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I wonder if people even know what those restrictions are and how exactly the anti-tivoisation clause works. It does not forbid anyone from running software on t

by jordigh 11y ago

I wonder if people even know what those restrictions are and how exactly the anti-tivoisation clause works. It does not forbid anyone from running software on tivoised devices, which is what some people seem to think it does. All that it requires is that if you distribute the software primarily to be used on a User Product (as GPLv3 calls it), then as part of the installation information (which in GPLv2 used to just mean install and build scripts), you must also provide the signing keys for the hardware. This also does not mean that GPLv3 makes software signing impossible and that you must forbid users from rejecting unsigned software if they so wish. It doesn't mean that you have to distribute every secret key that you use for signing software. It merely means that you have to give your users a way to install software on the User Product as they see fit, if they see fit. It's up to the user to decide to override any signing feature or not. It's very much in spirit with GPLv2 that required installation scripts. As far as GPLv3, hardware signing keys are just another part of installation scripts (the actual term used in GPLv3 is "Installation Information"). http://radar.oreilly.com/2007/03/gplv3-user-products-clause.html http://radar.oreilly.com/2007/03/gplv3-user-products-clause.... https://copyleft.org/guide/comprehensive-gpl-guidech10.html#x13-820009.9.2 https://copyleft.org/guide/comprehensive-gpl-guidech10.html#...

eridius 11y ago
Or to put it another way, GPLv3 mandates that your hardware be insecure (because you cannot prevent a malicious actor from installing malicious software on someone's device, which would normally be done by requiring all updates to be codesigned by the manufacturer). And it's not just limited to software that would be installed on the hardware; companies like Apple won't even allow employees to install GPLv3 software on their work computer because if a single piece of GPLv3-licensed code makes it into iOS, even completely accidentally, the license demands that Apple release their root signing keys to the world, completely destroying the security of hundreds of millions of devices. Also don't forget the patent stuff in GPLv3. That's not quite as scary as the anti-TiVoization stuff, but it's still pretty significant for large companies.
- gherkin0 11y ago
  > GPLv3 mandates that your hardware be insecure (because you cannot prevent a malicious actor from installing malicious software on someone's device, which would normally be done by requiring all updates to be codesigned by the manufacturer). I think that's wrong: http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html#GiveUpKeys http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html#GiveUpKeys: > I use public key cryptography to sign my code to assure its authenticity. Is it true that GPLv3 forces me to release my private signing keys? (#GiveUpKeys) > No. The only time you would be required to release signing keys is if you conveyed GPLed software inside a User Product, and its hardware checked the software for a valid cryptographic signature before it would function. In that specific case, you would be required to provide anyone who owned the device, on demand, with the key to sign and install modified software on his device so that it will run. If each instance of the device uses a different key, then you need only give each purchaser the key for his instance. It sounds like a manufacturer could ship a GPLv3-compliant User Product with two signing keys: a secret one known only to the manufacturer, and a second per-device key than can be used by the end-user to install modified software. Such a manufacturer wouldn't be forced to disclose their signing key because the user already has access to an equivalent. I also imagine it would be kosher for the device to provide the user the option, in the name of security, to permanently clear the second per-device key, so only manufacturer updates can ever be installed. > companies like Apple won't even allow employees to install GPLv3 software on their work computer because if a single piece of GPLv3-licensed code makes it into iOS, even completely accidentally, the license demands that Apple release their root signing keys to the world, completely destroying the security of hundreds of millions of devices. If Apple is behaving that way, it's Apple's own fault, not the GPLv3's. They could have chosen to design their software in a way that would have given them better options if they are ever forced to comply with the GPLv3, but they chose not to.
  - eridius 11y ago
    What you've just described is a completely insecure hardware platform. Giving out a second private key that can still be used to install third-party updates is just as insecure as giving out their normal private key, the only real difference is if anyone actually looks at the code signature they can tell the difference between third-party and first-party code. Allowing the user to lock out that second key doesn't fix anything because 99.99% of users will never do that, or even know it exists. > If Apple is behaving that way, it's Apple's own fault, not the GPLv3's. They could have chosen to design their software in a way that would have given them better options if they are ever forced to comply with the GPLv3, but they chose not to. That makes no sense. What you said is basically equivalent to "That's Apple's fault, they could have just designed their hardware platform to be completely insecure". GPLv3 is fundamentally incompatible with having a secure hardware platform. This is absolutely GPLv3's fault.

by jordigh 11y ago

eridius 11y ago

Or to put it another way, GPLv3 mandates that your hardware be insecure (because you cannot prevent a malicious actor from installing malicious software on someone's device, which would normally be done by requiring all updates to be codesigned by the manufacturer). And it's not just limited to software that would be installed on the hardware; companies like Apple won't even allow employees to install GPLv3 software on their work computer because if a single piece of GPLv3-licensed code makes it into iOS, even completely accidentally, the license demands that Apple release their root signing keys to the world, completely destroying the security of hundreds of millions of devices. Also don't forget the patent stuff in GPLv3. That's not quite as scary as the anti-TiVoization stuff, but it's still pretty significant for large companies.

gherkin0 11y ago
> GPLv3 mandates that your hardware be insecure (because you cannot prevent a malicious actor from installing malicious software on someone's device, which would normally be done by requiring all updates to be codesigned by the manufacturer). I think that's wrong: http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html#GiveUpKeys http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html#GiveUpKeys: > I use public key cryptography to sign my code to assure its authenticity. Is it true that GPLv3 forces me to release my private signing keys? (#GiveUpKeys) > No. The only time you would be required to release signing keys is if you conveyed GPLed software inside a User Product, and its hardware checked the software for a valid cryptographic signature before it would function. In that specific case, you would be required to provide anyone who owned the device, on demand, with the key to sign and install modified software on his device so that it will run. If each instance of the device uses a different key, then you need only give each purchaser the key for his instance. It sounds like a manufacturer could ship a GPLv3-compliant User Product with two signing keys: a secret one known only to the manufacturer, and a second per-device key than can be used by the end-user to install modified software. Such a manufacturer wouldn't be forced to disclose their signing key because the user already has access to an equivalent. I also imagine it would be kosher for the device to provide the user the option, in the name of security, to permanently clear the second per-device key, so only manufacturer updates can ever be installed. > companies like Apple won't even allow employees to install GPLv3 software on their work computer because if a single piece of GPLv3-licensed code makes it into iOS, even completely accidentally, the license demands that Apple release their root signing keys to the world, completely destroying the security of hundreds of millions of devices. If Apple is behaving that way, it's Apple's own fault, not the GPLv3's. They could have chosen to design their software in a way that would have given them better options if they are ever forced to comply with the GPLv3, but they chose not to.
- eridius 11y ago
  What you've just described is a completely insecure hardware platform. Giving out a second private key that can still be used to install third-party updates is just as insecure as giving out their normal private key, the only real difference is if anyone actually looks at the code signature they can tell the difference between third-party and first-party code. Allowing the user to lock out that second key doesn't fix anything because 99.99% of users will never do that, or even know it exists. > If Apple is behaving that way, it's Apple's own fault, not the GPLv3's. They could have chosen to design their software in a way that would have given them better options if they are ever forced to comply with the GPLv3, but they chose not to. That makes no sense. What you said is basically equivalent to "That's Apple's fault, they could have just designed their hardware platform to be completely insecure". GPLv3 is fundamentally incompatible with having a secure hardware platform. This is absolutely GPLv3's fault.