So, your concern with password managers right now is that losing your master password means you lose everything? You wish to design a new system where the thre

So, your concern with password managers right now is that losing your master password means you lose everything? You wish to design a new system where the threat model includes losing the master password? I think your implementation only adds 3 bits "more" security than a "basic" implementation that is: hash web site name || root password. Say, in your implementation, the attacker gets the root password and "salt based on another random password" (it's likely that they get both at the same time because they would be stored in the same place. If they're not stored in the same place, you just discovered a weak form of 2-factor auth). All the attacker has to do at this point is guess 10 values (30-40) and try each one to get the account password. That's your 3 extra bits of security from the 'basic' implementation. But if you just look at the two "features" you presented of your scheme, I don't know any popular password manager (LastPass, 1Password, etc) that doesn't have them. Can you explain?