5 ms·

> But that doesn't explain the mechanism for conciousness to occur, it just explains why it might exist. Hmm, what if both, the physical mechanism and the subj

by mh-cx 10y ago

> But that doesn't explain the mechanism for conciousness to occur, it just explains why it might exist. Hmm, what if both, the physical mechanism and the subjective qualia are simply intertwined in a way, that can not be deduced any further? Maybe it's a little like the relation between gravitational forces and curved space time. Both are basically the same thing. But if you're used to live in one system, it's hard to imagine how it feels to see things from the other perspective. Still there may be a lot of value to the complementary theory. Much like the GTR opened up a whole new range of physical applications, a physical theory of consciousness may lead to computer systems that we will have to attribute being conscious the same way as we do with our fellow human beings - just because both will follow the same fundamental laws of consciousness.

aninhumer 10y ago
The two seem fairly trivially separable though. I can imagine a thing that has the same physical mechanisms as me, but does not experience conciousness (i.e. a p-zombie), and I can imagine something with no physical mechanisms that does (i.e. a soul). Now it's possible neither of those things can actually exist, but the fact that I can imagine them demonstrates the distinction I'm making.
- mh-cx 10y ago
  > I can imagine a thing that has the same physical mechanisms as me, but does not experience conciousness (i.e. a p-zombie) Hmm, really? How? To be honest, I can't. Honestly I think this is just a meaningless mind trick. The more I think about it, the less the notion of a p-zombie really makes sense to me. If a p-zombie existed, and I could never really tell the difference from the outside, this gives rise to many blind-alley-models of the world, for example solipsism: Maybe all others are just p-zombies and maybe I'm the only thing that really exists in the sphere of consciousness (=soul?). I can never know for sure. But if it's true, then there's not really much room for any further discussion. So I have to assume that everything that behaves like being conscious in fact has a consciousness - even if it isn't even aware of its being conscious.
  - aninhumer 10y ago
    Of course I assume that other people are concious, but I am nonetheless capable of imagining a person who is not. And the point isn't whether such a thing is physically possible in our universe, merely that being able to conceive of such a thing identifies the distinction we're drawing. There is a notion of experience separate from the physical process that may cause it, because for any such process, we can imagine a world where it does not actually experience anything.

by mh-cx 10y ago

aninhumer 10y ago

The two seem fairly trivially separable though. I can imagine a thing that has the same physical mechanisms as me, but does not experience conciousness (i.e. a p-zombie), and I can imagine something with no physical mechanisms that does (i.e. a soul). Now it's possible neither of those things can actually exist, but the fact that I can imagine them demonstrates the distinction I'm making.

mh-cx 10y ago
> I can imagine a thing that has the same physical mechanisms as me, but does not experience conciousness (i.e. a p-zombie) Hmm, really? How? To be honest, I can't. Honestly I think this is just a meaningless mind trick. The more I think about it, the less the notion of a p-zombie really makes sense to me. If a p-zombie existed, and I could never really tell the difference from the outside, this gives rise to many blind-alley-models of the world, for example solipsism: Maybe all others are just p-zombies and maybe I'm the only thing that really exists in the sphere of consciousness (=soul?). I can never know for sure. But if it's true, then there's not really much room for any further discussion. So I have to assume that everything that behaves like being conscious in fact has a consciousness - even if it isn't even aware of its being conscious.
- aninhumer 10y ago
  Of course I assume that other people are concious, but I am nonetheless capable of imagining a person who is not. And the point isn't whether such a thing is physically possible in our universe, merely that being able to conceive of such a thing identifies the distinction we're drawing. There is a notion of experience separate from the physical process that may cause it, because for any such process, we can imagine a world where it does not actually experience anything.