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What should be said is that security only through obscurity is bad. Security through obscurity is fine as long as you're not relying on it. At the worst, it doe
by mikeash 10y ago
What should be said is that security only through obscurity is bad. Security through obscurity is fine as long as you're not relying on it. At the worst, it doesn't hurt, just don't count on it to save your bacon.
- dllthomas 10y ago> At the worst, it doesn't hurt At the worst, it imposes cost for little benefit.
- sametmax 10y agoObscurity almost always drive down script kiddies and generic bots away so the cost is amortized by the ressource you save and can focus on real threats.
- AstralStorm 10y agoOr instead assume that your untested defences are working. Or in case of an obscure algorithm, assume it is good, because it had not been challenged.
- sametmax 10y agoYou will be tested and challenged. Just by a few competent people instead of a lot of noise. Besides, you can always have a honeypot with no obscure defense for a quick beta test if you need to. You'll have your flies quickly.
- dllthomas 10y agoI did not imply that this was every case, or most cases. Parent said "worst case" - you have to be mindful of the cost you are imposing.
- mfoy_ 10y agoThat's exactly what the article is about.
- ethbro 10y agoExactly. Maybe a better way to look at its benefits is by cracking "security" into two components: scalability resistance and penetration resistance. Scalability resistance is the probability of a given vulnerability being successful against your configuration. Penetration resistance is the probability of your configuration being penetrated by an attacker focusing on it. Scalability is a valid security threat as it defines the vulnerability time window due to scarce attacker resources (attack attempts/time unit). Yes, it does and should fail catastrophically -- either the attack is not applicable to your config or it has been adapted and is. But just because plate armor had gaps didn't mean it was a stupid idea...
- wepple 10y agoMy biggest concern with security through obscurity is that it begins to be relied upon as a significant defensive mechanism. the incredible rate at which I see "but we have X" as a reason not to do good security is depressing.
- mikeash 10y agoI totally agree with that. If you do this kind of thing, you have to be absolutely sure that it's never used as an excuse for not having actual security.
- PeterisP 10y agoJust came in from grading a bunch of student-made systems. Several of them were proud of having their passwords secured in the database - by storing unsalted SHA1 or MD5 hashes. It's like going through a checklist of desired features, finding "security" on it and doing any single half-assed thing to check that box.
- ademarre 10y ago> At the worst, it doesn't hurt I do agree with the article, but at its worst, obscurity can hurt. Obscurity can add complexity, and it's said that "complexity is the enemy of security". For example, sysadmins and maintainers could lose track of which layers are security and which are obscurity. In turn, this leads to decisions that compromise security because the maintainers overvalued the obscurity layers.
- zanny 10y agoNot just added complexity, but added sense of false security. To be in a situation where you consider obscurity even a cursory part of your infrastructure is the moment you are relying on it by the nature of considering it even a fraction of total security. It is only reasonable to consider when its both insignificant in the total security stem and you have the willpower of a monk to resist ever considering it valuable.
- jrochkind1 10y agoYep, complexity, the false sense of security you get from an inflated judgement of what it gives you, and the 'opportunity cost' of time you spent devising, implementing, and dealing with it instead of some actual secure protection.
- Natsu 10y agoIt's more like the parts that have to be secret should be small and easily changed (passwords, keys, etc.) rather than your protocols (which are going to be very hard to change). There's no harm in a layer of obscurity over a secure system, but there's a social problem where it's more often used to obscure the workings of insecure systems than anything else. So all things being equal, one would prefer the cipher that's been well-studied by academics without being broken vs. the mystery cipher that claims to use all the most secure cryptographic constructs without giving anyone the details.
- taneq 10y agoI'd take that a step further and say "defense not in depth is bad." Don't rely on any single method (mathematical, steganographic, misdirection, anything) if you want to be really secure.