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I'll try. "Free will" is the hypothesis that it is, in principle, impossible to determine the outputs of a brain just by measuring its physical state with perf

I'll try. "Free will" is the hypothesis that it is, in principle, impossible to determine the outputs of a brain just by measuring its physical state with perfect accuracy. In other words, if you have two physically identical brains, with physically identical states, these brains can have different outputs.

JulianMorrison 17y ago
The thing that I do that feels like "free will" is use adaptive heuristic problem solving to explore an imperfectly mapped problem/solution space while attempting to maximize value fulfillment payoff.
- foldr 17y ago
  Why would that feel like free will? Wouldn't it just feel like using adaptive heuristic problem solving to explore an imperfectly mapped problem/solution space while attempting to maximize value fulfillment payoff? It's of course logically possible that doing that could make someone feel like they had free will, but it seems a rather odd idea.
  - JulianMorrison 17y ago
    Because the choice resulting from problem solving is adaptive and heuristic, I can't run it advance of the evidential state I'm in when I choose. I can't know the evidential state in advance, because the problem/solution space is imperfectly mapped. So it feels like my choices are not determined in advance. (However they're entirely determined at the instant I make them.)
    - foldr 17y ago
      I'm confused by the "because" in the first sentence and the "so" in the penultimate. I see no reason why the one thing should cause the other. As I say, it's logically possibly that there could be such a causal relation, but in general there's no reason to think that doing X should feel like doing Y -- you'd expect it to feel like doing X! If I don't know what my choice will be, I'd expect that to feel like not knowing what my choice will be. Which is a distinct state from feeling that I have freedom of choice. In fact if you use your imagination, you can come up with scenarios in which you don't know what your future choice will be, but it clearly doesn't feel like a free choice. E.g. if you say "I will choose to get a coffee if I roll the die and the number is 3 or above, or a tea otherwise."
      - JulianMorrison 17y ago
        Did you misread? That "because" is an internal connective inside the first sentence only. (I'd rephrase, but I'm not sure what would be clearer.) The part explaining the causal relationship is the penultimate sentence, "it feels like my choices are not determined in advance". "If I don't know what my choice will be, I'd expect that to feel like not knowing what my choice will be." You expect to know what your choice will be only when you choose it. That equals the feeling of "freedom of choice".
        foldr 17y ago
        My mistake regarding because. Yes, I was talking about the causal relationship in the penultimate sentence only. >The part explaining the causal relationship is the penultimate sentence It doesn't explain it, it just asserts it. There is no reason why a lack of foreknowledge about your future decisions should make you feel as if you have free choice. It could just as well make you feel like you're bobbing around at random in the causal flux.
        JulianMorrison 17y ago
        Splitting the phrase/concept "free choice" into "free" and "choice", I have been mostly talking about the "free", because it describes the feeling that a choice "might be anything and I won't know until I've made it". Above, you are more concerned with whether it's a "choice" (versus "bobbing around at random") - but you know implicitly the mechanism is adaptive and heuristic and that it attempts to maximize value fulfillment payoff. So it will make a "choice" (defined in this context as a purposeful decision). Therefore, free choice.
        foldr 17y ago
        I don't think your analysis of "free choice" captures the relevant meaning. You can't answer these sorts of questions by playing with words. You need to think about the phenomenon that is being referred to, not the phrase I used to describe it. >but you know implicitly the mechanism is adaptive and heuristic and that it attempts to maximize value fulfillment payoff Actually, I'm not sure that I know any of those things (it might help if one of those terms actually meant something).
joss82 17y ago
Heisenberg uncertainty principle prevents perfectly accurate measure of "physical state". So, two brains as physically identical as possible will probably have (slightly) different outputs. But those differences would have nothing to do with human will. They would be random, or, more precisely, non-deterministic (per definition, as you can't measure them). So, having a non-deterministic free will is like having no free will at all. Conclusion: We have no free will nor fate ;)
- joeyo 17y ago
  Conclusion: We have no free will nor fate ;) The alternative interpretation is that all particles in the universe have free will. ;)
  - joss82 17y ago
    At a bigger scale, they seem to act randomly, though. But maybe if we could follow one particle in its everyday life, we see how it exercises its free will?
  - anamax 17y ago
    " If we have free will, so do subatomic particles, mathematicians claim to prove." http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/35391/title/Math_Trek__Do_subatomic_particles_have_free_will%3F http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/35391/title/Math_...
- codexon 17y ago
  Heisenberg uncertainty principle prevents perfectly accurate measure of "physical state". So, two brains as physically identical as possible will probably have (slightly) different outputs. You are right about the definition but wrong about your conclusion. It is impossible to measure 2 brains and be sure they are physically identical. But this does not mean 2 brains cannot be physically identical.
  - joss82 17y ago
    I really thought that Heisenberg was talking about the reality and not the measure.
foldr 17y ago
I think a better definition would be "the thing that makes people responsible for their choices." The really hard problem of free will is explaining how on earth people could be responsible for their actions if these actions aren't freely chosen. (Or of explaining what it means for something to be freely chosen if they are indeed freely chosen.) The issue of determinism vs. non-determinism is a complete red herring, IMHO. A belief in free will is not just a belief in non-determinism, or a rejection of physicalism.
- byrneseyeview 17y ago
  You can stop thinking in terms of "responsibility" and start thinking in terms of "incentives." i.e. you can still send a criminal to jail even though they didn't decide to be a criminal, if jail time is more likely to discourage other criminals. If you don't have free will, you still respond to stimuli. So instead of punishing someone for willful action, you subject them to stimuli.
  - foldr 17y ago
    But I don't want to stop thinking in terms of responsibility. I just can't view other people as black boxes who "respond to stimuli", because that's incompatible with any kind of moral or human outlook on the world. After all, I don't think of myself as a black box who responds to stimuli. And how can I be a truly moral person if I think others are fundamentally different from me?
    - joeyo 17y ago
      Byrneseyeview is presenting an overly simplistic view. It's true that we do respond to stimuli, but fortunately we don't respond only to stimuli but also to our internal states (thoughts, feelings, memories, and even moral judgments). As a result, I don't think that physicalism is incompatible with morality (even if it is incompatible with free will) because you can still interpret someone's actions in the context of their mental state--just like the legal system currently does.
    - joeyo 17y ago

