It's not perfect, but E2E crypto does make it significantly harder to get to the plaintext. A backdoor will always leave some kind of paper trail (if you know w

It's not perfect, but E2E crypto does make it significantly harder to get to the plaintext. A backdoor will always leave some kind of paper trail (if you know what to look for), whereas intercepting the plaintext on the server cannot be detected by users at all. Legally speaking, compelling a company to intercept messages that they have access to sounds different than compelling them to develop and sign a backdoored version of their product - that's essentially the Apple vs. FBI case. I think this is a case of perfect being the enemy of good. If a state actor wants access to your messages, you're probably screwed anyway, unless your OpSec is top-notch. E2E crypto means that they'll have to really want your messages, at which point they're probably better off just stealing your phone or using a $5 wrench.