4 ms·
Ok, it's not clear here as I read each paper. Here's what each one says. Multics paper first. Already has a discussion of source vs object. Source is more visib
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
Ok, it's not clear here as I read each paper. Here's what each one says. Multics paper first. Already has a discussion of source vs object. Source is more visible but survives recompilations. That's the backdrop here. Here's quote:
"It was noted above that while object code trap doors are invisible, they are vulnerable to recompilations. The compiler (or assembler) trap door is inserted to permit object code trap doors to survive even a complete recompilation of the entire system. In Multics, most of the ring 0 supervisor is written in PL/I. A penetrator could insert a trap door in the PL/I compiler to note when it is compiling a ring 0 module. Then the compiler would insert an object code trap door in the ring 0 module without listing the code in the listing. Since the PL/I compiler is itself written in PL/I, the trap door can maintain itself,
even when the compiler is recompiled."
Given backdrop, hard to say whether they put it in the source or object code of the compiler. It's ambiguous: "since PL/I compiler is written in PL/I." Either it's because they have backdoor in its source code or because the backdoored, object code is the PL/I compiler that will be used to re-compile any PL/I source. Next paragraph indicates they insert the trapdoor in another routine using object code that closely matches that produced from PL/I source. So, I'm assuming... with some uncertainty... that they bugged the object code of PL/I compiler to add trapdoor to it and all executables on compiles. With nothing left in the source.
Then, Thompson paper simply says:
"First we compile the modified source with teh normal C compiler to produce a bugged binary. We install this binary as the official C. We can now remove the bugs from the source of teh compiler and the new binary will reinsert the bugs whenever it is compiled. Of course, the login command will remain bugged with no trace in source anywhere."
Sounds like they're doing the same thing except MULTICS attack uses assembly code directly. They might have coded it in PL/I first, then directly inputed the code. That would make both attacks equal. Who knows. That they each bug the compiler at object level with no source-level evidence seems accurate. In that case, Thompson attack is MULTICS PL/I attack applied to C with clear use of C for subversion artifact.
- kragen 10y agoYou're right! I imagine Karger and Schell wrote their backdoor in PL/I too — it seems like it would just be a lot easier that way.