berlin, Germany, around 3 million I believe). - I walk 150m to my polling place. It's similar for most people. - I've never waited more than 5 minutes - The polling place is run mostly by volunteers, about 5 or 6 per place, with civil servants filling spots that can't be filled. Costs are neglible. - I get a paper ballot, I mark my vote with a pen - After 6pm I sometimes return and watch the counting. I can freely walk around between the people sorting the ballots and look at anything I want - Did the same with friends last time around, we each had a bottle of beer, nobody cared. They were mostly older people happy to get a few visitors and talk a bit of politics. - Pretty accurate first results (not exit polls) usually around 9pm. - I can check the counts from my polling place the next day. Votes for the large party are in the lower 3-digits, so it's possible for me to specifically verify a few results.
- gambiting 10y ago
  Poland here, same process. Well, I don't think I can actually watch them count, but then again, I never tried.
  - programLyrique 10y ago
    In France, if you can vote, you can even count, and people can volunteer when they cast their ballot. The president of the voting station will usually also ask young voters to help.
- evgen 10y ago
  Voting procedures are handled at the state level, subject to terms from the federal government regarding basic access and fairness, so there is a lot of variety. I lived for twenty years in CA and I could have said the same thing about my polling experiences except for doing the counting (you can volunteer to be an elector and after some basic training do so, they just don't let the general public wander in to the best of my knowledge.) Experiences vary.
- CuriousSkeptic 10y ago
  One issue is the cost and logistics of it all. In Sweden we therefore have three different elections on the same day. Campaigning tend to focus on the national election, thus the others gets a back seat and quality suffers. Also, I've helped some smaller parties with the ballot distribution. It's not a small task for a small party to ensure each an every polling place in the country has ballots. Just the physical logistics of it is hard enough, but then you also have to deal with all the people who seem to think that only established parties has a right to participate in the election in the first place. The barrier to entry is quite high. Perhaps that is a feature though.
philipn 10y ago
San Francisco has started the process of creating just that kind of end-to-end open source voting system (using the existing paper ballots, optical scanning and manual recount process that exists here). Here's some more information: https://gcn.com/articles/2016/06/02/sf-open-source-voting.aspx https://gcn.com/articles/2016/06/02/sf-open-source-voting.as...
mavhc 10y ago
Australia had open source voting machines in 2003 http://www.wired.com/2003/11/aussies-do-it-right-e-voting/ http://www.wired.com/2003/11/aussies-do-it-right-e-voting/ If we can bank online we can vote online, not that hard. Not perfect, but better than paper voting, that's full of bugs
- germanier 10y ago
  How do I verify that the machine actually runs the published software? With online banking there is a paper trail of every action taken. If we want secrecy of the vote that's suddenly a lot harder to do.
  - mavhc 10y ago
    Not really, you just have to be given a number that you can later match, no one has to know that number is you. Could even digitally sign things. I propose a system where each vote is broadcast to multiple counting organisations, to avoid the counters being biased, and each vote is numbered, but only the voter knows that number so they can check with any counting organisation that it was recorded as they wished. E-voting makes better forms of voting cheaper, instead of just First Past The Post. Preference voting for example.
    - germanier 10y ago
      If you just give out a number you suddenly open up the system to voter coercion. I can actually prove to you how I voted. Also, as a voter I can't be sure that they system that gives me the number does not save the link between it and me. For preference voting you don't need e-voting. Using computers to help you count ballots (with an analog check and fallback option) is possible without actually collecting the votes electronically.
      - mavhc 10y ago
        Much more of an issue that people don't vote than people sell their votes, which they do indirectly anyway. Does anywhere use computer printed ballots?, to avoid ambiguously filled out ballots. Computer creates PNG, you print that, or it's printed at a station, you carry that paper to the vote counting machine, it's optically read, (and read by humans if you wish) without errors because it was just printed by a computer

