3 ms·

I agree. In this thought experiment, the consciousness is just copied. It wouldn't affect his original consciousness, though the "new" version would also feel a

I agree. In this thought experiment, the consciousness is just copied. It wouldn't affect his original consciousness, though the "new" version would also feel as though it was him. I've had this same thought experiment many times when thinking about the philosophical implications of teleportation. Even if the brain is disassembled and re-assembled, it would still be a copy. The original would cease to exist, effectively killing it. But the teleported copy would be none-the-wiser and think everything went fine. The only way around this I could see was somehow slowly moving functions of the brain to the new copy while disabling those same functions in the old brain. Perhaps this could be done with a form of entanglement, but it would have to be on a very large scale (ie entangle entire cells). Basically, the consciousness couldn't be interrupted while being transferred to the new copy.

ericb 19y ago
In terms of interruption, under anesthesia, I had no sense of time passing and woke up as if I had fast-forwarded. I imagine it is exactly like being dead. The world moved forward, and I wasn't in it. What if I joined my consciousness with a machine and slowly moved into it, then killed my physical body? I'm not sure if this is different than the gradual replacement of my body's cells. Maybe identity is a more hollow concept than we like to imagine. "I" am continual change. Where do you draw the line?
- ingenium 19y ago
  In the anesthesia, you would not be dead since there is obviously still brain activity. With moving your consciousness into a machine slowly, that would work for the exact reason you said; it's the same as the body replacing your cells. I think that consciousness is overrated. It's simply a product of this computer and the programming that we call the brain. It's more an illusion of consciousness, but I would have a hard time actually proving that and will save it for another post. With just a copy, there was never any type of physical connection linking the two. They are two separate physical entities, which would include the consciousness. An analogy is two identical computers running the same software. However, if they were one entity at some point and things were gradually turned off in the old brain, I think this would preserve what we call consciousness because our brain, including the copy which would mimic the brain, is very malleable and adaptable. It would transition into the new system. An analogy here is gradually replacing the parts in a computer. You upgrade the RAM, upgrade the motherboard, the processor, etc. You even image the hard drive to a new drive, but keep it in the same case and running the same OS and software. At what point is it no longer the same computer? With creating a copy of the brain, if the two are connected and then the connection is simply cut, then I don't think the new copy would actually be the same. If it's gradual, then yes. I'm not sure if I can say where the line actually is though.
  - ericb 19y ago
    The "me" brainwave seemed to be off while I was under. >> his team found a marked drop in the gamma-band activity (25-50 Hz) during anesthesia, a range of brain waves that is often associated with consciousness. http://sci-con.org/2002/05/consciousness-under-anesthesia/ http://sci-con.org/2002/05/consciousness-under-anesthesia/ Is a computer dead when it is unplugged? It seems to me it is in some sense. I could mail its parts around the world separately, reassemble, and restart it. I think of consciousness as a meta-phenomenon (I am inventing a term here). When watching a movie, there is no movie--only colored pixels changing at various times. Reductionists would like to deny the movie, but it is still there. So maybe I'm a materialist, but not a reductionist.
    - yters 19y ago
      I have a hard time seeing how you can be both at once. The materialist model has no need of properties to explain causality, except as syntactic sugar for us.
      - ericb 19y ago
        Second order effects can arise out of "base" matter without requiring a ghost in the machine. Conciousness is one of those effects. I am apparently a materialist, but you are muddling that with being a physicalist. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism
        yters 19y ago
        At this point we may get too much into the metaphysical weeds, but here's a thought experiment that might clarify for me what you mean: P = property M = material base for P We say P1 causes P2. Yet, the effect of P1 on P2 is indistinguishable from M1 on M2. So, how are P1 and P2 necessary for describing what's going on?

ericb 19y ago

In terms of interruption, under anesthesia, I had no sense of time passing and woke up as if I had fast-forwarded. I imagine it is exactly like being dead. The world moved forward, and I wasn't in it. What if I joined my consciousness with a machine and slowly moved into it, then killed my physical body? I'm not sure if this is different than the gradual replacement of my body's cells. Maybe identity is a more hollow concept than we like to imagine. "I" am continual change. Where do you draw the line?

ingenium 19y ago
In the anesthesia, you would not be dead since there is obviously still brain activity. With moving your consciousness into a machine slowly, that would work for the exact reason you said; it's the same as the body replacing your cells. I think that consciousness is overrated. It's simply a product of this computer and the programming that we call the brain. It's more an illusion of consciousness, but I would have a hard time actually proving that and will save it for another post. With just a copy, there was never any type of physical connection linking the two. They are two separate physical entities, which would include the consciousness. An analogy is two identical computers running the same software. However, if they were one entity at some point and things were gradually turned off in the old brain, I think this would preserve what we call consciousness because our brain, including the copy which would mimic the brain, is very malleable and adaptable. It would transition into the new system. An analogy here is gradually replacing the parts in a computer. You upgrade the RAM, upgrade the motherboard, the processor, etc. You even image the hard drive to a new drive, but keep it in the same case and running the same OS and software. At what point is it no longer the same computer? With creating a copy of the brain, if the two are connected and then the connection is simply cut, then I don't think the new copy would actually be the same. If it's gradual, then yes. I'm not sure if I can say where the line actually is though.
- ericb 19y ago
  The "me" brainwave seemed to be off while I was under. >> his team found a marked drop in the gamma-band activity (25-50 Hz) during anesthesia, a range of brain waves that is often associated with consciousness. http://sci-con.org/2002/05/consciousness-under-anesthesia/ http://sci-con.org/2002/05/consciousness-under-anesthesia/ Is a computer dead when it is unplugged? It seems to me it is in some sense. I could mail its parts around the world separately, reassemble, and restart it. I think of consciousness as a meta-phenomenon (I am inventing a term here). When watching a movie, there is no movie--only colored pixels changing at various times. Reductionists would like to deny the movie, but it is still there. So maybe I'm a materialist, but not a reductionist.
  - yters 19y ago
    I have a hard time seeing how you can be both at once. The materialist model has no need of properties to explain causality, except as syntactic sugar for us.
    - ericb 19y ago
      Second order effects can arise out of "base" matter without requiring a ghost in the machine. Conciousness is one of those effects. I am apparently a materialist, but you are muddling that with being a physicalist. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism
      - yters 19y ago
        At this point we may get too much into the metaphysical weeds, but here's a thought experiment that might clarify for me what you mean: P = property M = material base for P We say P1 causes P2. Yet, the effect of P1 on P2 is indistinguishable from M1 on M2. So, how are P1 and P2 necessary for describing what's going on?