3 ms·

I think the assumption is that any sufficiently motivated attacker will find a way to compromise their target. What e2e encryption accomplishes is the end of dr

by rashkov 10y ago

I think the assumption is that any sufficiently motivated attacker will find a way to compromise their target. What e2e encryption accomplishes is the end of dragnet surveillance of entire societies, something that Snowden has exposed in great detail already.

xg15 10y ago
But my point is that the way end-to-end encryption is implemented currently doesn't even accomplish that: Either you trust your messenger provider not to be complicit in any surveillance or data mining activities, then plain TLS (with key-pinning) is enough to save you from being snooped - or you don't trust them, then you're not actually protected as they could push an update at any time to sidestep the encryption. There are certain cases were current end-to-end encryption brings more security - e.g. if a provider's data center is compromised but the provider itself isn't. But those seem like edge cases to me that don't justify the attention the feature is currently getting.
- pfg 10y ago
  It's not perfect, but E2E crypto does make it significantly harder to get to the plaintext. A backdoor will always leave some kind of paper trail (if you know what to look for), whereas intercepting the plaintext on the server cannot be detected by users at all. Legally speaking, compelling a company to intercept messages that they have access to sounds different than compelling them to develop and sign a backdoored version of their product - that's essentially the Apple vs. FBI case. I think this is a case of perfect being the enemy of good. If a state actor wants access to your messages, you're probably screwed anyway, unless your OpSec is top-notch. E2E crypto means that they'll have to really want your messages, at which point they're probably better off just stealing your phone or using a $5 wrench.

3 ms·

I think the assumption is that any sufficiently motivated attacker will find a way to compromise their target. What e2e encryption accomplishes is the end of dr

by rashkov 10y ago

xg15 10y ago
But my point is that the way end-to-end encryption is implemented currently doesn't even accomplish that: Either you trust your messenger provider not to be complicit in any surveillance or data mining activities, then plain TLS (with key-pinning) is enough to save you from being snooped - or you don't trust them, then you're not actually protected as they could push an update at any time to sidestep the encryption. There are certain cases were current end-to-end encryption brings more security - e.g. if a provider's data center is compromised but the provider itself isn't. But those seem like edge cases to me that don't justify the attention the feature is currently getting.
- pfg 10y ago
  It's not perfect, but E2E crypto does make it significantly harder to get to the plaintext. A backdoor will always leave some kind of paper trail (if you know what to look for), whereas intercepting the plaintext on the server cannot be detected by users at all. Legally speaking, compelling a company to intercept messages that they have access to sounds different than compelling them to develop and sign a backdoored version of their product - that's essentially the Apple vs. FBI case. I think this is a case of perfect being the enemy of good. If a state actor wants access to your messages, you're probably screwed anyway, unless your OpSec is top-notch. E2E crypto means that they'll have to really want your messages, at which point they're probably better off just stealing your phone or using a $5 wrench.