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That's in my proposal for a secure or private phone that I drop on people trying to build one. Hopefully it will get in a successful product at some point. Need
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
That's in my proposal for a secure or private phone that I drop on people trying to build one. Hopefully it will get in a successful product at some point. Need one for mic, front camera, rear camera, and radios. Might compromise to have a physical switch for mic and radios with something inside phone (eg a jumper) to turn off others. I want to be sure I can cut actual power to mic and wireless, though.
- drdaeman 10y agoIf your threat model concerns with hardware/firmware exploits, then you can't trust the physical switches unless they cut all the wires - and unless you can validate that this is what they do. Theoretically speaking, a malicious (or threatened/persuaded/forced) manufacturer may implement a non-standard way to power the supposedly disconnected component using still-connected wiring, to be used for a special occasions. /tinfoil
- nickpsecurity 10y agoYou should see my full write-up: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10906999 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10906999 I went into detail on what it takes on hardware side: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10468624 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10468624
- willholloway 10y agoAgreed, which is why I believe sound proof cases are the only sensible approach, and work with all current consumer devices.
- sametmax 10y agoThis is why I got a shutter on m laptop camera. It's mechanicl, and I can see it's on or off. It should be a legal obligation to provide those, for camera and mic.
- markokrajnc 10y agoRegarding "legal obligation": in some countries the government may be the second main user of your camera and mic - next to you...
- sametmax 10y agoThis is sadly true.
- jimhefferon 10y agoI want a DPDT switch that sits between the mic and the rest of the phone. That seems do-able to me. I use masking tape over the camera, so I'm looking for a similar microphone solution. (I don't want it inside the case, since I want to be able to flip the switch conveniently. Likewise, removing the battery is not what I want.)
- MrMid 10y agoWell, I just.. disconnected the mic in my laptop, the day it arrived (there is no webcam). As phones are concerned, I use my trusty SE ELM featurephone, so I'm not very worried about Googles, Facebooks, Samsunsungs...
- Canada 10y agoI'd also buy such a phone. The switches to toggle each radio and sensor could be behind the removable back panel. I wish it were possible to easily disable in software mobile service without also disabling wifi and bluetooth as well.
- digi_owl 10y agoAt least on my Huawei P6 i can set it to flight mode and then turn back on wifi and bluetooth. Actually i have used the thing more like a PDA than a phone, as i have a well functioning HSPA capable featurephone that i pair up if ever i need data on the go.
- morganvachon 10y ago> i have a well functioning HSPA capable featurephone Make and model, please? I've been searching for something like that for a while now. Everything I've found is either carrier-specific, doesn't allow tethering, or is 2G only.
- digi_owl 10y agoLong since discontinued, sadly. Its a SonyEricsson C702.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoYou mean it's a soft-switch that tells you it does that. You have no idea if the radio is actually running at any time or not. That plus their reliability issues are why I don't like soft-switches.
- dredmorbius 10y agoSell a micless phone. Actually, it's a tablet, and if you want it to go into surveillance / phone mode, you plug in your own goddamend mic. Most headsets have one. Alternatively: a phone whose "off" mode is a battery eject.
- majewsky 10y agoRe battery eject: How can you be sure that the removable battery is the only one?
- dredmorbius 10y agoFair point. Proofs are hard, but on a mass-market device, considerable secondary storage would be fairly evident in a teardown. Microcurrent devices fed by a small cap or disguised secondary battery might function. But you'd have very limited capabilities. You might well ask how sure you are that there's not a secondary microphone on the device, to which I can only suggest you cannot be too paranoid.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoBrilliant. Never even occurred to me. People often use headsets, wired or wireless, for the mic. Can just not enable audio unless one is plugged in. That's so easy to verify. Thanks for stating the obvious to my overly-complex mind. :)
- dredmorbius 10y ago:) I've always found built-in/integrated cameras/mics to represent tremendous negative value. 1. I cannot unambiguously disable them. 2. I cannot upgrade / swap them readily for something better. Aftermarket/detachable just seems such an obvious alternative. And yeah, a simpler solution to a hard problem ;-)
- edwintorok 10y agoSee slide 30 on this Neo900 presentation: http://neo900.org/stuff/ohsw2014/ohsw2014.pdf http://neo900.org/stuff/ohsw2014/ohsw2014.pdf Also see the various kill switches on the block diagram (GPS kill, modem monitor, mic not directly attached to modem (so you could probably send fake audio/silence),etc: http://neo900.org/stuff/block-diagrams/neo900/neo900.html http://neo900.org/stuff/block-diagrams/neo900/neo900.html See slides 16 through 23 here for some details on the modem/audio monitoring/separation: http://neo900.org/stuff/cccamp15/ccc2015talk/talk.pdf http://neo900.org/stuff/cccamp15/ccc2015talk/talk.pdf Would this meet some of your criteria? If there is something missing you can discuss with the people involved (on IRC usually): http://neo900.org/contact http://neo900.org/contact
- nickpsecurity 10y agoIt meets some of my criteria. They're doing good work. Gotta ditch that TI processor when possible. Need some hardware and software modifications. However, actual switches for power and audio coming through Linux part are positives. Removes some low-hanging fruit.
- Bromskloss 10y ago> my proposal for a secure or private phone that I drop on people trying to build one Can we see it?
- nickpsecurity 10y agoHere's my write-up on securing Tor that shows issues and mitigations from high-assurance security in action with my own style: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/identifying_dre.html#c6678915 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/identifying_d... Here's one write-up of similar methods applied to mobile: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/06/blackphone.html#c6673423 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/06/blackphone.ht... Here's some links to HW and SW techniques that might be used in SOC to knock out the 0-days: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11848132 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11848132 Note: You can see difference between few in real security on HW side. Mainstream, faux security immediately says IOMMU, stateless, whatever. High-assurance, real security is concerned with segmentation, pointer protection, making memory untrusted, TCB effects, optionally timing of ISA operations, and so on. Apps + their CPUs get hit all over. Securing one takes more than a mere IOMMU or something. ;)