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> Did you just claim that people with aphantasia [...] have no subjective experience? I don't think so. I wasn't talking about imagination (as in: thinking of

by adwn 10y ago

> Did you just claim that people with aphantasia [...] have no subjective experience? I don't think so. I wasn't talking about imagination (as in: thinking of a cube and rotating it in your mind), but rather about experiencing the input from my physical eyes. It's as if there's someone inside my head that experiences and feels what I physically see. Of course, this doesn't help: the homunculus model is thoroughly debunked. [1] > Or do you group all possible "inner senses" used for imagining "what something is like" into "qualia" without separating them into distinct functionalities that are in bijection with the available physical senses? There are qualia like anxiety or restlessness that are not linked to physical senses, so that's a no on the bijection. I have no idea whether those "inner eyes, ears, etc." that link imagination to physical senses are related to qualia – it's so difficult to imagine myself into different minds. Besides, coming up with an objective, clear, non-recursive definition for subjective experience is way above my paygrade. Another random thought that I just had: People with depression sometimes hurt themselves physically, because that's the only way they can still feel something (according to them). Maybe this is related to a dampened subjective experience, which allows only extreme inputs to be experienced? [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument

eli_gottlieb 10y ago
>It's as if there's someone inside my head that experiences and feels what I physically see. No, you only imagine that. And I'm being serious: people who aren't brought up being told that consciousness is like having a little homunculus in your head simply never feel "as if" there was one. >There are qualia like anxiety or restlessness that are not linked to physical senses, so that's a no on the bijection. I would normally call those emotions rather than qualia. Hmmm. Would you say the "qualia-ness" of things comes from the internal perception that the "feelings" are external to the person who feels, and impinge on them? >Another random thought that I just had: People with depression sometimes hurt themselves physically, because that's the only way they can still feel something (according to them). Maybe this is related to a dampened subjective experience, which allows only extreme inputs to be experienced? But dampened affect (dampened emotional signaling in the brain) is already a known and seemingly somewhat understood symptom of depression.
- aninhumer 10y ago
  >people who aren't brought up being told that consciousness is like having a little homunculus in your head simply never feel "as if" there was one. So you're saying people brought up differently are p-zombies? Because that's the only way I can interpret that. Feeling like there's a homonculous is fundamentally what experiencing the world is like for me, and has been since long before I was able to understand complex philosophical questions about conciousness.
  - eli_gottlieb 10y ago
    >So you're saying people brought up differently are p-zombies? No, I'm saying that people brought up differently actually identify our selves with our actual, physical bodies, and don't imagine/visualize a tiny little figurine in our head. We have a different experience of the world, not no experience. To me it seems weirder to say, "When I get bitten by a dog, the little homunculus gets a loud alarm ringing in his little room saying, 'BITTEN BY DOG!'" than "When I get bitten by a dog, its teeth feel sharp and painful."

by adwn 10y ago

eli_gottlieb 10y ago

>It's as if there's someone inside my head that experiences and feels what I physically see. No, you only imagine that. And I'm being serious: people who aren't brought up being told that consciousness is like having a little homunculus in your head simply never feel "as if" there was one. >There are qualia like anxiety or restlessness that are not linked to physical senses, so that's a no on the bijection. I would normally call those emotions rather than qualia. Hmmm. Would you say the "qualia-ness" of things comes from the internal perception that the "feelings" are external to the person who feels, and impinge on them? >Another random thought that I just had: People with depression sometimes hurt themselves physically, because that's the only way they can still feel something (according to them). Maybe this is related to a dampened subjective experience, which allows only extreme inputs to be experienced? But dampened affect (dampened emotional signaling in the brain) is already a known and seemingly somewhat understood symptom of depression.

aninhumer 10y ago
>people who aren't brought up being told that consciousness is like having a little homunculus in your head simply never feel "as if" there was one. So you're saying people brought up differently are p-zombies? Because that's the only way I can interpret that. Feeling like there's a homonculous is fundamentally what experiencing the world is like for me, and has been since long before I was able to understand complex philosophical questions about conciousness.
- eli_gottlieb 10y ago
  >So you're saying people brought up differently are p-zombies? No, I'm saying that people brought up differently actually identify our selves with our actual, physical bodies, and don't imagine/visualize a tiny little figurine in our head. We have a different experience of the world, not no experience. To me it seems weirder to say, "When I get bitten by a dog, the little homunculus gets a loud alarm ringing in his little room saying, 'BITTEN BY DOG!'" than "When I get bitten by a dog, its teeth feel sharp and painful."