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ZumoDrive rolls a hard six
- cperciva 17y agoI feel bad about bashing a YC company -- even though I'm not part of YC, I feel that I've been on news.YC for long enough to be at least somewhat part of the YC community -- but seriously, this is your idea of security? I'm sure you can do better.
- pvg 17y agoDon't. The only thing I'd suggest is the disclaimer "I'm just the author of a competing service -- Tarsnap. [...]" belongs at the top. It doesn't invalidate your points but if there's any reason to perceive a conflict of interest, the sensible thing is to get it out of the way first, rather than as an aside at the end.
- paraschopra 17y agoYup, honestly, the post is really good but the plug at the end gave a linkbait flavor to the whole thing.
- DougBTX 17y agoMy reaction was, "Oh, this is cperciva's blog, that man knows his stuff."
- constantinople 17y agoAgreed but few things are most distasteful than technological catfighting.
- jhancock 17y agoI don't see this as a cat fight. People using online backup services are being sold "security". Not all users care about, much less understand, security to the extent that user of tarsnap do, but users should know if a product's marketing matches the reality of the product. It is common in most industries for a competitor to point out these gaps. Colin provided a tasteful opposing argument to ZumoDrive's marketing, IMO.
- nailer 17y agoAlso a lot of other cloud storage providers encrypt the data so only their clients have access to it: Nasuni does this too.
- rythie 17y agoAgreed. I feel the author conned me while reading it, when all the while it was a pitch for his own product.
- cperciva 17y agoI wasn't sure whether to put that at the top -- one the one hand it would solve the problem you describe, but on the other hand, most of the readers of my blog already know about Tarsnap and it rather interferes with the "flow" of my text. But judging by the comments here, it sounds like I came to the wrong conclusion -- I'll edit that post to state my conflict at the top.
- shrughes 17y agoThe problem I have with ZumoDrive's security claims is not that they're insecure -- they sort of have to be, given the feature set they have -- it's just that their claims are theatrical. They could make things so that data can only be accessed right when the user enters their password, without having to give up the cross-user deduplication that I presume they'd perform, but ultimately, if you want a convenient online storage service, with data meant to be shared across computers, and browsable online or in other convenient circumstances, going with full-blown Tarsnap-like security is going to be a pain.
- JoachimSchipper 17y agoI admit that deduplication isn't going to work if you encrypt everything with different keys, but why can a Tarsnap-like design not be "convenient" in the way you seem to use the word? A few good (encrypted!) indices are all you need. You could write something like a WebDAV proxy if you want to make it "universally" accessible. (Of course, Tarsnap isn't designed for this, but that doesn't mean that it couldn't be.)
- briansmith 17y agoYou upload the file with computer A, and you want to download it with computer B. Computer B has to be able to decrypt the file that was encrypted on computer A. If you want this to be doable without keys being installed computer B ahead of time (for example, you want to be able to go over to your friend's house and download the file from his computer, using just the web browser), then the server has to know the encryption key. For my own personal use, I prefer something more like Tarsnap's or Mozy's design, but the benefits of ZumoDrive's design definitely would be appealing for many users.
- evgen 17y agoNo, computer B just needs some way to access the encrypted key for the files from computer A. You can either have computer A create a master key that gets encrypted with a user-supplied password and then handed out to any client that passes a "does user A approve of this transfer" check, or you can use fine-grained ACLs or capabilities similar to what is done in something like Tahoe-LAFS. The server does not need to see unencrypted data in either case.
- smanek 17y agoWhat's wrong with using client-authenticated SSL with predistributed keys (and only trusting the pre-distributed keys)? I trust a well-tested TLS implementation more than I trust whatever crypto I can manage to write myself. Also, to provide the features ZumoDrive does, they have to have access to your unencrypted data - don't they? They aren't even attempting to keep your data safe from their server (and never claim to). It's not the trade-off I would chose for my company's production data (my company - Postabon - uses Tarsnap for that ;-)) - but it's perfectly valid for my low-sensitivity personal files (I use Dropbox for most of my personal stuff). (Incidentally, as someone with active TS clearance who has written 'military grade' code currently deployed on JWICS, 'military grade' doesn't mean that much in terms of crypto - at least for the 'application level' stuff I worked on ...).
- cperciva 17y agoWhat's wrong with using client-authenticated SSL with predistributed keys (and only trusting the pre-distributed keys)? If you set up your own CA and you distribute a CA keyring with only that CA key, you avoid the what-about-China problem. But you still have a heck of a lot of moving parts which can break. (EDIT: Also, I'm 99% certain that ZumoDrive isn't doing this.) I trust a well-tested TLS implementation more than I trust whatever crypto I can manage to write myself. You should come to my conference talk, "everything you need to know about crypto in 1 hour". :-) Also, to provide the features ZumoDrive does, they have to have access to your unencrypted data - don't they? To be honest, I haven't looked at exactly what features ZumoDrive has. I just saw them making bogus claims about their security, and decided to call them on it.
