I agree - it seems to be another variety of "nothing buttery." I don't see how locating the production of experience in attention schemas (which seem, inasmuch

I agree - it seems to be another variety of "nothing buttery." I don't see how locating the production of experience in attention schemas (which seem, inasmuch as they're scientifically respectable, to be indistinguishable from advanced signal processing) gets us any further with the hard problem of understanding how any subjective experience at all is necessitated or implied by what the brain does functionally. It's often occurred to me that the very difficulty we have discussing the nature of subjective experience (inverse spectrum, etc.) points to some superfluity there - giving you a precise description of retinal state, a color code, the frequencies of light, etc., isn't enough for you to tell whether my experience of red is like yours - but what description would suffice? On this line, I occasionally indulge in the thought that "qualia" are a necessary but irrelevant tokenisation of our experience, a bit like variable names: you need a bucket to put that data in, but the particular name you give to the bucket doesn't matter.