> SLS is a stunningly overpriced rocket that Congress is forcing NASA to build to keep former shuttle contractors and NASA centers employed. Understanding this

> SLS is a stunningly overpriced rocket that Congress is forcing NASA to build to keep former shuttle contractors and NASA centers employed. Understanding this is key to understanding a key constraint on how NASA operates. 10 separate field centers that work together, but are just as likely to try and stab each other in the back using their local congresspersons to get work earmarked. I work in support both NASA aeronautics and space. Generally speaking, I appreciate the aero side more because, despite the small fraction of the overall agency budget, I feel like it has a much healthier and better-defined relationship with industry and academia at large (e.g. no one in NASA aero has any illusion about being an airline or airframe production company, we work and deliver on fundamental R&D). Which makes sense as largely a direct continuation of our precursor agency, NACA. I remember there being a feeling that, post STS, the space side could make a similar transition - a developer of in-space fundamental research technology, and mission design/management with launch systems being treated as a "solved" technology to be purchased from vendors. But I think that senators in AL, FL, and TX will make sure that nevers happens, because it would likely gut the workforces of MSFC, KSC, and JSC.