3 ms·
In my main comment, I showed my flow already prevented this as it relied on validated, open, standard cells plus analog reviewed by multiple, suspicious parties
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
In my main comment, I showed my flow already prevented this as it relied on validated, open, standard cells plus analog reviewed by multiple, suspicious parties. Plus called the exact attack. Due to memory loss, I forgot that Thompson didn't actually invent the Thompson attack: Schell and Karger did during MULTICS evaluation. It's in 2 papers on bottom. So, you can add that to counterpoints to Thompson Attack legend. ;)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11771243 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11771243
Also, I produced a set of links to drop on high-assurance, subversion in general, and my verified compiler technique. I still need to do a Pastebin or something on latter as right now it's embedded in conversation with jeffreyrogers.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10478742 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10478742
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182282 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182282
EDIT: While he was ripping off MULTICS, Thompson should've also tried to do prefixed strings, protected stacks, and safer-by-default languages like it had. Might have prevented many attacks on the UNIXen back in the day. Today. Ten years from now. ;)