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What extra do the encrypted messaging services offer on top of say, forcing a regular mail server to only user tls1.2. Must we all move onto a single provider?
by Already__Taken 10y ago
What extra do the encrypted messaging services offer on top of say, forcing a regular mail server to only user tls1.2. Must we all move onto a single provider?
I'm just curious why that's not good enough where sysadmins collectively pester whoever they require secure communication with to also have a tls1.2 mailserver. Would that not be job done?
- dsr_ 10y agoThat would not be end-to-end. Email is a store-and-forward service, so even if you guarantee that every network hop is protected, the message is in cleartext (and thus inspectable, alterable and censorable) on every server.
- stephenr 10y agoForcing TLS for the MTA at each end is about network encryption (i.e. akin to HTTPS) this "solution" is about encrypting the contents of the message envelope, i.e. restricting who can read the contents of the message regardless of how its transferred. As I mentioned elsewhere, it is however yet another non-solution, for the same reason you queried - it's all reliant on a single provider. Real end-to-end encrypted email is when your mail client uses either S/MIME or PGP/GPG to encrypt your message using the recipient's public key(s). In that situation, it doesn't matter what mail service they use, or what network transport the MTA's use - it's readable only by them (well technically only by anyone with the appropriate private key - I'm going to assume people are protecting their keys).