3 ms·
I also set up FileVault on my Mac, which I don't particularly like because it uses my login password to encrypt the hard drive. I run Mint on my ThinkPad, and
by gargravarr 10y ago
I also set up FileVault on my Mac, which I don't particularly like because it uses my login password to encrypt the hard drive.
I run Mint on my ThinkPad, and encrypted the hard drive at install-time (which is LUKS in the background). This means I have a separate password for the OS and my user data. The boot password is very long (it's a saying that is memorable to me) so is pretty difficult to brute-force, while my user password is complex enough for regular use. I also have my user data encrypted. LUKS can leverage the AES instructions on current-gen CPUs to speed up encrypted operations to near-native speeds, but even without it, you'll only notice a slow-down if you're doing heavy IO. My MBP is an old Core 2 Duo and is not unsable with FDE enabled.
I also used my Yubikey as a second factor for a time - you can hook this into the LUKS decryption screen to hash the passphrase a second time to generate the decryption key. While I was at it, I had my Yubikey set up to be required to log in or unlock the screen. So while there was a backup passphrase to unlock the hard drive, I couldn't get into my own user account without the Yubikey. I eventually disabled this because I thought it was overkill, but it works pretty well.
However, don't forget that encryption ONLY protects data at rest! A laptop in sleep mode is NOT secure, even with FDE. I always shut down the machine completely when I'm in a situation I could lose it (e.g. airport security). Otherwise, the keys are kept in memory, and a determined hacker has ways of getting to them - look up DMA attacks. Downloading the contents of RAM through a firewire port is pretty trivial these days.
A final thing to note - none of these methods stop a thief installing their own OS on your machine. Whilst this means your data is secure, you can make things a little bit harder for the thief by adding a boot or BIOS password to prevent them booting from a different medium. There are ways to reset this, admittedly, but since it won't get in your way (much), add another stumbling block for your enemy.
- cyphar 10y ago> A final thing to note - none of these methods stop a thief installing their own OS on your machine. Whilst this means your data is secure, you can make things a little bit harder for the thief by adding a boot or BIOS password to prevent them booting from a different medium. There are ways to reset this, admittedly, but since it won't get in your way (much), add another stumbling block for your enemy. If you use UEFI with secure boot (and your own keys with the windows ones removed, and an administrative password set up in your firmware) then you're in theory protected against that attack as well. What's more, openSUSE Just Works™ with UEFI. I wanted to flash LibreBoot (a CoreBoot distribution that is free as in freedom) but I'm worried about bricking my laptop (as well as not being sure about how good Linux's support is for that).