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The other problem is many people wont have pre-existing copies of the required private key available. If your attacker is in a position to MitM your download of
by bigiain 10y ago
The other problem is many people wont have pre-existing copies of the required private key available. If your attacker is in a position to MitM your download of a signed binary, they're probably also in a position to MitM your retrieval of the public key. SSL/TLS certainly helps there (at least the attacker then also needs to be capable of acquiring root CA signed TLS certs for the download site and any readily available PGP key sites. It wont slow the NSA down much - but it will help against the guy with the WiFi Pineapple in your local Starbucks…)
- merijnv 10y ago> The other problem is many people wont have pre-existing copies of the required private key available. We're talking about software updates, you embed the key INSIDE the software to avoid this problem.
- bigiain 10y agoAhhh, good catch... Agreed. (Though with my overly-cynical hat on, I now just suspect you've only moved the problem to the previous update's authentication - and recursively back to the initial download. How do you protect against the initial download being MitMed and having an attacker's public key inserted - this is functionally the same as HSTS - if you can MitM the first visit you win...)
- deno 10y agoYou need to trust something at some point, be it TLS session and the server you’re talking with, or an SHA csum you verify with a friend (or using PGP’s WoT), and even further the process(es) and person(s) responsible for actually signing the releases. As for “moving the problem,” it is worth it. Because it’s easier to verify the origin of the software once, then for every update. If there’s a new vulnerability in TLS this will only affect new installations. Verifying (& signing) packages offline is much more anti-fragile.