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Whether or not sentient things tend to have some shared core values or goals is a question that can, in principle, be investigated empirically. We can look at

Whether or not sentient things tend to have some shared core values or goals is a question that can, in principle, be investigated empirically. We can look at facts about people, and the world, and corroborate or disprove that hypothesis. You go on to say, if I'm understanding you correctly, that the atheist-moral-realist is still mired in subjectivity because the existence of any such shared goals/values could never truly be demonstrated. It could never be demonstrated, since no matter how far and wide you look, there could be a counter-example lurking around the next corner. But thats simply the predicament of any theory or observation about the real world. As Sagan said, "we reach not absolute truth, only asymptotic approaches to the truth". We could find a counter-example to the law of thermodynamics tomorrow... but currently, according to the best knowledge we have, the law appears factually true, and that's how we treat it. And its worth pointing out, this line of conversation is more about limitations in our knowledge about learning moral facts, not whether said facts (or the underlying ontology, etc) are actually true or false. This sort of thing is a challenge for everyone, no matter theist, atheist, pantheist, or pastafarian. Limited access to moral facts are a given. For everybody. We all have to cope with the fact that our moral knowledge is imperfect and probably supported by quite a few subjective factors. If disagreement over moral facts is evidence against atheist moral realism, its an equally powerful (if not moreso) argument against theism-based moral realism.

keane 10y ago
>We can look at facts Sentient things happening to hold values cannot tell us if these values are objectively the case. >It could never be demonstrated, since no matter how far and wide you look, there could be a counter-example lurking No. It could be shown that 99% of humans hold the value 'cows should never be killed'. It is not the 1% that dissent that invalidates this datapoint from being able to tell us if this held belief refers/corresponds to an objective value. >If disagreement over moral facts is evidence against atheist moral realism Again, that humans disagree is not being given as reason atheist moral realism is untenable. That humans disagree or agree or have any opinion about anything has zero impact on whether moral properties refer to mind-independent objective facts. Zero. Consider reading the linked essay in the original comment or browsing the rest of the comments to better understand what is being put forward to show that combination of beliefs is untenable. >its an equally powerful (if not moreso) argument against theism-based moral realism. That people disagree over what is true is not at all an indication that truth itself does not exist or cannot be found.
- SmirkingRevenge 10y ago
  > Sentient things happening to hold values cannot tell us if these values are objectively the case. Here's how I'm understanding you... what you are pointing out is that even if all human beings valued, say human flourishing, with no exceptions, that there's still yet no factual purchase from which to say they SHOULD value human flourishing rather than something else. Well... as they do, goal-based meta-ethical theories are generally going to point to something like that kind of (hypothetical) shared, innate orientation towards "human flourishing" AS the metaphysical bottom rung. It IS the purchase from which moral statements gain any sort of coherent meaning at all (Since you value X, therefore you should Y). You can always keep asking, "But why is THAT Good?" questions, but it just doesn't make sense too. Maybe this can help illustrate the point. I could similarly ask, "Whats so good about God's Nature"? Within typical theist meta-ethical frameworks, those words basically parse as, "What's so good about good?" or "Whats so God's Nature about God's Nature?" "Since you value human flourishing above all, you ought to value human flourishing above all". Those are just syntax errors. :) The overall point is this... IF it is true that there's some hypothetical, universal goal X, then statements such as, "Since X, you should Y" can be factually, universally, objectively true. "You value human flourishing, so you should help your neighbor", etc. Not only is there no is-ought problem in such frameworks, "ought" DEPENDS on "is".
  - keane 10y ago
    >there's still yet no factual…from which they should Exactly, except not 'factual' but no valid reasoning to do so. From the essay: "For there is no such Finis Ultimus [utmost aim] nor Summum Bonum [greatest good] as is spoken of in the books of the old Moral Philosophers." —Thomas Hobbes "It [is] extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values… It is nowhere written that “the good” exists…" —Jean-Paul Sartre "It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger." —David Hume >It IS the purchase from which moral statements gain any sort of coherent meaning at all (Since you value X, therefore you should Y). No one is denying that humans use moral statements. It can be the meaning in Moral Nonrealism. It cannot be the meaning in Moral Realism. Here is why, again from the essay: "In suggested approaches to morality, I am surprised to find authors moving from propositions with the usual copula ‘is’ (or ‘is not’) to ones that are connected by ‘ought’ (or ‘ought not’). This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the greatest consequence. For as this ‘ought’ (or ‘ought not’) expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be pointed out and explained; and at the same time a reason should be given, for how this new relation can be—inconceivably—a deduction from others that are entirely different from it. I am persuaded, that attention to this one small matter will let us see that the definitions of right and wrong are not based on the relations of objects nor can be perceived by reason." —David Hume >I could similarly ask, "Whats so good about God's Nature"? The limitation applies to a non supernatural/supramundane universe. Hence Hume declares the only possibility "The standard of Sentiments [Values] is ultimately derived from that Supreme Being, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence."

