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> GPLv3 mandates that your hardware be insecure (because you cannot prevent a malicious actor from installing malicious software on someone's device, which woul

> GPLv3 mandates that your hardware be insecure (because you cannot prevent a malicious actor from installing malicious software on someone's device, which would normally be done by requiring all updates to be codesigned by the manufacturer). I think that's wrong: http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html#GiveUpKeys http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html#GiveUpKeys: > I use public key cryptography to sign my code to assure its authenticity. Is it true that GPLv3 forces me to release my private signing keys? (#GiveUpKeys) > No. The only time you would be required to release signing keys is if you conveyed GPLed software inside a User Product, and its hardware checked the software for a valid cryptographic signature before it would function. In that specific case, you would be required to provide anyone who owned the device, on demand, with the key to sign and install modified software on his device so that it will run. If each instance of the device uses a different key, then you need only give each purchaser the key for his instance. It sounds like a manufacturer could ship a GPLv3-compliant User Product with two signing keys: a secret one known only to the manufacturer, and a second per-device key than can be used by the end-user to install modified software. Such a manufacturer wouldn't be forced to disclose their signing key because the user already has access to an equivalent. I also imagine it would be kosher for the device to provide the user the option, in the name of security, to permanently clear the second per-device key, so only manufacturer updates can ever be installed. > companies like Apple won't even allow employees to install GPLv3 software on their work computer because if a single piece of GPLv3-licensed code makes it into iOS, even completely accidentally, the license demands that Apple release their root signing keys to the world, completely destroying the security of hundreds of millions of devices. If Apple is behaving that way, it's Apple's own fault, not the GPLv3's. They could have chosen to design their software in a way that would have given them better options if they are ever forced to comply with the GPLv3, but they chose not to.

eridius 10y ago
What you've just described is a completely insecure hardware platform. Giving out a second private key that can still be used to install third-party updates is just as insecure as giving out their normal private key, the only real difference is if anyone actually looks at the code signature they can tell the difference between third-party and first-party code. Allowing the user to lock out that second key doesn't fix anything because 99.99% of users will never do that, or even know it exists. > If Apple is behaving that way, it's Apple's own fault, not the GPLv3's. They could have chosen to design their software in a way that would have given them better options if they are ever forced to comply with the GPLv3, but they chose not to. That makes no sense. What you said is basically equivalent to "That's Apple's fault, they could have just designed their hardware platform to be completely insecure". GPLv3 is fundamentally incompatible with having a secure hardware platform. This is absolutely GPLv3's fault.
- malka 10y ago
  Each user would get its own private key that could only be used on its own device. It could not be used to sign software for someone else device
  - eridius 10y ago
    Hmm, that's actually the first suggestion I've heard that's at least technically workable, though it's pretty darn impractical to do at any kind of scale.
    - gherkin0 10y ago
      > though it's pretty darn impractical to do at any kind of scale. How so? It's a solved problem. Don't smartphones already have numerous device-specific identifiers and keys loaded to them? All they would really need to do is slap an extra sticker on the device with the device-specific key printed on it. For instance, my phone came with a sticker with its IMEI printed on it.
      - eridius 10y ago
        IMEI can be recovered once you throw the sticker away. A private key that can be used to install new software cannot be recovered, or if it can that's a huge security risk.
        gherkin0 10y ago
        The device should not have the private key loaded onto it at all, just the corresponding public key. The private key would only exist on the sticker and thus be unrecoverable if you threw it out or destroyed it. The IMEI example was just to demonstrate the ability to slap a device-unique code + matching sticker on something during manufacturing at scale.
        eridius 10y ago

eridius 10y ago

What you've just described is a completely insecure hardware platform. Giving out a second private key that can still be used to install third-party updates is just as insecure as giving out their normal private key, the only real difference is if anyone actually looks at the code signature they can tell the difference between third-party and first-party code. Allowing the user to lock out that second key doesn't fix anything because 99.99% of users will never do that, or even know it exists. > If Apple is behaving that way, it's Apple's own fault, not the GPLv3's. They could have chosen to design their software in a way that would have given them better options if they are ever forced to comply with the GPLv3, but they chose not to. That makes no sense. What you said is basically equivalent to "That's Apple's fault, they could have just designed their hardware platform to be completely insecure". GPLv3 is fundamentally incompatible with having a secure hardware platform. This is absolutely GPLv3's fault.

malka 10y ago
Each user would get its own private key that could only be used on its own device. It could not be used to sign software for someone else device
- eridius 10y ago
  Hmm, that's actually the first suggestion I've heard that's at least technically workable, though it's pretty darn impractical to do at any kind of scale.
  - gherkin0 10y ago
    > though it's pretty darn impractical to do at any kind of scale. How so? It's a solved problem. Don't smartphones already have numerous device-specific identifiers and keys loaded to them? All they would really need to do is slap an extra sticker on the device with the device-specific key printed on it. For instance, my phone came with a sticker with its IMEI printed on it.
    - eridius 10y ago
      IMEI can be recovered once you throw the sticker away. A private key that can be used to install new software cannot be recovered, or if it can that's a huge security risk.
      - gherkin0 10y ago
        The device should not have the private key loaded onto it at all, just the corresponding public key. The private key would only exist on the sticker and thus be unrecoverable if you threw it out or destroyed it. The IMEI example was just to demonstrate the ability to slap a device-unique code + matching sticker on something during manufacturing at scale.
        eridius 10y ago