JulianMorrison 17y ago

The thing that I do that feels like "free will" is use adaptive heuristic problem solving to explore an imperfectly mapped problem/solution space while attempting to maximize value fulfillment payoff.

foldr 17y ago
Why would that feel like free will? Wouldn't it just feel like using adaptive heuristic problem solving to explore an imperfectly mapped problem/solution space while attempting to maximize value fulfillment payoff? It's of course logically possible that doing that could make someone feel like they had free will, but it seems a rather odd idea.
- JulianMorrison 17y ago
  Because the choice resulting from problem solving is adaptive and heuristic, I can't run it advance of the evidential state I'm in when I choose. I can't know the evidential state in advance, because the problem/solution space is imperfectly mapped. So it feels like my choices are not determined in advance. (However they're entirely determined at the instant I make them.)
  - foldr 17y ago
    I'm confused by the "because" in the first sentence and the "so" in the penultimate. I see no reason why the one thing should cause the other. As I say, it's logically possibly that there could be such a causal relation, but in general there's no reason to think that doing X should feel like doing Y -- you'd expect it to feel like doing X! If I don't know what my choice will be, I'd expect that to feel like not knowing what my choice will be. Which is a distinct state from feeling that I have freedom of choice. In fact if you use your imagination, you can come up with scenarios in which you don't know what your future choice will be, but it clearly doesn't feel like a free choice. E.g. if you say "I will choose to get a coffee if I roll the die and the number is 3 or above, or a tea otherwise."
    - JulianMorrison 17y ago
      Did you misread? That "because" is an internal connective inside the first sentence only. (I'd rephrase, but I'm not sure what would be clearer.) The part explaining the causal relationship is the penultimate sentence, "it feels like my choices are not determined in advance". "If I don't know what my choice will be, I'd expect that to feel like not knowing what my choice will be." You expect to know what your choice will be only when you choose it. That equals the feeling of "freedom of choice".
      - foldr 17y ago
        My mistake regarding because. Yes, I was talking about the causal relationship in the penultimate sentence only. >The part explaining the causal relationship is the penultimate sentence It doesn't explain it, it just asserts it. There is no reason why a lack of foreknowledge about your future decisions should make you feel as if you have free choice. It could just as well make you feel like you're bobbing around at random in the causal flux.
        JulianMorrison 17y ago
        Splitting the phrase/concept "free choice" into "free" and "choice", I have been mostly talking about the "free", because it describes the feeling that a choice "might be anything and I won't know until I've made it". Above, you are more concerned with whether it's a "choice" (versus "bobbing around at random") - but you know implicitly the mechanism is adaptive and heuristic and that it attempts to maximize value fulfillment payoff. So it will make a "choice" (defined in this context as a purposeful decision). Therefore, free choice.
        foldr 17y ago
        I don't think your analysis of "free choice" captures the relevant meaning. You can't answer these sorts of questions by playing with words. You need to think about the phenomenon that is being referred to, not the phrase I used to describe it. >but you know implicitly the mechanism is adaptive and heuristic and that it attempts to maximize value fulfillment payoff Actually, I'm not sure that I know any of those things (it might help if one of those terms actually meant something).