vacri 10y ago

> However, it isn't really realistic to do re-counts right now, nor do people do them regularly. Australia uses paper ballots, and every election there's a seat or two somewhere that there's a recount. The major parties get their volunteers[0] to scrutinise the officials as they count as well, so you have multiple opposing interests scrutinising the actual count. Every vote basically gets at least three pairs of eyeballs on it. The officials and the watchers observe the ballot boxes all the way from the booths to the counting areas. It's difficult to come up with a more robust way of doing an actual public election, though there are some minor drawbacks. And as far as I'm aware, this system is actually cheaper (per capita) than the US electronic systems. I imagine the 'low tech' nature is where a lot of savings happen - little need for technical skills. [0]'Scrutineering' is boring as hell, but parties already lean heavily on their volunteers, what's one more thing?

sgnelson 10y ago
The US has been down that road, and I forgive you for not knowing this (as you're Australian). But let me introduce you to Hanging Chad. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chad_(paper) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chad_(paper) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_election_recount https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_election_recount Although, calling this system a "Paper ballot" is not quite the truth. While it uses paper as the medium, the hole punching method is non-traditional in relation to basic written checks/X's or even scantron selection (which also has issues). But my point is that even "simple" and "low tech" methods can still have unexpected issues, such as the infamous Florida case.
- IanCal 10y ago
  UK here, it's just a cross on a box. Nothing as complicated as these hole punching machines.
pmontra 10y ago
Italy here, it works in the same way. Parties have their watchers. I expect this to happen in every country, unless there is only one real party and the others are there just for the show. In every paper based system problems can arise outside the voting site: parties can buy votes but that's the same with internet voting. With the internet and computers an attacker has the benefit of changing a vote every 1,000, on the client or on the server or on the network (MITM). That's enough to win many close elections. I wonder how parties could watch against that. Are we going to end up with computers with rootkits for every major party fighting each other for the right to vote on our behalf?
- frobozz 10y ago
  The paper based system guards against vote buying through the guarantee of secrecy. I go into a booth on my own, make my mark(s) fold my paper, and put it in a locked box. No one but me knows how I voted. If I go in with someone else, the officials will take action. You can try to buy my vote, but I can just take your money and vote however I want. If I can vote from wherever I like, then someone can stand over my shoulder and watch me vote, then only pay for it if I do as I'm told.

pdkl95 10y ago

> However, it isn't really realistic to do re-counts right now, nor do people do them regularly. About half of the states require by law a recount by hand at a random selection of voting locations. > If the people doing the counting are bought then that is an issue too. That's why you have hostile observers from opposing parties present. > open source software So you have the source. Now prove that it is installed at both the client and server. Then prove that the operating system, bootloader, and every other part of the computer you need to trust is actually loading and running your software properly. Difficulty: Volkswagen showed it's easy evade inspections, and good luck proving anything on a system with Intel ME. Do you know that there isn't an extra core or ROM hidden inside one of the chips?

TeMPOraL 10y ago
> > If the people doing the counting are bought then that is an issue too. > That's why you have hostile observers from opposing parties present. That's probably why GP wrote "bought", not "asked nicely to miscount in their party's favour". That said, it's probably a game neither party would like to play too much, as it seems it could spiral out of control and turn into a race to bottom, sucking out more and more party money.
- frobozz 10y ago
  >> That's why you have hostile observers from opposing parties present. Even though observers are supposed to behave in an impartial and accurate way, partisan observers help ensure accuracy by their partisanship. If an individual counter is bought by Party A, observers from Parties B and C are there. When the teller puts some of Party C's votes in Party A's pile, Party C is there to bring it to the attention of officials. If it is likely to be close between A and B, and a teller puts a spoiled, party D, or independent paper in A's pile, then B will note it. Once these things have been raised, they are recorded and read by more officials and observers. That increases the number of people you need to buy off in order to effect a change in the result, which in turn increases the chance of being caught or having to buy off someone who cannot be bought in your favour.

