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> Is there really only "perfect" or "useless" with nothing in-between? Are you suggesting that the ability to completely circumvent a system doesn't make that
by mikegerwitz 10y ago
> Is there really only "perfect" or "useless" with nothing in-between?
Are you suggesting that the ability to completely circumvent a system doesn't make that system broken?
If the goal of WhatsApp encryption is to protect against surveillance, and there's a way to surveil users using WhatsApp, then it's broken, full stop. Are you going to place your trust in a home security system that works pretty well, but only against unskilled burglars? Or what about an authentication system to a server holding sensitive customer information? Or your banking information? Or information that might put your life at risk as a dissident in a repressive state?
- khedoros 10y ago> Are you suggesting that the ability to completely circumvent a system doesn't make that system broken? A system can be broken without being useless. >If the goal of WhatsApp encryption is to protect against surveillance You skipped an import word from the post you replied to: "mass". Even with a hole in SS7, it makes it impractical to collect messages from everyone, even if it's practical to collect messages from specific targets.
- mikegerwitz 10y ago> A system can be broken without being useless. Sure, just as a completely insecure system can be useful. I'm not arguing that. But not useful for the purpose of protecting users against surveillance. > You skipped an import word from the post you replied to: "mass". skrebbel made a blanket statement, which I was replying to.
- khedoros 10y ago>But not useful for the purpose of protecting users against surveillance. I'd argue that it can be useful for that purpose without being perfect. If it stops my communication from being caught in a mass dragnet, then it's useful for protecting me against surveillance even when it's possible to circumvent the security on the scale of individuals (rather than populations). > skrebbel made a blanket statement, which I was replying to. Right, they did. They made the statement that even flawed security makes mass surveillance much more difficult than an unencrypted system would (or words to that effect). It seems like "stop mass-scale surveillance" is a separate goal from "stop individual-scale surveillance". I feel like you set up a strawman, rather than actually addressing what skrebbel originally said.
- mikegerwitz 10y ago> It seems like "stop mass-scale surveillance" is a separate goal from "stop individual-scale surveillance". I feel like you set up a strawman, rather than actually addressing what skrebbel originally said. My point was that security is often black-and-white because a crack can turn out to be a crater, and often is. With regards to state-sponsored, dragnet surveillance: those are the most skilled attackers, and they've exploited far more subtle issues than the one being discussed here; they're the ones that you need to be worried about for undisclosed vulnerabilities, letalone terribly obvious flaws like this one.
- skrebbel 10y agoYes, to all your questions except the last one. That's the whole point. If I intend to overthrow president Trump, I won't use WhatsApp. Most other purposes, seems pretty fine now.
- mikegerwitz 10y ago> Yes, to all your questions except the last one. I'm sorry, but I don't understand. You are okay with a provably vulnerable system protecting some of life's most important assets. Could you elaborate? > That's the whole point. If I intend to overthrow president Trump, I won't use WhatsApp. You made a blanket statement about the integrity of purportedly secure systems. These exact arguments can apply just as well to other systems, like Tor, or SSH, or HTTP over TLS.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]