7 ms·

What's incoherent about p-zombies? I can imagine that the nature of conciousness might mean they're not possible, but that doesn't make the concept incoherent.

pas 10y ago
It's not incoherent, just vacuous, because most critics see the difference as nothing. There's nothing they lack. There's no difference between behaving identically and behaving identically and experiencing it. Because if you ask a p-zombie to describe what it experiences (what you feel, etc..) and they tell you that they experience nothing, then there's indeed a difference, so their behavior is not identical, if they lie, then we can spot that with an fMRI, or eventually they somehow have extra information (so they are magical zombies, so eveything is possible).
- aninhumer 10y ago
  Of course there's no observable difference, that's the definition of a pzombie, and the whole point of the concept. Just because we can't observe a lack of consciousness doesn't mean it's not meaningful difference.
  - naasking 10y ago
    Can you point to another such property, whereby it's not observable but is a meangingful difference? If not, why should qualia qualify?
    - aninhumer 10y ago
      I'm not sure how absence of other examples refutes one that exists? Experience is meaningful because it's the difference between saying "ow" and actually suffering.
      - naasking 10y ago
        The question is whether we have justification to believe that it actually exists as a legitimate example. Every other property that we granted such special ontological status has been soundly refuted. Why should I expect this to be any different?
        jnicholasp 10y ago
        > Why should I expect this to be any different? Because you experience it? If you do.. The difference between the idea of qualia and the other properties that we granted special status to and then later refuted, is that in the latter cases we were trying to explain something external that we thought we were observing, whereas with subjective experience we are discussing a phenomenon that we (or at least some of us) directly, infallibly observe. It is not possible for me to be mistaken about whether there is something it is like to be me; it is not possible for me to be mistaken about whether what I experience is what I experience. It is possible for me to be mistaken about whether there is something it is like to be you, because I cannot directly observe your internal experience.
        naasking 10y ago
        > in the latter cases we were trying to explain something external that we thought we were observing, whereas with subjective experience we are discussing a phenomenon that we (or at least some of us) directly, infallibly observe. There's no distinction. When I see what looks like a broken pencil sitting in a glass of water, I am observing exactly what I describe. The reason the pencil looks broken is not because I should grant water some magical powers to break and reconstitute pencils, but turned out to be refracted light. Analogously, I can observe that I do have subjective experience, but why should I assume that the reason I have subjective experience is different than all other observables? Why would it be some irreducible, unobservable quality? You seem to be claiming that the existence of subjective experience is reason enough alone, and I don't see how that follows.
        deleted 10y ago
        [deleted]
    - catawbasam 10y ago
      Imagine you witness a situation where a young man releases a heavy weight. The weight falls and crushes a child playing below. Your child. The young man happens to be mute. If he could speak, he would tell you he did it on purpose, and was glad he killed your child. But he's mute. You will never know he meant to do it. Does his (unobservable) intent make any difference to you?
      - corecoder 10y ago
        Bad example: "unobservable" and "we were looking the other way" are not the same thing. Have you scanned the young man's brain activity as you interrogate him? Have you done that with all future technology? By the way, any chances the young man can write? Here's a tricky one: did I ate spaghetti three years ago? You don't know and very probably you'll never know, but it's an empirical question nonetheless, and who knows, maybe tomorrow you'll think of a way to actually find out, or you'll stumble on some evidence you didn't know was there.
      - naasking 10y ago
        > Does his (unobservable) intent make any difference to you? Only in so far as one's intent describes one's view of others. Malicious intent of the sort you describe entails danger towards others, which is observable.
  - pas 10y ago
    Then the debate seems pretty nonsensical. Even though it's touted as somehow having appeal. ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#7 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#7 ) The concept is used as an argument against physicalism, because it might be logically possible (concievable). Maybe I'm just testifying about how closed my mind is, but to me the answer is a simple no, they are not [not even coherent], end of debate, go think about ethics, at least that seems hard. Dualists are so full of abstract possibilities since Descartes that they are somehow overlooking the difference between imagination-fueled word-soup of consciousness and real problems of consciousness. Qualia is the noise in our cognition when our brain tries to make sense of the noise in our feelings when we try to consider what's this feeling consicous thing. It's real, and it's nothing, and it's pretty personal, because some people don't really care about it, others build entire philo departments on it :)
    - aninhumer 10y ago
      >The concept is used as an argument against physicalism, I don't see it as an argument against anything, it's just an interesting philosophical hypothetical made plausible by our inability to observe conciousness. I could certainly see an argument that they're not that interesting on a more practical level (since by definition, we can never apply any conclusions made about them) but I don't understand the suggestion that they're logically incoherent.
  - corecoder 10y ago
    How is this discussion any different if we replace consciousness (meaning "actual" consciousness) with, say, Grace, virtue, soul, etc?
    - aninhumer 10y ago
      Because we can directly observe our own conciousness, therefore we each know that there is at least one instance of it.

