4 ms·

> You don't feel that a city has the right to enact an ordinance keeping black people out even if it made them feel safer (I assume) Your example is specifical

by gonzo 10y ago

> You don't feel that a city has the right to enact an ordinance keeping black people out even if it made them feel safer (I assume) Your example is specifically barred by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as decided in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), as well as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, codified at 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, aka "The Fair Housing Act" Because it used to happen.

yummyfajitas 10y ago
The question is why is this limit good, but a different limit is bad? We are all aware that the law has various (mostly arbitrary) limits. The question being asked is what consistent limit should be applied in general?
- jdbernard 10y ago
  Because being black is an inherent trait outside of someone's control. Choosing to be an Uber driver is a person's active choice, and everyone has a fingerprint. So you're not forced to do something you don't want to do, and you're not being discriminated against because of something you cannot control.
  - yummyfajitas 10y ago
    This is an interesting principle, and it applies in this case. But it has other interesting conclusions. For instance, your principle seems to allow discrimination against Jews/Muslims/people who engage in homosexual acts/promiscuous women/etc. And it seems to bar discrimination against, e.g., the short and ugly (at least if being ugly is not caused by being fat). Do you endorse these conclusions? If not, then this clearly can't be your motivating principle.
    - jdbernard 10y ago
      The position I stated in my post above I do hold and do endorse as a good philosophy for life. However, the conclusions you have drawn do not follow logically from what I stated. All I said was that one should not discriminate based on innate attributes. I said nothing about other forms of discrimination. You have made the assumption that the inverse of my statement is true: that because I denounce discrimination based on attributes outside of people's control that I must support discrimination based on attributes within their control. This is not a logical conclusion of my statement and is not true. Generally speaking, I reject discrimination against people based on any attributes, within or without their control, except those attributes which directly pertain to the subject in question. So, for example, in a job situation, ideally, the only attributes we should be using to discriminate between candidates are their experience, knowledge, and ability to fulfill the duties of the position. If the job requires lifting heavy weights, discriminating upon your ability to lift heavy weights is fine. Discriminating based on sex (maybe justified because statistically most women are not strong enough to perform the duties) is not fine, because it is an indirect attribute. If this women meets the requirements it is irrelevant what other women can or cannot do. In this case with Uber and Lyft the city/state has the right (one could argue duty) to take steps to ensure the trustworthiness/safety of drivers operating commercial transportation services within its jurisdiction. Race does not say anything about the trustworthiness or criminal nature of a specific person. Even if, hypothetically, you assume that statistically one race is more prone to violence than another that does not speak directly about this candidate. It is an indirect measure like the example of sex above. An accurate background check, however, can shed light on facts in a person's past that are directly relevant to that question.
      - yummyfajitas 10y ago
        You have made the assumption that the inverse of my statement is true: that because I denounce discrimination based on attributes outside of people's control that I must support discrimination... I made no such assumption. I merely pointed out that your principle doesn't prohibit such things. In this case with Uber and Lyft the city/state has the right (one could argue duty) to take steps to ensure the trustworthiness/safety of drivers...Even if, hypothetically, you assume that statistically one race is more prone to violence than another that does not speak directly about this candidate. Neither does past criminal history. Some criminals are reformed and will not commit crimes. Both past criminal history and race are statistical predictors of future criminal behavior. So are various things under one's control like the neighborhood they live in, their friends, etc. It's a fact, and one I haven't fully come to grips with philosophically, that base rates matter. I.e., you'll do a better job predicting violence if you take race into account [1]. Actually using it makes me uncomfortable, but not using it is also burying our heads in the sand. From a moral philosophy perspective I'm simply confused. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_rate_fallacy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_rate_fallacy
- tptacek 10y ago
  Because the "no black people" limit is abusive, in large part intended to be abusive, and has no good-faith public policy purpose, and the other limits can't be described that way. You can describe them as erroneous or ineffective --- the way you could describe virtually any regulation --- but you can't make that argument about them. Since this distinction seems pretty obvious, I have to wonder why you'd pretend not to see it.
  - yummyfajitas 10y ago
    Many regulations of this sort - particularly within the taxi space - are merely economic protectionism favoring one group over another. Suppose the "no black people" limit were merely designed for economic protectionism with no malicious intent. Would that make it acceptable? You can add to it various pretexts as erroneous and ineffective justification, e.g. "black people are more likely to be dangerous criminals than non-blacks, we don't want passengers getting robbed", if that makes the question clearer. I'm also confused by your last line. Why do you believe I'm "pretending" something? I'm simply pointing out what the core philosophical question is. I know how I justify my moral positions - my opposition to protectionism (either pro-white or pro-medallion owner) is driven by my opposition to violence. But when you give up opposition to violence - which you must do if it's acceptable to protect medallion owners with violence - I don't know how to oppose pro-white protectionism. What makes non-whites deserving of protection from bad laws but non-medallion owners undeserving?
    - tptacek 10y ago
      I'm not going to dignify an argument that suggests that because some regulations might be erroneous, have unintended consequences, or even be crafted specifically to favor some particular group, that most regulations are therefore equivalent to institutionalized racism. To me, that's really just a veiled swipe at the idea that institutionalized racism is a uniquely toxic problem.
      - yummyfajitas 10y ago
        It's not a "veiled swipe" at all. I'm pretty explicitly stating that I consider racism to be extrinsically bad - I only care when it causes intrinsically bad actions like protectionism, and that protectionist acts which are non-racist are also bad. I get the impression you have a different moral conclusion, but I have no idea how you reach it in a logically consistent manner. I take it you refuse to state your principles?
- dragonwriter 10y ago
  > We are all aware that the law has various (mostly arbitrary) limits. I disagree that the limits in this domain in existing law are arbitrary; the Constitutional, statute, and case law rules have fairly clear motivation and rationale.