- smanek 17y agoIf you set up your own CA and you distribute a CA keyring with only that CA key, you avoid the what-about-China problem. But you still have a heck of a lot of moving parts which can break. It's not fun - but I have done it before. I would still contend that setting up a CA and distributing a keyring is easier and less likely to be insecure than trying to write actual secure crypto code (at least for most normal coders like myself - people like djb or cperciva are excluded ;-)). You should come to my conference talk, "everything you need to know about crypto in 1 hour". :-) Boy, I wish something like that existed. Every time I'm starting to feel like I know something, I learn about a new type of attack (a side-channel that leaks more than I thought possible, a length-extension that apparently violates the oversimplified hash properties I knew, etc) that makes me feel like an idiot.
- tsally 17y agoEvery time I see one of your websites I think of a homeless guy holding a sign that says: "will trade strong crypto for good web design". :-p
- deleted 17y ago[deleted]
- ableal 17y agoI am reminded of these old lines by Neal Stephenson: The Hole Hawg is a drill made by the Milwaukee Tool Company. If you look in a typical hardware store you may find smaller Milwaukee drills but not the Hole Hawg, which is too powerful and too expensive for homeowners. The Hole Hawg does not have the pistol-like design of a cheap homeowner's drill. It is a cube of solid metal with a handle sticking out of one face and a chuck mounted in another. The cube contains a disconcertingly potent electric motor.[...] I have no objections to beautiful design externals, but would prefer it dresses up good engineering instead of hiding shoddy innards. Actually, the other day a nice Mac online backup app showed up here, and my private thought was that the author and Colin could probably profit from a collaboration.
- tptacek 17y agoIf you're going to write an article overtly bashing your competitors, you should do better than picking on them for saying "military-grade cryptography". The fact of the matter is that the only real differentiator between Zumodrive and Tarsnap is the integrity of the code that implements the service. Nobody is going to break TLS in order to get Zumodrive data. Cryptography has exactly one implication for attackers: it is an opportunity to cause unexpected things to happen at the target. This is only possible when you do something unusual with cryptography. From that perspective, Tarsnap worries me more than Zumodrive: there is nothing that is going to go wrong with their SSL implementation that I'll be able to take advantage of, and I can't say that about your contraption. (Here you will inevitably point to a string of OpenSSL security advisories to attempt to refute this point. You won't be convincing, for two reasons. First, it's been a long time since someone found an OpenSSL flaw that would move the dials for an attacker in a basic one-way-authenticated SSL session. Second, no security practitioner would trust your code more than OpenSSL, which, while terrible, has had something like 15 years of audit exposure.) From what I can see, nobody professional has stated that they've looked at Zumodrive or Tarsnap. I'm pulling for you, Colin, but you haven't earned the right to impugn other people's security. You should rewrite your article. Instead of trying to tear down a competitor, you should write an article about how Tarsnap is different from other backup solutions. You should write about how your threat model is different, and how you believe you're the only solution that has been architected to encrypt backup data in such a way that even the hosting providers can't access it. You blew a bunch of credibility by trying to make these points while sniping at a competitor. Instead of thinking about how great Tarsnap is, I'm left questioning the objectivity of every line you wrote. What a waste! There's a reason every business book in the universe says not to disparage competitors. Go read one!
- tsuraan 17y agoYou completely missed the point. To access data from ZumoDrive (according to the article), all that you need is access to the EC2 instance that hosts the service. There's no need to break any encryption because ZumoDrive apparently uses SSL to provide link-level encryption, and then it encrypts the data that it gets onto the S3 storage. The fact that there is a cleartext copy of the data under the control of the service is the problem; anybody with access to ZumoDrive can get that cleartext data. With tarsnap, the data is encrypted on the client machine, and only the client ever sees the cleartext. That's the key difference.
- drm237 17y agoHow can you possibly compare a consumer service ment to make it easy to access files across multiple devices with a backup solution ment only for the most technical people? Can you imaging if ZumoDrive had you (or your parents?!) generate your own crypto keys which you would then have to manually transfer to your iphone when you wanted to access your data on it? Think a web interface sounds nice? Great, just login with your username, password, and crypto keys (that hopefully you have memorized), so we can decrypt your files and render a web interface. The article makes some decent point and if you're storing the nuclear launch codes, yeah, don't put them in ZumoDrive. Otherwise, the article would have been much more useful if it suggested alternatives that would still operate within ZumoDrive's existing user experience.
- cperciva 17y agoI wasn't comparing ZumoDrive to Tarsnap (except in the very last paragraph). I was comparing ZumoDrive to their own propaganda.
- shabda 17y ago> So as you can see, the Cylons have many hurdles to overcome in order to take over ZumoDrive and your data. Isnt that essentially wrong? The cycolns have to overcome exactly ONE hurdle to steal the data. (Not a security guy by any strech of definition.)
- cperciva 17y agoIt depends in part on how you count things; but yes, ZumoDrive is more weakness-in-width than defence-in-depth.