4 ms·
For example, with most webservers you can pretty safely restrict access to a file by giving it a filename containing some key that cannot realistically be guess
by onion2k 10y ago
For example, with most webservers you can pretty safely restrict access to a file by giving it a filename containing some key that cannot realistically be guessed.
While that might feel like your security is an unguessable filename, the actual security you're relying on is the server not listing what's in a directory - which is reliant on every service on the machine that has file system level access to list a directory being secure. If an attacker gets access to any of them then they can get to your file.
In other words, while the key is not public per se, it's very easily attacked through unrelated services. That is a problem.
- SideburnsOfDoom 10y agoLike with the ssh example, the vast majority of attacks (I mean in terms of sheer numbers) are dumb, automated and done in bulk. e.g. Like just requesting the file "admin.php" on any website. Like trying to login with user "admin" and common passwords. If you don't have these files/logins then from a theoretical point of view of securing "every service on the machine" you haven't done anything; but as the 18,000 : 5 ratio in the article shows, you are in fact safer by halting the vast majority of naive attacks at that layer. And at a fairly low cost.
- xg15 10y agoAdd to that other systems which treat URLs as data with little security value - e.g. proxies or browsers that record visites URLs and may allow other people to reconstruct the filename.