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Doctors don't need the threat of tort to have an economic incentive to oversupply health care, while consumers of health care have a significant asymmetric info
by barrkel 17y ago
Doctors don't need the threat of tort to have an economic incentive to oversupply health care, while consumers of health care have a significant asymmetric information disadvantage, so they cannot necessarily contradict their doctor's advice.
Meanwhile, non-mandatory health insurance, in the absence of other factors, is a recipe for adverse selection.
- SamAtt 17y agoIf you're going to take the point that doctors are dishonest than pretty much anything goes so I don't see your point as being valid. But assuming doctors are professionals with a degree of integrity the only reason they'd over treat is if they felt they could lose their practice for not doing so (and if they knew other doctors felt the same way and would over treat in the same way) As for your last point i can't really refute it because you didn't really back it up and if it were obviously true than the health debate would be settled already.
- barrkel 17y agoIf you're going to take the point that incentives don't matter, you're going to have to back it up, because it sounds like you're saying that capitalism - the profit motive - doesn't work. Is ordering an extra test - just in case - malpractice? Is not doing another scan, because it's expensive, morally superior? Are you saying that we should expect economically efficient care from doctors out of their benevolence? "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Are doctors different? Adverse selection is also a pretty basic economics concept. You can read more about its applicability to health insurance here - and cites more: http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2574.html http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2574.html