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> You're assuming the conclusion that consciousness isn't just processing external stimuli with internal state to generate output signals, just a particular for

by adwn 10y ago

> You're assuming the conclusion that consciousness isn't just processing external stimuli with internal state to generate output signals, just a particular form of it. Yes, that is my assumption, because that is what I observe (only in my own mind, of course – I don't know how to observe it in others). I'm not alone, many (most? all?) people are claiming to observe that.

naasking 10y ago
Except: 1. It isn't a valid observation, because you don't actually observe that consciousness is not part of the process of processing external stimuli. At best, you can observe that consciousness exists. 2. It isn't a valid conclusion even if it were a valid observation. Or do you also conclude that water magically breaks pencils and reconstitutes them when they are removed [1]? [1] http://cdn.c.photoshelter.com/img-get/I0000KUS4vG.ZoqQ/s/860/860/Fphoto-24918908C-2RM.jpg http://cdn.c.photoshelter.com/img-get/I0000KUS4vG.ZoqQ/s/860...
- aninhumer 10y ago
  I observe that conciousness exists, and I can conceive of no way to logically deduce its occurrence from any physical processes, nor any way to consider them as the same thing. To me, experience itself is fundamentally a separate thing from any process that might cause it to occur, and I don't know how to conceive of it any other way.
  - naasking 10y ago
    > I can conceive of no way to logically deduce its occurrence from any physical processes, nor any way to consider them as the same thing. That you cannot conceive of it does not make it inconceivable. In fact, scientific theories [1] exist to explain exactly the functional purpose of consciousness. [1] http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500/full http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00...
    - aninhumer 10y ago
      >That you cannot conceive of it does not make it inconceivable. True, but I find it sufficiently difficult to conceive of that I'm not convinced anyone else can. If you claim to be able to, can you explain it to me? To me, saying experience "is" brain processing is like saying the image on the screen at a cinema "is" projector operation. One may cause the other, but they're still separate things. > scientific theories [1] exist to explain exactly the functional purpose of consciousness. But that doesn't explain the mechanism for conciousness to occur, it just explains why it might exist.
      - naasking 10y ago
        > But that doesn't explain the mechanism for conciousness to occur, it just explains why it might exist. It does explain the mechanism actually. The mind builds representations for predictive purposes, it builds a representation of attention because that increases predictive power in achieving goals, a representation of attention is consciousness. Certainly it's not sufficiently detailed such that you can build one, but that's not really needed to make it conceivable.
        aninhumer 10y ago
        That goes some way to explaining the mechanics, but there's still a vital last step needed to take it from a simulation process to an actual experience of that simulation. You seem to be describing that step as "representation of attention", but I'm not sure what that's supposed to mean.
        naasking 10y ago
        Did you read the paper? Take a look at Figure 1 and contrast 1a and 1b. The combination of perceptions you're paying attention to + focusing on a model of yourself paying attention to your perceptions yields subjectivity. Your brain shifting between the signals from your direct perceptions and signals from your model of yourself focusing on your perceptions is the perceptive difference we call subjective experience. I think the description there explains it quite well if that's unsatisfactory. Certainly it's lacking in sufficient detail to build an artificial consciousness, but it's not lacking in empirical data and testable hypotheses. It's also a perfect example of how subjective experience could be an illusion that exists, and yet still convince us that it's in some sense fundamental.

by adwn 10y ago

naasking 10y ago

Except: 1. It isn't a valid observation, because you don't actually observe that consciousness is not part of the process of processing external stimuli. At best, you can observe that consciousness exists. 2. It isn't a valid conclusion even if it were a valid observation. Or do you also conclude that water magically breaks pencils and reconstitutes them when they are removed [1]? [1] http://cdn.c.photoshelter.com/img-get/I0000KUS4vG.ZoqQ/s/860/860/Fphoto-24918908C-2RM.jpg http://cdn.c.photoshelter.com/img-get/I0000KUS4vG.ZoqQ/s/860...

aninhumer 10y ago
I observe that conciousness exists, and I can conceive of no way to logically deduce its occurrence from any physical processes, nor any way to consider them as the same thing. To me, experience itself is fundamentally a separate thing from any process that might cause it to occur, and I don't know how to conceive of it any other way.
- naasking 10y ago
  > I can conceive of no way to logically deduce its occurrence from any physical processes, nor any way to consider them as the same thing. That you cannot conceive of it does not make it inconceivable. In fact, scientific theories [1] exist to explain exactly the functional purpose of consciousness. [1] http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500/full http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00...
  - aninhumer 10y ago
    >That you cannot conceive of it does not make it inconceivable. True, but I find it sufficiently difficult to conceive of that I'm not convinced anyone else can. If you claim to be able to, can you explain it to me? To me, saying experience "is" brain processing is like saying the image on the screen at a cinema "is" projector operation. One may cause the other, but they're still separate things. > scientific theories [1] exist to explain exactly the functional purpose of consciousness. But that doesn't explain the mechanism for conciousness to occur, it just explains why it might exist.
    - naasking 10y ago
      > But that doesn't explain the mechanism for conciousness to occur, it just explains why it might exist. It does explain the mechanism actually. The mind builds representations for predictive purposes, it builds a representation of attention because that increases predictive power in achieving goals, a representation of attention is consciousness. Certainly it's not sufficiently detailed such that you can build one, but that's not really needed to make it conceivable.
      - aninhumer 10y ago
        That goes some way to explaining the mechanics, but there's still a vital last step needed to take it from a simulation process to an actual experience of that simulation. You seem to be describing that step as "representation of attention", but I'm not sure what that's supposed to mean.
        naasking 10y ago
        Did you read the paper? Take a look at Figure 1 and contrast 1a and 1b. The combination of perceptions you're paying attention to + focusing on a model of yourself paying attention to your perceptions yields subjectivity. Your brain shifting between the signals from your direct perceptions and signals from your model of yourself focusing on your perceptions is the perceptive difference we call subjective experience. I think the description there explains it quite well if that's unsatisfactory. Certainly it's lacking in sufficient detail to build an artificial consciousness, but it's not lacking in empirical data and testable hypotheses. It's also a perfect example of how subjective experience could be an illusion that exists, and yet still convince us that it's in some sense fundamental.