2 ms·

That's a good point, but honestly I wouldn't be able to tell you the account names of any of the packages i use regularly. And unless the account name of the p

That's a good point, but honestly I wouldn't be able to tell you the account names of any of the packages i use regularly. And unless the account name of the package maintainers is brought front-and-center, you aren't necessarily going to know it shouldn't be different until it's too late.

kibwen 10y ago
A user doesn't need to be able to recognize the account name, that's the purpose of your aforementioned prompt. Let's consider the possible scenarios for installing "foo/bar": I. I've installed anything from the author "foo" before on this machine, implying that I trust "foo". A. On a system with namespaced packages, I attempt to install "fpp/bar". I've never installed anything from the author "fpp" before, so I get a prompt. B. On a system without namespaced packages, I attempt to install "bsr". 1. If "bsr" is by an author I trust, then it will be installed. This will be confusing, but is not a security vulnerability. because this author is already running code on my machines. 2. If "bsr" is by an author I don't trust, then I get a prompt, as in scenario I.A. II. I've never installed anything from the author "foo" before on this machine. A. On a system with namespaced packages, I attempt to install "fpp/bar". The system prompts me, as in scenario I.A., but because I expect this prompt I don't bother reading it and blindly accept it. The prompt does reiterate the name of the author, but if I didn't catch the typo the first time, there's little chance I'll catch the typo this time. Remember: the value of the prompt is not the reiteration of the name, it's in its unexpected nature, because research has repeatedly shown that users, even power users, do not bother reading routine prompts (this is why, e.g., Chrome no longer allows users to bypass the enormously scary warning page that appears when a secure site has a certificate error). My system gets owned. B. On a system without namespaced packages, I attempt to install "bsr". The system prompts me, as in scenario I.A., but because I expect this prompt I don't bother reading it and blindly accept it. My system gets owned. A more complete version of the solution that you're proposing would be to have an actual implementation of a web of trust, but even that doesn't solve all the security problems inherent to package repositories.

kibwen 10y ago

A user doesn't need to be able to recognize the account name, that's the purpose of your aforementioned prompt. Let's consider the possible scenarios for installing "foo/bar": I. I've installed anything from the author "foo" before on this machine, implying that I trust "foo". A. On a system with namespaced packages, I attempt to install "fpp/bar". I've never installed anything from the author "fpp" before, so I get a prompt. B. On a system without namespaced packages, I attempt to install "bsr". 1. If "bsr" is by an author I trust, then it will be installed. This will be confusing, but is not a security vulnerability. because this author is already running code on my machines. 2. If "bsr" is by an author I don't trust, then I get a prompt, as in scenario I.A. II. I've never installed anything from the author "foo" before on this machine. A. On a system with namespaced packages, I attempt to install "fpp/bar". The system prompts me, as in scenario I.A., but because I expect this prompt I don't bother reading it and blindly accept it. The prompt does reiterate the name of the author, but if I didn't catch the typo the first time, there's little chance I'll catch the typo this time. Remember: the value of the prompt is not the reiteration of the name, it's in its unexpected nature, because research has repeatedly shown that users, even power users, do not bother reading routine prompts (this is why, e.g., Chrome no longer allows users to bypass the enormously scary warning page that appears when a secure site has a certificate error). My system gets owned. B. On a system without namespaced packages, I attempt to install "bsr". The system prompts me, as in scenario I.A., but because I expect this prompt I don't bother reading it and blindly accept it. My system gets owned. A more complete version of the solution that you're proposing would be to have an actual implementation of a web of trust, but even that doesn't solve all the security problems inherent to package repositories.