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He probably couldn't without raising alarms. As administrator to the SharePoint site he had many means to access (and copy) the files contained therein (from th

He probably couldn't without raising alarms. As administrator to the SharePoint site he had many means to access (and copy) the files contained therein (from the servers themselves) but to make a big copy of his emails would require very risky operations on his personal workstation. A device that is probably intricately monitored.

nickpsecurity 10y ago
Yeah, the stuff was probably extremely hard: http://www.amazon.com/Cable-Matters-113051-Monitor-Splitter/dp/B005H3I38G http://www.amazon.com/Cable-Matters-113051-Monitor-Splitter/... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4dCIZAXceQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4dCIZAXceQ Really, difficult. ;)
- woodman 10y ago
  The concern is a plausible cover for action. Your suggested solution would be a little difficult to explain away - especially considering the kind of coworkers you'd have at the NSA. Instead of explaining why you're archiving all your mail, you'd have to explain the cabling, capture card, massive video files...
  - nickpsecurity 10y ago
    He connected on monitored systems to all kinds of servers under several credentials to steal their files. You think a hidden camera on his chest aimed at his monitor or phone just angled in its direction is too much risk, though?
    - woodman 10y ago
      Yes. There are a lot of rational explanations for why you'd break security protocols, there is no good reason to come into work wearing a wire. Would you rather have to explain a login to IT security, or explain the pinhole camera taped to your chest - after a newly instituted random wanding takes place?
      - nickpsecurity 10y ago
        There is not a single, rationale reason why one guy would be mass downloading files under several people's names on his personal machine. Whereas, wearing a wire long enough to look at a few emails entails almost no risk in comparison. There will be nobody noticing it unless you're very careless. You will also leave no records. There's about no comparison between screenshoting some emails and conning employees out of passwords then mass downloading TS files. My suggestion is WAY lower risk. Worked for CIA and KGB whole Cold War, goo. ;)
        woodman 10y ago
        I know that you have a good grasp on security, not only is it in your name - but we've discussed the issue before... so the position you're taking on this is surprising. You've never seen an employee blatantly violate security policies in order to meet a deadline, or just because they're way out of their depth? He was writing a unit test that ran in a production environment, there - stupid reason that gets you fired but doesn't result in the FBI landing on you like a ton of bricks. This is kind of a silly discussion though, Snowden was in a very good position to be aware of the risks for his selected course of action. Cover for action is a tradecraft phrase - the CIA and KGB recognize the importance of running an op on more that wishful thinking and luck. The only reason why miniature cameras are associated with them is because of embarrassing public failures, not because that is their MO.
        nickpsecurity 10y ago
        I just said in another comment he could've done it in many ways that don't involve a camera. It's one among many. Overall point is he was moving massive, unauthorized data from his computer to HD's or something. He could've moved some emails, too. If not due to security, he could sneak photos of a handful of emails. Cover or not given he was about to crash and burn his whole life. He could save them for last.
        vidarh 10y ago
        Do you know how the NSA internal systems operate? Unless you have insider info, I don't see how you can be so sure what risks are involved. It depends entirely on the setup. E.g. my very, very cursory contact with military computer systems involve visiting offices where access to the classified data and e-mail were physically separated onto different computers and different networks, maintained by different people working in different locations. It's very possible to have the run of one network and not be able to be sure of how closely he was monitored on the other. As for taking photos, on one of the contracting gigs I did that involve entirely unclassified jobs at a research institute nothing like the NSA, I was assigned a full time babysitter during the contract. The guy even waited outside the toilets when I had to go, because they were not allowed to let me go anywhere at all alone. These places take security seriously. It is not at all a given that Snowden had reasonable expectation of being in a position where he could take pictures without someone seeing it. That he was able to do other things is not a good reason for him to take additional risk. On the contrary - it may have been good reason for him to be particularly careful about appearing squeaky clean in other ways to improve his odds if he had to explain away something else.
- gherkin0 10y ago
  Yeah, I'm sure he would've raised no suspicions whatsoever by taking snapshots of his NSA workstation screen with a camera. /s
  - nickpsecurity 10y ago
    He wouldn't have if he did it right. Security was very lax if you've followed anything about the situation. Whereas, I've done exactly this in a higher security setting. I'm not speculating. He can bug his computer. He can hide executables tgat copy it to disks. He can screenshot it to disks. He can photo/video the screen. Examples abound. And remember he's a trained, ex-CIA spy. Not some idiot that cant pull off fieldcraft 101. He just failed to collect evidence one way or another for a key claim.

