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Except... http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ I think 'nickpsecurity has previously made some interesting remarks o

by Jach 10y ago

Except... http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ I think 'nickpsecurity has previously made some interesting remarks on the issue at lower levels...

aabaker99 10y ago
Can you explain this a bit more? I've only read both the abstracts but if I understand right your link deals with compiler-level attacks but the OP deals with hardware-level attacks ("fabrication-time attacker").
- Jach 10y ago
  It was basically a comment on the submission title -- Ken Thompson's famous attack has a counter that's been known about for a while. For the submission itself it's not as related as other commenters note they don't provide a way for the exploit to propagate like KT's attack. I'll have to read the full paper later but I wonder if it references https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king_html/ https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/...
nickpsecurity 10y ago
In my main comment, I showed my flow already prevented this as it relied on validated, open, standard cells plus analog reviewed by multiple, suspicious parties. Plus called the exact attack. Due to memory loss, I forgot that Thompson didn't actually invent the Thompson attack: Schell and Karger did during MULTICS evaluation. It's in 2 papers on bottom. So, you can add that to counterpoints to Thompson Attack legend. ;) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11771243 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11771243 Also, I produced a set of links to drop on high-assurance, subversion in general, and my verified compiler technique. I still need to do a Pastebin or something on latter as right now it's embedded in conversation with jeffreyrogers. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10478742 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10478742 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182282 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182282 EDIT: While he was ripping off MULTICS, Thompson should've also tried to do prefixed strings, protected stacks, and safer-by-default languages like it had. Might have prevented many attacks on the UNIXen back in the day. Today. Ten years from now. ;)

by Jach 10y ago

Except... http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ http://www.dwheeler.com/trusting-trust/ I think 'nickpsecurity has previously made some interesting remarks on the issue at lower levels...

aabaker99 10y ago

Can you explain this a bit more? I've only read both the abstracts but if I understand right your link deals with compiler-level attacks but the OP deals with hardware-level attacks ("fabrication-time attacker").

Jach 10y ago
It was basically a comment on the submission title -- Ken Thompson's famous attack has a counter that's been known about for a while. For the submission itself it's not as related as other commenters note they don't provide a way for the exploit to propagate like KT's attack. I'll have to read the full paper later but I wonder if it references https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king_html/ https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/...

nickpsecurity 10y ago

In my main comment, I showed my flow already prevented this as it relied on validated, open, standard cells plus analog reviewed by multiple, suspicious parties. Plus called the exact attack. Due to memory loss, I forgot that Thompson didn't actually invent the Thompson attack: Schell and Karger did during MULTICS evaluation. It's in 2 papers on bottom. So, you can add that to counterpoints to Thompson Attack legend. ;) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11771243 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11771243 Also, I produced a set of links to drop on high-assurance, subversion in general, and my verified compiler technique. I still need to do a Pastebin or something on latter as right now it's embedded in conversation with jeffreyrogers. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10478742 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10478742 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182282 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182282 EDIT: While he was ripping off MULTICS, Thompson should've also tried to do prefixed strings, protected stacks, and safer-by-default languages like it had. Might have prevented many attacks on the UNIXen back in the day. Today. Ten years from now. ;)