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a philosophical zombie behaves in every externally observable way the same as a non-zombie, but the philosophical zombie has no inner life. so if you can observ
by pasquinelli 10y ago
a philosophical zombie behaves in every externally observable way the same as a non-zombie, but the philosophical zombie has no inner life. so if you can observe it in other people, for instance, in what they post on the internet, then it isn't pertinent to the philosophical zombie question. everything you can observe then is equally philosophical zombie like.
- jnicholasp 10y agoI wonder if that's completely true, though: that p-zombies behave in every observable way the same as non-zombies. What about in this very discussion of inner life and zombie-ness? Will a p-zombie claim to have subjective experience, or will they be confused by the concept (maybe along the lines of this other comment I replied to: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11856232 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11856232)
- aninhumer 10y agoWell p-zombies are a hypothetical concept which is usually considered indistinguishable by definition. But yes, it's interesting to consider a degenerate kind of p-zombie which can be detected by its failure to comprehend the concept of qualia. However, I feel like if such p-zombies did exist, there would be far more significant differences, so I feel like some people just having intellectual difficulty with the idea is more likely.
- jnicholasp 10y agoYes, I'm interested in the possible real world situation, which does seem plausible to me. I accept the idea that, in almost every way, an actual human p-zombie would behave indistinguishably from a conscious human, but if we let go of the indistinguishable-by-definition requirement, it does seem possible that the discussion of qualia is one of the very few, perhaps only, places where p-zombies would behave differently than conscious beings. What other significant differences would you expect?
- aninhumer 10y agoI'm not sure I have a great example, I'll try and think of one. But more generally, I just feel like there are so many things we do that are informed by our experiencing qualia, that the idea of a p-zombie that seemingly mimics all of them except understanding the notion of qualia seems intuitively dubious. (Also is this some kind of conciousness Calvinism?)
- jnicholasp 10y agoIt's not clear to me that there would be a meaningful behavioral difference between an entity that feels pain/pleasure from a given behavior, vs. one that "only" registers negative/positive incentive. But, like pretty much everything in this topic, the water is murky and it's hard to tell what is reliable and what isn't. What do you mean by the Calvinism question? Whether the real existence of human p-zombies would parallel the Calvinist doctrine of predestination and there being only a subset of humans who are the elect chosen for paradise? If so.. yeah, maybe?
- aninhumer 10y ago>What do you mean by the Calvinism question? I was kind of throwing out a vague idea/similarity without really thinking it through there... More specifically though, the Calvinist idea that the chosen people are the only ones who will ever be able to understand God. (AIUI)
- jnicholasp 10y agoAh, ok. Yeah, sort of similar: only some "chosen" people might have actual experiences attached to their existence, for better or for worse.
- aninhumer 10y agoPerhaps related is this Slate Star Codex article, which briefly speculates that a god could create a universe where net-negative-utility people are p-zombies: http://slatestarcodex.com/2015/03/15/answer-to-job/ http://slatestarcodex.com/2015/03/15/answer-to-job/