keane 10y ago

>We can look at facts Sentient things happening to hold values cannot tell us if these values are objectively the case. >It could never be demonstrated, since no matter how far and wide you look, there could be a counter-example lurking No. It could be shown that 99% of humans hold the value 'cows should never be killed'. It is not the 1% that dissent that invalidates this datapoint from being able to tell us if this held belief refers/corresponds to an objective value. >If disagreement over moral facts is evidence against atheist moral realism Again, that humans disagree is not being given as reason atheist moral realism is untenable. That humans disagree or agree or have any opinion about anything has zero impact on whether moral properties refer to mind-independent objective facts. Zero. Consider reading the linked essay in the original comment or browsing the rest of the comments to better understand what is being put forward to show that combination of beliefs is untenable. >its an equally powerful (if not moreso) argument against theism-based moral realism. That people disagree over what is true is not at all an indication that truth itself does not exist or cannot be found.

SmirkingRevenge 10y ago
> Sentient things happening to hold values cannot tell us if these values are objectively the case. Here's how I'm understanding you... what you are pointing out is that even if all human beings valued, say human flourishing, with no exceptions, that there's still yet no factual purchase from which to say they SHOULD value human flourishing rather than something else. Well... as they do, goal-based meta-ethical theories are generally going to point to something like that kind of (hypothetical) shared, innate orientation towards "human flourishing" AS the metaphysical bottom rung. It IS the purchase from which moral statements gain any sort of coherent meaning at all (Since you value X, therefore you should Y). You can always keep asking, "But why is THAT Good?" questions, but it just doesn't make sense too. Maybe this can help illustrate the point. I could similarly ask, "Whats so good about God's Nature"? Within typical theist meta-ethical frameworks, those words basically parse as, "What's so good about good?" or "Whats so God's Nature about God's Nature?" "Since you value human flourishing above all, you ought to value human flourishing above all". Those are just syntax errors. :) The overall point is this... IF it is true that there's some hypothetical, universal goal X, then statements such as, "Since X, you should Y" can be factually, universally, objectively true. "You value human flourishing, so you should help your neighbor", etc. Not only is there no is-ought problem in such frameworks, "ought" DEPENDS on "is".
- keane 10y ago
  >there's still yet no factual…from which they should Exactly, except not 'factual' but no valid reasoning to do so. From the essay: "For there is no such Finis Ultimus [utmost aim] nor Summum Bonum [greatest good] as is spoken of in the books of the old Moral Philosophers." —Thomas Hobbes "It [is] extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values… It is nowhere written that “the good” exists…" —Jean-Paul Sartre "It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger." —David Hume >It IS the purchase from which moral statements gain any sort of coherent meaning at all (Since you value X, therefore you should Y). No one is denying that humans use moral statements. It can be the meaning in Moral Nonrealism. It cannot be the meaning in Moral Realism. Here is why, again from the essay: "In suggested approaches to morality, I am surprised to find authors moving from propositions with the usual copula ‘is’ (or ‘is not’) to ones that are connected by ‘ought’ (or ‘ought not’). This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the greatest consequence. For as this ‘ought’ (or ‘ought not’) expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be pointed out and explained; and at the same time a reason should be given, for how this new relation can be—inconceivably—a deduction from others that are entirely different from it. I am persuaded, that attention to this one small matter will let us see that the definitions of right and wrong are not based on the relations of objects nor can be perceived by reason." —David Hume >I could similarly ask, "Whats so good about God's Nature"? The limitation applies to a non supernatural/supramundane universe. Hence Hume declares the only possibility "The standard of Sentiments [Values] is ultimately derived from that Supreme Being, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence."