4 ms·

So you need physical access to the server/device, specialized power supply equipment, and then 104 hours on an 81-machine cluster of 2.4 GHz Pentium-4's to do t

So you need physical access to the server/device, specialized power supply equipment, and then 104 hours on an 81-machine cluster of 2.4 GHz Pentium-4's to do the exploit. All of which can be solved by simply salting an error checking algorithm with a little randomness. Their definition of 'Severe' is severely lacking.

olefoo 17y ago
Well, it is the register after all. Wish they still had the about page that said "We are the corruptibles,...", good times.
- wendroid 17y ago
  Yeah, those were fun times when they were on 64kbps! I have a "Integrity, we've heard of it" t-shirt :)
danparsonson 17y ago
Well you obviously missed this part: "The scientists are also experimenting with the possibility of exploiting the bug using lasers or natural radiation sources, they said." Where once I could bring my laser or a large piece of radioactive rock to work, now I will be met with suspicion, even outright hostility :-(
ErrantX 17y ago
el'reg love to try and make out interesting exploit stories as "we're all going to die". Which is a shame because it is an interesting story.
- tptacek 17y ago
  Dan Goodin is one of the good guys. No tech pub, Ars included, is staffed with people who can independently validate stories about crypto. Goodin at least tracks down multiple sources for his stories.
  - ErrantX 17y ago
    True; but they do have a tendency to big up these vulnerabilities more than other sites (in this case only in the title, it seems, but still...)
    - tptacek 17y ago
      When you've (a) got a bunch of UMich researchers telling you it's big, (b) got the OpenSSL team telling you it's important enough to merit an immediate fix, (c) got Karsten Nohl telling you it's big, and (d) it's in SSL, then you're going to run a story saying it's big. Look, it's not big. We probably all get that. But there's nothing negative you can really say about the Register for how they ran this story. I think they do a better job with security than almost any other tech pub.
kylec 17y ago
Well, SSL is based off of the concept of a web of trust, which means that if you obtain a root SSL cert (like those held by Verisign, etc) you can perform man-in-the-middle attacks on countless sites. So while the requirements for successfully mounting the attack are very high, so are the potential rewards.
- tptacek 17y ago
  SSL is based on trust anchors (PKI), not web of trust (web of trust is PGP).
- wendroid 17y ago
  "on the" not "off of the"
- rlpb 17y ago
  I assume that you're talking about obtaining a root SSL cert private key. In order to do this using this exploit, you'd need physical access to a machine that has that private key stored on it already (presumably a few very high security servers at Verisign, etc). I'm pretty sure that you'd find it easier to compromise such a server remotely using some other attack not discussed here. I'm also sure that companies holding such a key take their security very seriously. In short, I don't think that this side-channel attack is even close to being applied to anything but a DRM system; certainly not to a root SSL cert.
Tuna-Fish 17y ago
This kind of attack is not useful for taking on a server, but, for example, it could be used to completely break HDCP. Get a couple of Blu-Ray players, use this to sniff out their keys and distribute those. Do it a couple of times and key revocation becomes infeasible because of the cost of replacing hardware.
- anamax 17y ago
  > Do it a couple of times and key revocation becomes infeasible because of the cost of replacing hardware. Who bears the cost of replacing hardware when a Blu-Ray key is revoked? That's a serious question. If the key used by my Blu-Ray player is revoked, who pays to fix things so I can continue to use it to watch new movies? Not to be cynical or anything, but I'll bet that I'm the one on the hook after the warrantee period, and maybe even earlier. If I'm correct, key revokation is a public relations nightmare waiting to happen.
  - tptacek 17y ago
    My sense is that revocation targets the software players more than the set-top boxes, but I note also that the set-top boxes are firmware-updatable. HDCP is also not where the battle's taking place; the rippers are targeting BD+, Blu-Ray's built-in DRM scheme. BD+ is considerably more sophisticated than a simple key you can rip out of memory.

olefoo 17y ago

Well, it is the register after all. Wish they still had the about page that said "We are the corruptibles,...", good times.

wendroid 17y ago
Yeah, those were fun times when they were on 64kbps! I have a "Integrity, we've heard of it" t-shirt :)

danparsonson 17y ago

Well you obviously missed this part: "The scientists are also experimenting with the possibility of exploiting the bug using lasers or natural radiation sources, they said." Where once I could bring my laser or a large piece of radioactive rock to work, now I will be met with suspicion, even outright hostility :-(

ErrantX 17y ago

el'reg love to try and make out interesting exploit stories as "we're all going to die". Which is a shame because it is an interesting story.

tptacek 17y ago
Dan Goodin is one of the good guys. No tech pub, Ars included, is staffed with people who can independently validate stories about crypto. Goodin at least tracks down multiple sources for his stories.
- ErrantX 17y ago
  True; but they do have a tendency to big up these vulnerabilities more than other sites (in this case only in the title, it seems, but still...)
  - tptacek 17y ago
    When you've (a) got a bunch of UMich researchers telling you it's big, (b) got the OpenSSL team telling you it's important enough to merit an immediate fix, (c) got Karsten Nohl telling you it's big, and (d) it's in SSL, then you're going to run a story saying it's big. Look, it's not big. We probably all get that. But there's nothing negative you can really say about the Register for how they ran this story. I think they do a better job with security than almost any other tech pub.

kylec 17y ago

Well, SSL is based off of the concept of a web of trust, which means that if you obtain a root SSL cert (like those held by Verisign, etc) you can perform man-in-the-middle attacks on countless sites. So while the requirements for successfully mounting the attack are very high, so are the potential rewards.

tptacek 17y ago
SSL is based on trust anchors (PKI), not web of trust (web of trust is PGP).
wendroid 17y ago
"on the" not "off of the"
rlpb 17y ago
I assume that you're talking about obtaining a root SSL cert private key. In order to do this using this exploit, you'd need physical access to a machine that has that private key stored on it already (presumably a few very high security servers at Verisign, etc). I'm pretty sure that you'd find it easier to compromise such a server remotely using some other attack not discussed here. I'm also sure that companies holding such a key take their security very seriously. In short, I don't think that this side-channel attack is even close to being applied to anything but a DRM system; certainly not to a root SSL cert.

Tuna-Fish 17y ago

This kind of attack is not useful for taking on a server, but, for example, it could be used to completely break HDCP. Get a couple of Blu-Ray players, use this to sniff out their keys and distribute those. Do it a couple of times and key revocation becomes infeasible because of the cost of replacing hardware.

anamax 17y ago
> Do it a couple of times and key revocation becomes infeasible because of the cost of replacing hardware. Who bears the cost of replacing hardware when a Blu-Ray key is revoked? That's a serious question. If the key used by my Blu-Ray player is revoked, who pays to fix things so I can continue to use it to watch new movies? Not to be cynical or anything, but I'll bet that I'm the one on the hook after the warrantee period, and maybe even earlier. If I'm correct, key revokation is a public relations nightmare waiting to happen.
- tptacek 17y ago
  My sense is that revocation targets the software players more than the set-top boxes, but I note also that the set-top boxes are firmware-updatable. HDCP is also not where the battle's taking place; the rippers are targeting BD+, Blu-Ray's built-in DRM scheme. BD+ is considerably more sophisticated than a simple key you can rip out of memory.