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Can you elaborate on what a materialistic bias means in this regard? I've seen neural nets do things that are surprising for "materials" like recognize images,

by ericb 19y ago

Can you elaborate on what a materialistic bias means in this regard? I've seen neural nets do things that are surprising for "materials" like recognize images, and seen code evolve new capabilities. These things would seem surprising if some spiritual component was needed.

yters 19y ago
Tell me what you think of this thought experiment: Assume there is a machine that can exactly replicate my brain. Consequently, it can replicate my consciousness. However, nothing you do to the machine affects my experience, and visa versa. Therefore, it did not replicate my consciousness. So, either 1) a brain can't be replicated or 2) consciousness is not reducible to my brain.
- ericb 19y ago
  As improbable as it is, I've pondered the exact same thought experiment. I came to a different conclusion. I think consciousness is like an instance of an object in the computer world. Consciousness is entirely materialistic with the material being like the location it resides in(in a computer, the memory addresses). In your example you've copied it, but into a different set of material. It's a different instance of the object--a new copy which just happens to have the same memories. So I think it's possible to create consciousness and to copy it, but not to have it be the same consciousness. I think your question is one of identity, not materialism, though. Thoughts?
  - ingenium 19y ago
    I agree. In this thought experiment, the consciousness is just copied. It wouldn't affect his original consciousness, though the "new" version would also feel as though it was him. I've had this same thought experiment many times when thinking about the philosophical implications of teleportation. Even if the brain is disassembled and re-assembled, it would still be a copy. The original would cease to exist, effectively killing it. But the teleported copy would be none-the-wiser and think everything went fine. The only way around this I could see was somehow slowly moving functions of the brain to the new copy while disabling those same functions in the old brain. Perhaps this could be done with a form of entanglement, but it would have to be on a very large scale (ie entangle entire cells). Basically, the consciousness couldn't be interrupted while being transferred to the new copy.
    - ericb 19y ago
      In terms of interruption, under anesthesia, I had no sense of time passing and woke up as if I had fast-forwarded. I imagine it is exactly like being dead. The world moved forward, and I wasn't in it. What if I joined my consciousness with a machine and slowly moved into it, then killed my physical body? I'm not sure if this is different than the gradual replacement of my body's cells. Maybe identity is a more hollow concept than we like to imagine. "I" am continual change. Where do you draw the line?
      - ingenium 19y ago
        In the anesthesia, you would not be dead since there is obviously still brain activity. With moving your consciousness into a machine slowly, that would work for the exact reason you said; it's the same as the body replacing your cells. I think that consciousness is overrated. It's simply a product of this computer and the programming that we call the brain. It's more an illusion of consciousness, but I would have a hard time actually proving that and will save it for another post. With just a copy, there was never any type of physical connection linking the two. They are two separate physical entities, which would include the consciousness. An analogy is two identical computers running the same software. However, if they were one entity at some point and things were gradually turned off in the old brain, I think this would preserve what we call consciousness because our brain, including the copy which would mimic the brain, is very malleable and adaptable. It would transition into the new system. An analogy here is gradually replacing the parts in a computer. You upgrade the RAM, upgrade the motherboard, the processor, etc. You even image the hard drive to a new drive, but keep it in the same case and running the same OS and software. At what point is it no longer the same computer? With creating a copy of the brain, if the two are connected and then the connection is simply cut, then I don't think the new copy would actually be the same. If it's gradual, then yes. I'm not sure if I can say where the line actually is though.
        ericb 19y ago
        The "me" brainwave seemed to be off while I was under. >> his team found a marked drop in the gamma-band activity (25-50 Hz) during anesthesia, a range of brain waves that is often associated with consciousness. http://sci-con.org/2002/05/consciousness-under-anesthesia/ http://sci-con.org/2002/05/consciousness-under-anesthesia/ Is a computer dead when it is unplugged? It seems to me it is in some sense. I could mail its parts around the world separately, reassemble, and restart it. I think of consciousness as a meta-phenomenon (I am inventing a term here). When watching a movie, there is no movie--only colored pixels changing at various times. Reductionists would like to deny the movie, but it is still there. So maybe I'm a materialist, but not a reductionist.
  - yters 19y ago
    If all properties are emergent, then with the same material construction you'll have the same properties emerge. However, the two consciousnesses, as you point out, have to be different. Therefore, they cannot be emergent.
    - ericb 19y ago
      "Same blueprint" is different than "same material." I never said "all properties are emergent." Also, why would repeatability mean something cannot be emergent? I can instantiate many "instances" of an object on a computer. I know they are not the same object, though. Your conclusion does not follow from your premises. Picture 2 chocolate cakes next to each other. The cake-ness arises from the arrangement of molecules, but they are 2 different instances of a cake. The fact that eggs + sugar + baking causes the emergent "cake" property does not mean they are the ~same~ cake. The fact that the 2 cakes have separate identities (cake 1, and cake 2) does not mean that cake is not an emergent property. Out of curiosity, are you not a programmer? Are my programming metaphors lost on you?
      - yters 19y ago
        The "I" of consciousness has to be replicated right along with the consciousness, so replicant yters has to have the same "I" as myself; in the way that the two cakes have the same cakeness or two objects have the same class.
        ericb 19y ago
        I think you think of consciousness as a singleton, whereas I see it as an instance. I think more instances (copies) can be created, but they will not be the original. I don't think these copies in any way threaten the original--it itself is just one instance in a particular location in space and time (analagous to whatever occupies a memory address at a particular point in time). I don't think the "I" has to be replicated and am still unsure why you think so. Can you clarify this more for me?
        19y ago

by ericb 19y ago

yters 19y ago

Tell me what you think of this thought experiment: Assume there is a machine that can exactly replicate my brain. Consequently, it can replicate my consciousness. However, nothing you do to the machine affects my experience, and visa versa. Therefore, it did not replicate my consciousness. So, either 1) a brain can't be replicated or 2) consciousness is not reducible to my brain.