nickpsecurity 10y ago

Yeah, the stuff was probably extremely hard: http://www.amazon.com/Cable-Matters-113051-Monitor-Splitter/dp/B005H3I38G http://www.amazon.com/Cable-Matters-113051-Monitor-Splitter/... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4dCIZAXceQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4dCIZAXceQ Really, difficult. ;)

woodman 10y ago
The concern is a plausible cover for action. Your suggested solution would be a little difficult to explain away - especially considering the kind of coworkers you'd have at the NSA. Instead of explaining why you're archiving all your mail, you'd have to explain the cabling, capture card, massive video files...
- nickpsecurity 10y ago
  He connected on monitored systems to all kinds of servers under several credentials to steal their files. You think a hidden camera on his chest aimed at his monitor or phone just angled in its direction is too much risk, though?
  - woodman 10y ago
    Yes. There are a lot of rational explanations for why you'd break security protocols, there is no good reason to come into work wearing a wire. Would you rather have to explain a login to IT security, or explain the pinhole camera taped to your chest - after a newly instituted random wanding takes place?
    - nickpsecurity 10y ago
      There is not a single, rationale reason why one guy would be mass downloading files under several people's names on his personal machine. Whereas, wearing a wire long enough to look at a few emails entails almost no risk in comparison. There will be nobody noticing it unless you're very careless. You will also leave no records. There's about no comparison between screenshoting some emails and conning employees out of passwords then mass downloading TS files. My suggestion is WAY lower risk. Worked for CIA and KGB whole Cold War, goo. ;)
      - woodman 10y ago
        I know that you have a good grasp on security, not only is it in your name - but we've discussed the issue before... so the position you're taking on this is surprising. You've never seen an employee blatantly violate security policies in order to meet a deadline, or just because they're way out of their depth? He was writing a unit test that ran in a production environment, there - stupid reason that gets you fired but doesn't result in the FBI landing on you like a ton of bricks. This is kind of a silly discussion though, Snowden was in a very good position to be aware of the risks for his selected course of action. Cover for action is a tradecraft phrase - the CIA and KGB recognize the importance of running an op on more that wishful thinking and luck. The only reason why miniature cameras are associated with them is because of embarrassing public failures, not because that is their MO.
        nickpsecurity 10y ago
        I just said in another comment he could've done it in many ways that don't involve a camera. It's one among many. Overall point is he was moving massive, unauthorized data from his computer to HD's or something. He could've moved some emails, too. If not due to security, he could sneak photos of a handful of emails. Cover or not given he was about to crash and burn his whole life. He could save them for last.
        vidarh 10y ago
        Do you know how the NSA internal systems operate? Unless you have insider info, I don't see how you can be so sure what risks are involved. It depends entirely on the setup. E.g. my very, very cursory contact with military computer systems involve visiting offices where access to the classified data and e-mail were physically separated onto different computers and different networks, maintained by different people working in different locations. It's very possible to have the run of one network and not be able to be sure of how closely he was monitored on the other. As for taking photos, on one of the contracting gigs I did that involve entirely unclassified jobs at a research institute nothing like the NSA, I was assigned a full time babysitter during the contract. The guy even waited outside the toilets when I had to go, because they were not allowed to let me go anywhere at all alone. These places take security seriously. It is not at all a given that Snowden had reasonable expectation of being in a position where he could take pictures without someone seeing it. That he was able to do other things is not a good reason for him to take additional risk. On the contrary - it may have been good reason for him to be particularly careful about appearing squeaky clean in other ways to improve his odds if he had to explain away something else.
gherkin0 10y ago
Yeah, I'm sure he would've raised no suspicions whatsoever by taking snapshots of his NSA workstation screen with a camera. /s
- nickpsecurity 10y ago
  He wouldn't have if he did it right. Security was very lax if you've followed anything about the situation. Whereas, I've done exactly this in a higher security setting. I'm not speculating. He can bug his computer. He can hide executables tgat copy it to disks. He can screenshot it to disks. He can photo/video the screen. Examples abound. And remember he's a trained, ex-CIA spy. Not some idiot that cant pull off fieldcraft 101. He just failed to collect evidence one way or another for a key claim.