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>why should I assume that the reason I have subjective experience is different than all other observables? We're not talking about the reason, we're talking ab

>why should I assume that the reason I have subjective experience is different than all other observables? We're not talking about the reason, we're talking about the experience itself. Maybe that experience occurs as the result of physical processes, but it's still a separate thing. Arguing that qualia don't exist because you can't observe them externally is like a blind person arguing that I can't possibly see a broken pencil because they can feel the pencil is solid.

jnicholasp 10y ago
> Arguing that qualia don't exist because you can't observe them externally is like a blind person arguing that I can't possibly see a broken pencil because they can feel the pencil is solid. This is what makes me wonder whether some of us are, in fact, p-zombies: only a blind person, someone who doesn't have visual experiences, could argue that visual experience doesn't exist, and similarly it seems that only someone who doesn't have subjective experience could argue that it doesn't exist. And there do appear to be people arguing that subjective experience doesn't exist. Either I'm misunderstanding them, I'm failing to see the third way, or some of us are indeed p-zombies.
naasking 10y ago
> Maybe that experience occurs as the result of physical processes, but it's still a separate thing. To say something doesn't really exist is to say that it doesn't have metaphysical status on par with matter. If you say that consciousness really, fundamentally exists, then you're saying that it has the same status in reality as the fundamental particles of physics. We should expect to find some consciousness field and particles upon which it acts; or you would have to posit something like panpsychism which suggests that consciousness is an intrinsic property of all matter. Consciousness not really existing implies that it's an illusion, in the same way that cars, and jobs and countries are an illusion. Certainly they "exist" in some colloquial sense, but they don't exist in a fundamental metaphysical sense.

jnicholasp 10y ago

> Arguing that qualia don't exist because you can't observe them externally is like a blind person arguing that I can't possibly see a broken pencil because they can feel the pencil is solid. This is what makes me wonder whether some of us are, in fact, p-zombies: only a blind person, someone who doesn't have visual experiences, could argue that visual experience doesn't exist, and similarly it seems that only someone who doesn't have subjective experience could argue that it doesn't exist. And there do appear to be people arguing that subjective experience doesn't exist. Either I'm misunderstanding them, I'm failing to see the third way, or some of us are indeed p-zombies.

naasking 10y ago

> Maybe that experience occurs as the result of physical processes, but it's still a separate thing. To say something doesn't really exist is to say that it doesn't have metaphysical status on par with matter. If you say that consciousness really, fundamentally exists, then you're saying that it has the same status in reality as the fundamental particles of physics. We should expect to find some consciousness field and particles upon which it acts; or you would have to posit something like panpsychism which suggests that consciousness is an intrinsic property of all matter. Consciousness not really existing implies that it's an illusion, in the same way that cars, and jobs and countries are an illusion. Certainly they "exist" in some colloquial sense, but they don't exist in a fundamental metaphysical sense.