ericb 19y ago
As improbable as it is, I've pondered the exact same thought experiment. I came to a different conclusion. I think consciousness is like an instance of an object in the computer world. Consciousness is entirely materialistic with the material being like the location it resides in(in a computer, the memory addresses). In your example you've copied it, but into a different set of material. It's a different instance of the object--a new copy which just happens to have the same memories. So I think it's possible to create consciousness and to copy it, but not to have it be the same consciousness. I think your question is one of identity, not materialism, though. Thoughts?
- ingenium 19y ago
  I agree. In this thought experiment, the consciousness is just copied. It wouldn't affect his original consciousness, though the "new" version would also feel as though it was him. I've had this same thought experiment many times when thinking about the philosophical implications of teleportation. Even if the brain is disassembled and re-assembled, it would still be a copy. The original would cease to exist, effectively killing it. But the teleported copy would be none-the-wiser and think everything went fine. The only way around this I could see was somehow slowly moving functions of the brain to the new copy while disabling those same functions in the old brain. Perhaps this could be done with a form of entanglement, but it would have to be on a very large scale (ie entangle entire cells). Basically, the consciousness couldn't be interrupted while being transferred to the new copy.
  - ericb 19y ago
    In terms of interruption, under anesthesia, I had no sense of time passing and woke up as if I had fast-forwarded. I imagine it is exactly like being dead. The world moved forward, and I wasn't in it. What if I joined my consciousness with a machine and slowly moved into it, then killed my physical body? I'm not sure if this is different than the gradual replacement of my body's cells. Maybe identity is a more hollow concept than we like to imagine. "I" am continual change. Where do you draw the line?
    - ingenium 19y ago
      In the anesthesia, you would not be dead since there is obviously still brain activity. With moving your consciousness into a machine slowly, that would work for the exact reason you said; it's the same as the body replacing your cells. I think that consciousness is overrated. It's simply a product of this computer and the programming that we call the brain. It's more an illusion of consciousness, but I would have a hard time actually proving that and will save it for another post. With just a copy, there was never any type of physical connection linking the two. They are two separate physical entities, which would include the consciousness. An analogy is two identical computers running the same software. However, if they were one entity at some point and things were gradually turned off in the old brain, I think this would preserve what we call consciousness because our brain, including the copy which would mimic the brain, is very malleable and adaptable. It would transition into the new system. An analogy here is gradually replacing the parts in a computer. You upgrade the RAM, upgrade the motherboard, the processor, etc. You even image the hard drive to a new drive, but keep it in the same case and running the same OS and software. At what point is it no longer the same computer? With creating a copy of the brain, if the two are connected and then the connection is simply cut, then I don't think the new copy would actually be the same. If it's gradual, then yes. I'm not sure if I can say where the line actually is though.
      - ericb 19y ago
        The "me" brainwave seemed to be off while I was under. >> his team found a marked drop in the gamma-band activity (25-50 Hz) during anesthesia, a range of brain waves that is often associated with consciousness. http://sci-con.org/2002/05/consciousness-under-anesthesia/ http://sci-con.org/2002/05/consciousness-under-anesthesia/ Is a computer dead when it is unplugged? It seems to me it is in some sense. I could mail its parts around the world separately, reassemble, and restart it. I think of consciousness as a meta-phenomenon (I am inventing a term here). When watching a movie, there is no movie--only colored pixels changing at various times. Reductionists would like to deny the movie, but it is still there. So maybe I'm a materialist, but not a reductionist.
- yters 19y ago
  If all properties are emergent, then with the same material construction you'll have the same properties emerge. However, the two consciousnesses, as you point out, have to be different. Therefore, they cannot be emergent.
  - ericb 19y ago
    "Same blueprint" is different than "same material." I never said "all properties are emergent." Also, why would repeatability mean something cannot be emergent? I can instantiate many "instances" of an object on a computer. I know they are not the same object, though. Your conclusion does not follow from your premises. Picture 2 chocolate cakes next to each other. The cake-ness arises from the arrangement of molecules, but they are 2 different instances of a cake. The fact that eggs + sugar + baking causes the emergent "cake" property does not mean they are the ~same~ cake. The fact that the 2 cakes have separate identities (cake 1, and cake 2) does not mean that cake is not an emergent property. Out of curiosity, are you not a programmer? Are my programming metaphors lost on you?
    - yters 19y ago
      The "I" of consciousness has to be replicated right along with the consciousness, so replicant yters has to have the same "I" as myself; in the way that the two cakes have the same cakeness or two objects have the same class.
      - ericb 19y ago
        I think you think of consciousness as a singleton, whereas I see it as an instance. I think more instances (copies) can be created, but they will not be the original. I don't think these copies in any way threaten the original--it itself is just one instance in a particular location in space and time (analagous to whatever occupies a memory address at a particular point in time). I don't think the "I" has to be replicated and am still unsure why you think so. Can you clarify this more for me?
        19y ago