pas 10y ago

It's not incoherent, just vacuous, because most critics see the difference as nothing. There's nothing they lack. There's no difference between behaving identically and behaving identically and experiencing it. Because if you ask a p-zombie to describe what it experiences (what you feel, etc..) and they tell you that they experience nothing, then there's indeed a difference, so their behavior is not identical, if they lie, then we can spot that with an fMRI, or eventually they somehow have extra information (so they are magical zombies, so eveything is possible).

aninhumer 10y ago
Of course there's no observable difference, that's the definition of a pzombie, and the whole point of the concept. Just because we can't observe a lack of consciousness doesn't mean it's not meaningful difference.
- naasking 10y ago
  Can you point to another such property, whereby it's not observable but is a meangingful difference? If not, why should qualia qualify?
  - aninhumer 10y ago
    I'm not sure how absence of other examples refutes one that exists? Experience is meaningful because it's the difference between saying "ow" and actually suffering.
    - naasking 10y ago
      The question is whether we have justification to believe that it actually exists as a legitimate example. Every other property that we granted such special ontological status has been soundly refuted. Why should I expect this to be any different?
      - jnicholasp 10y ago
        > Why should I expect this to be any different? Because you experience it? If you do.. The difference between the idea of qualia and the other properties that we granted special status to and then later refuted, is that in the latter cases we were trying to explain something external that we thought we were observing, whereas with subjective experience we are discussing a phenomenon that we (or at least some of us) directly, infallibly observe. It is not possible for me to be mistaken about whether there is something it is like to be me; it is not possible for me to be mistaken about whether what I experience is what I experience. It is possible for me to be mistaken about whether there is something it is like to be you, because I cannot directly observe your internal experience.
        naasking 10y ago
        > in the latter cases we were trying to explain something external that we thought we were observing, whereas with subjective experience we are discussing a phenomenon that we (or at least some of us) directly, infallibly observe. There's no distinction. When I see what looks like a broken pencil sitting in a glass of water, I am observing exactly what I describe. The reason the pencil looks broken is not because I should grant water some magical powers to break and reconstitute pencils, but turned out to be refracted light. Analogously, I can observe that I do have subjective experience, but why should I assume that the reason I have subjective experience is different than all other observables? Why would it be some irreducible, unobservable quality? You seem to be claiming that the existence of subjective experience is reason enough alone, and I don't see how that follows.
        deleted 10y ago
        [deleted]
  - catawbasam 10y ago
    Imagine you witness a situation where a young man releases a heavy weight. The weight falls and crushes a child playing below. Your child. The young man happens to be mute. If he could speak, he would tell you he did it on purpose, and was glad he killed your child. But he's mute. You will never know he meant to do it. Does his (unobservable) intent make any difference to you?
    - corecoder 10y ago
      Bad example: "unobservable" and "we were looking the other way" are not the same thing. Have you scanned the young man's brain activity as you interrogate him? Have you done that with all future technology? By the way, any chances the young man can write? Here's a tricky one: did I ate spaghetti three years ago? You don't know and very probably you'll never know, but it's an empirical question nonetheless, and who knows, maybe tomorrow you'll think of a way to actually find out, or you'll stumble on some evidence you didn't know was there.
    - naasking 10y ago
      > Does his (unobservable) intent make any difference to you? Only in so far as one's intent describes one's view of others. Malicious intent of the sort you describe entails danger towards others, which is observable.
- pas 10y ago
  Then the debate seems pretty nonsensical. Even though it's touted as somehow having appeal. ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#7 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#7 ) The concept is used as an argument against physicalism, because it might be logically possible (concievable). Maybe I'm just testifying about how closed my mind is, but to me the answer is a simple no, they are not [not even coherent], end of debate, go think about ethics, at least that seems hard. Dualists are so full of abstract possibilities since Descartes that they are somehow overlooking the difference between imagination-fueled word-soup of consciousness and real problems of consciousness. Qualia is the noise in our cognition when our brain tries to make sense of the noise in our feelings when we try to consider what's this feeling consicous thing. It's real, and it's nothing, and it's pretty personal, because some people don't really care about it, others build entire philo departments on it :)
  - aninhumer 10y ago
    >The concept is used as an argument against physicalism, I don't see it as an argument against anything, it's just an interesting philosophical hypothetical made plausible by our inability to observe conciousness. I could certainly see an argument that they're not that interesting on a more practical level (since by definition, we can never apply any conclusions made about them) but I don't understand the suggestion that they're logically incoherent.
- corecoder 10y ago
  How is this discussion any different if we replace consciousness (meaning "actual" consciousness) with, say, Grace, virtue, soul, etc?
  - aninhumer 10y ago
    Because we can directly observe our own conciousness, therefore we each know that there is at least one instance of it.