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> Also companies like Intel and Microsoft have bought into the Clayton Christensen theory of "disruption" to the point where they really are throwing their exis
by mtgx 11y ago
> Also companies like Intel and Microsoft have bought into the Clayton Christensen theory of "disruption" to the point where they really are throwing their existing customers under the bus.
They could've fooled me. Clayton's theory wouldn't recommend changing Windows to adapt to the mobile form factor. It also wouldn't recommend Intel investing what are now probably over $10 billion in Atom and in making x86 work for mobile.
Quite the opposite. It would tell Microsoft to create a new operating system that is dedicated for those form factors, and it would tell Intel to adopt ARM on their own. Both should also be done under an isolated division, so they have no "conflicts of interest" with the incumbent products, whether it's about product features (like say Intel refusing to make Atom too strong so it doesn't encroach on Core territory), or setting up expensive (and unsustainable) infrastructure to compete against the leaner competitors.
I would also say both Microsoft and Intel failed in these markets because they were also late to try and become players in those markets, which is what the disruptive theory always warns incumbents about. It may be difficult to remember now, but even Windows 8 was considered "late" for the mobile market. So was Windows Phone 7 compared to iOS and Android. Same goes for Atom "catching up" to ARM chips in performance/low power (though not in price, a typical failure of a disrupted incumbent). If the "Wintel" monopoly wasn't so strong, you'd already see Celerons and Pentiums be replaced by ARM chips in notebooks and hybrids and whatnot, because those chips are the same ones that failed against ARM in mobile.
- udkl 11y agoThis is inline with what Stanford professor John Ousterhout says about the evolution (and necessary death) of software : "The most important component of evolution is death Or, said another way, it's easier to create a new organism than to change an existing one. Most organisms are highly resistant to change, but when they die it becomes possible for new and improved organisms to take their place. This rule applies to social structures such as corporations as well as biological organisms: very few companies are capable of making significant changes in their culture or business model, so it is good for companies eventually to go out of business, thereby opening space for better companies in the future. Computer software is a counter-example to this rule, with ironic results. Software is incredibly malleable: it can be updated with new versions relatively easily to fix problems and add new features. It is easier to change existing software than to build new software, so software tends to live a long time. To a first approximation, software doesn't die (compare this to the hardware in a computer, which is completely repaced every few years). At the same time, it is difficult to make major structural improvements to software once it has been shipped, so mistakes in early versions of the program often live forever. As a result, software tends to live too long: just good enough to discourage replacement, but slowly rotting away with more and more problems that are hard to fix. I wonder if the overall quality of computer software would improve if there were a way of forcing all software to be replaced after some period of time." https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-most-profound-life-lessons-from-Stanford-Professor-John-Ousterhout/answer/Anant-Bhardwaj https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-most-profound-life-lesson...