joss82 17y ago

Heisenberg uncertainty principle prevents perfectly accurate measure of "physical state". So, two brains as physically identical as possible will probably have (slightly) different outputs. But those differences would have nothing to do with human will. They would be random, or, more precisely, non-deterministic (per definition, as you can't measure them). So, having a non-deterministic free will is like having no free will at all. Conclusion: We have no free will nor fate ;)

joeyo 17y ago
Conclusion: We have no free will nor fate ;) The alternative interpretation is that all particles in the universe have free will. ;)
- joss82 17y ago
  At a bigger scale, they seem to act randomly, though. But maybe if we could follow one particle in its everyday life, we see how it exercises its free will?
- anamax 17y ago
  " If we have free will, so do subatomic particles, mathematicians claim to prove." http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/35391/title/Math_Trek__Do_subatomic_particles_have_free_will%3F http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/35391/title/Math_...
codexon 17y ago
Heisenberg uncertainty principle prevents perfectly accurate measure of "physical state". So, two brains as physically identical as possible will probably have (slightly) different outputs. You are right about the definition but wrong about your conclusion. It is impossible to measure 2 brains and be sure they are physically identical. But this does not mean 2 brains cannot be physically identical.
- joss82 17y ago
  I really thought that Heisenberg was talking about the reality and not the measure.

foldr 17y ago

I think a better definition would be "the thing that makes people responsible for their choices." The really hard problem of free will is explaining how on earth people could be responsible for their actions if these actions aren't freely chosen. (Or of explaining what it means for something to be freely chosen if they are indeed freely chosen.) The issue of determinism vs. non-determinism is a complete red herring, IMHO. A belief in free will is not just a belief in non-determinism, or a rejection of physicalism.

byrneseyeview 17y ago
You can stop thinking in terms of "responsibility" and start thinking in terms of "incentives." i.e. you can still send a criminal to jail even though they didn't decide to be a criminal, if jail time is more likely to discourage other criminals. If you don't have free will, you still respond to stimuli. So instead of punishing someone for willful action, you subject them to stimuli.
- foldr 17y ago
  But I don't want to stop thinking in terms of responsibility. I just can't view other people as black boxes who "respond to stimuli", because that's incompatible with any kind of moral or human outlook on the world. After all, I don't think of myself as a black box who responds to stimuli. And how can I be a truly moral person if I think others are fundamentally different from me?
  - joeyo 17y ago
    Byrneseyeview is presenting an overly simplistic view. It's true that we do respond to stimuli, but fortunately we don't respond only to stimuli but also to our internal states (thoughts, feelings, memories, and even moral judgments). As a result, I don't think that physicalism is incompatible with morality (even if it is incompatible with free will) because you can still interpret someone's actions in the context of their mental state--just like the legal system currently does.
  - joeyo 17y ago