matt4077 10y ago

I don't get the complexity the US creates around voting. I live in a fairly large city (Berlin, Germany, around 3 million I believe). - I walk 150m to my polling place. It's similar for most people. - I've never waited more than 5 minutes - The polling place is run mostly by volunteers, about 5 or 6 per place, with civil servants filling spots that can't be filled. Costs are neglible. - I get a paper ballot, I mark my vote with a pen - After 6pm I sometimes return and watch the counting. I can freely walk around between the people sorting the ballots and look at anything I want - Did the same with friends last time around, we each had a bottle of beer, nobody cared. They were mostly older people happy to get a few visitors and talk a bit of politics. - Pretty accurate first results (not exit polls) usually around 9pm. - I can check the counts from my polling place the next day. Votes for the large party are in the lower 3-digits, so it's possible for me to specifically verify a few results.

gambiting 10y ago
Poland here, same process. Well, I don't think I can actually watch them count, but then again, I never tried.
- programLyrique 10y ago
  In France, if you can vote, you can even count, and people can volunteer when they cast their ballot. The president of the voting station will usually also ask young voters to help.
evgen 10y ago
Voting procedures are handled at the state level, subject to terms from the federal government regarding basic access and fairness, so there is a lot of variety. I lived for twenty years in CA and I could have said the same thing about my polling experiences except for doing the counting (you can volunteer to be an elector and after some basic training do so, they just don't let the general public wander in to the best of my knowledge.) Experiences vary.
CuriousSkeptic 10y ago
One issue is the cost and logistics of it all. In Sweden we therefore have three different elections on the same day. Campaigning tend to focus on the national election, thus the others gets a back seat and quality suffers. Also, I've helped some smaller parties with the ballot distribution. It's not a small task for a small party to ensure each an every polling place in the country has ballots. Just the physical logistics of it is hard enough, but then you also have to deal with all the people who seem to think that only established parties has a right to participate in the election in the first place. The barrier to entry is quite high. Perhaps that is a feature though.

philipn 10y ago

San Francisco has started the process of creating just that kind of end-to-end open source voting system (using the existing paper ballots, optical scanning and manual recount process that exists here). Here's some more information: https://gcn.com/articles/2016/06/02/sf-open-source-voting.aspx https://gcn.com/articles/2016/06/02/sf-open-source-voting.as...

mavhc 10y ago

Australia had open source voting machines in 2003 http://www.wired.com/2003/11/aussies-do-it-right-e-voting/ http://www.wired.com/2003/11/aussies-do-it-right-e-voting/ If we can bank online we can vote online, not that hard. Not perfect, but better than paper voting, that's full of bugs

germanier 10y ago
How do I verify that the machine actually runs the published software? With online banking there is a paper trail of every action taken. If we want secrecy of the vote that's suddenly a lot harder to do.
- mavhc 10y ago
  Not really, you just have to be given a number that you can later match, no one has to know that number is you. Could even digitally sign things. I propose a system where each vote is broadcast to multiple counting organisations, to avoid the counters being biased, and each vote is numbered, but only the voter knows that number so they can check with any counting organisation that it was recorded as they wished. E-voting makes better forms of voting cheaper, instead of just First Past The Post. Preference voting for example.
  - germanier 10y ago
    If you just give out a number you suddenly open up the system to voter coercion. I can actually prove to you how I voted. Also, as a voter I can't be sure that they system that gives me the number does not save the link between it and me. For preference voting you don't need e-voting. Using computers to help you count ballots (with an analog check and fallback option) is possible without actually collecting the votes electronically.
    - mavhc 10y ago
      Much more of an issue that people don't vote than people sell their votes, which they do indirectly anyway. Does anywhere use computer printed ballots?, to avoid ambiguously filled out ballots. Computer creates PNG, you print that, or it's printed at a station, you carry that paper to the vote counting machine, it's optically read, (and read by humans if you wish) without errors because it was just printed by a computer