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Why is it necessary to reduce language to set theory? I say it is a heap when doing so improves the odds of my preferred outcome in a conversation. Being label

Why is it necessary to reduce language to set theory? I say it is a heap when doing so improves the odds of my preferred outcome in a conversation. Being labeled a heap doesn't have to be a binary truism. Or even a probability. I guess I reject the entire field of study :).

coldtea 10y ago
>Being labeled a heap doesn't have to be a binary truism. Or even a probability. That in itself is the whole point of the original observation. That there are things, and not fleeting things like notions and feelings, but actual tangible things, that are nevertheless not in a specific binary state, but in some non-specified intermediate state.
- chris_va 10y ago
  The semantics are difficult here, apologies. I can't tell if we are agreeing :) Why do things have to be in any state, even a "non-specific intermediate" one? The original observation seems to have devolved into an argument on the fundamental nature of language expressing "state". State here implying some sort of formalism, like sets. Can't we just assert that language doesn't assign or derive from a formal state? Rather, the use of language is highly correlated with outcomes/observations, but not intrinsically meaningful.
  - coldtea 10y ago
    >Why do things have to be in any state, even a "non-specific intermediate" one? Because being in a state is just another name of being a thing (or plain "being"). If you "are", by definition you are in some state (at any given point in time). >Can't we just assert that language doesn't assign or derive from a formal state? Rather, the use of language is highly correlated with outcomes/observations, but not intrinsically meaningful. Well, even without using language, we experience things as being in particular states -- we see them having color, making a noise, being there and not here, etc.
    - chris_va 10y ago
      I'm enjoying this too much :) Let us say "the sky is blue". With formalism, you'd argue that blue is a state, and the sky is a thing, and they have a relationship. I'd argue that language does not actually assign strict identities/state. There isn't some platonic "blue" or "heap". Rather "sky" is a word highly correlated with a set of observations, as is "blue". When we combine the words into the sentence above, we end up with a sequence that results in a useful outcome from our perspective, so we say it. The original link shows how people really try to assign boundaries, as if one "thing" really "is blue" and another isn't. And then it becomes self contradictory, and people invent yet more explanations. I just question the base assumption that we need to assign logic/boundaries/formalism to language.

coldtea 10y ago

>Being labeled a heap doesn't have to be a binary truism. Or even a probability. That in itself is the whole point of the original observation. That there are things, and not fleeting things like notions and feelings, but actual tangible things, that are nevertheless not in a specific binary state, but in some non-specified intermediate state.

chris_va 10y ago
The semantics are difficult here, apologies. I can't tell if we are agreeing :) Why do things have to be in any state, even a "non-specific intermediate" one? The original observation seems to have devolved into an argument on the fundamental nature of language expressing "state". State here implying some sort of formalism, like sets. Can't we just assert that language doesn't assign or derive from a formal state? Rather, the use of language is highly correlated with outcomes/observations, but not intrinsically meaningful.
- coldtea 10y ago
  >Why do things have to be in any state, even a "non-specific intermediate" one? Because being in a state is just another name of being a thing (or plain "being"). If you "are", by definition you are in some state (at any given point in time). >Can't we just assert that language doesn't assign or derive from a formal state? Rather, the use of language is highly correlated with outcomes/observations, but not intrinsically meaningful. Well, even without using language, we experience things as being in particular states -- we see them having color, making a noise, being there and not here, etc.
  - chris_va 10y ago
    I'm enjoying this too much :) Let us say "the sky is blue". With formalism, you'd argue that blue is a state, and the sky is a thing, and they have a relationship. I'd argue that language does not actually assign strict identities/state. There isn't some platonic "blue" or "heap". Rather "sky" is a word highly correlated with a set of observations, as is "blue". When we combine the words into the sentence above, we end up with a sequence that results in a useful outcome from our perspective, so we say it. The original link shows how people really try to assign boundaries, as if one "thing" really "is blue" and another isn't. And then it becomes self contradictory, and people invent yet more explanations. I just question the base assumption that we need to assign logic/boundaries/formalism to language.