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> The question is whether we have justification to believe that it actually exists I understood this to mean that you were doubting whether subjective experien
by jnicholasp 10y ago
> The question is whether we have justification to believe that it actually exists
I understood this to mean that you were doubting whether subjective experience actually exists, and I responded by arguing that it is not possible to doubt that your own subjective experience exists since you (I, at least) experience it directly, which is different than the class of now-refuted inferences that you were comparing it to in. I was not making any argument about where it comes from or what causes it.
- naasking 10y agoTo say that consciousness does not "actually exist" is the same kind of statement as saying that a car does not really exist. Certainly I drive something I call a car to work every morning. I have direct experience of this too. And yet, cars don't really exist at fundamental levels of reality, they are merely aggregates of more fundamental types of matter. And so it is with consciousness. We certainly have consciousness, but to then immediately assign consciousness special ontological status distinct from matter, ie. dualism at worst or panpsychism at best, is a huge leap that requires justification.
- jnicholasp 10y agoOk, I more or less agree with you here. A car is not a fundamental object, it's composed of many layers of constituent objects which eventually resolve down to fundamental particles and forces. And if physicalism is true, then consciousness also is not fundamental, but ultimately resolves down to fundamental particles and forces also. I don't know whether physicalism is true. It certainly seems like the best overall account of the universe that we currently have, but if there is a chink in physicalism's armor, consciousness might be it. Might. But, you're right, there's a huge leap between "might" and "is".