3 ms·
Nonce-exposing, not nonce-using. If I understand correctly, the idea is to have the api securely generate nonces behind the scenes; that is, E(K,M) is not deter
by andrewflnr 10y ago
Nonce-exposing, not nonce-using. If I understand correctly, the idea is to have the api securely generate nonces behind the scenes; that is, E(K,M) is not deterministic. In a high-level api for people who just need to move data from Alice to Bob securely, this seems reasonable.
- amluto 10y agoI goofed with this comment -- it was supposed to be a reply to a sdrapkin's comment, not a reply to the article. Not quite sure how I did that. Inferno, which sdrapkin cited as an example of crypto done right, offers this API: public static byte[] Encrypt(byte[] masterKey, ArraySegment<byte> plaintext, ArraySegment<byte>? salt = null) The docs suggest: The "salt" parameter can include Additional Data (AD) or its hash - which will also be authenticated. This is, in my opinion, not okay as a high-level easy-to-use primitive, as it leaks information if you don't properly use the salt. EDIT: I read the source (https://github.com/sdrapkin/SecurityDriven.Inferno/blob/master/EtM_CBC.cs#L62 https://github.com/sdrapkin/SecurityDriven.Inferno/blob/mast...), and Inferno's primitive is randomized. This avoids the info leak, but it's likely to be a decent amount slower as a result, and the primitive needs a good RNG. As a result, it might be vulnerable to failure if the application uses fork(), it's awkward to implement on some embedded platforms, etc. The point of nonce-misuse-resistant encryption is to reduce the damage from nonce reuse, not to give you an excuse to ignore nonces entirely for encryption of arbitrary data.
- sdrapkin 10y agoI've read the source too. You are strangely looking at EtM_CBC, which is not Inferno's primary mode. Inferno uses EtM_CTR for the "Encrypt" signature you cite. The raw CBC mode is already nonce-misuse-resistant (reveals common prefix), and thus is better than raw CTR from NMR perspective. If you want to critique Inferno's NMR properties, you should target its primary EtM_CTR primitive, rather than EtM_CBC. "vulnerable to failure if the application uses fork()" - I strongly suspect that your comfort-zone is c/c++/Linux/*nix, and not .NET framework and Windows. You failure scenario does not apply to Inferno. If CSRNG is "awkward to implement on some embedded platforms" then it is a platform problem, not Inferno's. Inferno is designed to take full advantage of plentiful (ie. high-quality/cheap/fast) cryptographically-strong randomness available to .NET framework on Windows. You question Inferno's speed - performance is in the eye of the benchmark beholder - but I doubt you have run any (ie. this is likely FUD). Based on the benchmarks I've run, Inferno is very fast. Inferno does not ignore nonces - it force-randomizes them internally to the maximum extent (320 bits of entropy). This creates a nonce-misuse-resitant design which eliminates user-supplied nonces, and does not break even under a faulty CSRNG producing a lot less entropy than it should.