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Tor's design document also warns a nation state level adversary who can view the whole network defeats any guarantees of anonymity. There's no way to know GCHQ/
by feklar 10y ago
Tor's design document also warns a nation state level adversary who can view the whole network defeats any guarantees of anonymity. There's no way to know GCHQ/NSA aren't running 90%+ of bridges and exit relays either in addition to having a total network overview at the backbone level.
Tor was designed for strong anonymity guarantees in nations that aren't 5 Eyes Alliance ie: China, Russia, ect.
- neerdowell 10y ago> There's no way to know GCHQ/NSA aren't running 90%+ of bridges and exit relays Yes there is. There are currently 857 exit nodes. The Tor Project only has to personally know who runs 86 of them to ensure that 90% of the exits are not run by the NSA. In fact, since ~90% of traffic exits through the top ~260 relays, they'd only need to know 27 of the people who run those.
- pakled_engineer 10y agoThere is ~7000 internal relays and 2,500 bridges. https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html This guarantee doesn't scale very well considering the combined 5 Eyes intel budget is ~60 billion USD and throwing just 0.1% of their budget at negating Tor would completely overwhelm the network with hundreds of thousands of stooge relays, plus they have the added benefit of global backbone cable traps. Tor can't give any kind of guarantee against a global passive adversary (5 Eyes) which is why they specifically warn against believing otherwise.
- maerF0x0 10y agoIs there some trustable way that one could financially support a server w/o unintentionally supporting a compromised server?
- gnopgnip 10y agoNoisebridge runs a tor exit relay and is registered as a 501c3 charity.