by gonzo 10y ago

yummyfajitas 10y ago

The question is why is this limit good, but a different limit is bad? We are all aware that the law has various (mostly arbitrary) limits. The question being asked is what consistent limit should be applied in general?

jdbernard 10y ago
Because being black is an inherent trait outside of someone's control. Choosing to be an Uber driver is a person's active choice, and everyone has a fingerprint. So you're not forced to do something you don't want to do, and you're not being discriminated against because of something you cannot control.
- yummyfajitas 10y ago
  This is an interesting principle, and it applies in this case. But it has other interesting conclusions. For instance, your principle seems to allow discrimination against Jews/Muslims/people who engage in homosexual acts/promiscuous women/etc. And it seems to bar discrimination against, e.g., the short and ugly (at least if being ugly is not caused by being fat). Do you endorse these conclusions? If not, then this clearly can't be your motivating principle.
  - jdbernard 10y ago
    The position I stated in my post above I do hold and do endorse as a good philosophy for life. However, the conclusions you have drawn do not follow logically from what I stated. All I said was that one should not discriminate based on innate attributes. I said nothing about other forms of discrimination. You have made the assumption that the inverse of my statement is true: that because I denounce discrimination based on attributes outside of people's control that I must support discrimination based on attributes within their control. This is not a logical conclusion of my statement and is not true. Generally speaking, I reject discrimination against people based on any attributes, within or without their control, except those attributes which directly pertain to the subject in question. So, for example, in a job situation, ideally, the only attributes we should be using to discriminate between candidates are their experience, knowledge, and ability to fulfill the duties of the position. If the job requires lifting heavy weights, discriminating upon your ability to lift heavy weights is fine. Discriminating based on sex (maybe justified because statistically most women are not strong enough to perform the duties) is not fine, because it is an indirect attribute. If this women meets the requirements it is irrelevant what other women can or cannot do. In this case with Uber and Lyft the city/state has the right (one could argue duty) to take steps to ensure the trustworthiness/safety of drivers operating commercial transportation services within its jurisdiction. Race does not say anything about the trustworthiness or criminal nature of a specific person. Even if, hypothetically, you assume that statistically one race is more prone to violence than another that does not speak directly about this candidate. It is an indirect measure like the example of sex above. An accurate background check, however, can shed light on facts in a person's past that are directly relevant to that question.
    - yummyfajitas 10y ago
      You have made the assumption that the inverse of my statement is true: that because I denounce discrimination based on attributes outside of people's control that I must support discrimination... I made no such assumption. I merely pointed out that your principle doesn't prohibit such things. In this case with Uber and Lyft the city/state has the right (one could argue duty) to take steps to ensure the trustworthiness/safety of drivers...Even if, hypothetically, you assume that statistically one race is more prone to violence than another that does not speak directly about this candidate. Neither does past criminal history. Some criminals are reformed and will not commit crimes. Both past criminal history and race are statistical predictors of future criminal behavior. So are various things under one's control like the neighborhood they live in, their friends, etc. It's a fact, and one I haven't fully come to grips with philosophically, that base rates matter. I.e., you'll do a better job predicting violence if you take race into account [1]. Actually using it makes me uncomfortable, but not using it is also burying our heads in the sand. From a moral philosophy perspective I'm simply confused. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_rate_fallacy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_rate_fallacy
tptacek 10y ago
Because the "no black people" limit is abusive, in large part intended to be abusive, and has no good-faith public policy purpose, and the other limits can't be described that way. You can describe them as erroneous or ineffective --- the way you could describe virtually any regulation --- but you can't make that argument about them. Since this distinction seems pretty obvious, I have to wonder why you'd pretend not to see it.
- yummyfajitas 10y ago
  Many regulations of this sort - particularly within the taxi space - are merely economic protectionism favoring one group over another. Suppose the "no black people" limit were merely designed for economic protectionism with no malicious intent. Would that make it acceptable? You can add to it various pretexts as erroneous and ineffective justification, e.g. "black people are more likely to be dangerous criminals than non-blacks, we don't want passengers getting robbed", if that makes the question clearer. I'm also confused by your last line. Why do you believe I'm "pretending" something? I'm simply pointing out what the core philosophical question is. I know how I justify my moral positions - my opposition to protectionism (either pro-white or pro-medallion owner) is driven by my opposition to violence. But when you give up opposition to violence - which you must do if it's acceptable to protect medallion owners with violence - I don't know how to oppose pro-white protectionism. What makes non-whites deserving of protection from bad laws but non-medallion owners undeserving?
  - tptacek 10y ago
    I'm not going to dignify an argument that suggests that because some regulations might be erroneous, have unintended consequences, or even be crafted specifically to favor some particular group, that most regulations are therefore equivalent to institutionalized racism. To me, that's really just a veiled swipe at the idea that institutionalized racism is a uniquely toxic problem.
    - yummyfajitas 10y ago
      It's not a "veiled swipe" at all. I'm pretty explicitly stating that I consider racism to be extrinsically bad - I only care when it causes intrinsically bad actions like protectionism, and that protectionist acts which are non-racist are also bad. I get the impression you have a different moral conclusion, but I have no idea how you reach it in a logically consistent manner. I take it you refuse to state your principles?
dragonwriter 10y ago
> We are all aware that the law has various (mostly arbitrary) limits. I disagree that the limits in this domain in existing law are arbitrary; the Constitutional, statute, and case law rules have fairly clear motivation and rationale.