4 ms·
> Of course, I'd be interested in your thoughts on the empiracle stuff and security evaluations for further improvement. For fun, you might try to apply my secu
by kbenson 11y ago
> Of course, I'd be interested in your thoughts on the empiracle stuff and security evaluations for further improvement. For fun, you might try to apply my security framework or empirical methods to your own systems to see what you find. Only for the brave, though. ;)
If only I worked in an environment where that was feasible. I write Perl for a very small off-market investment firm (event ticket brokerage) as the only software engineer. My work time is split between implementing UI changes to our internal webapp (which we are thankfully going to be subbing out), reporting and alerting tools for the data we collect, manipulating and maintaining the schema as data sources are added, remove or change and maintaining the tools and system that streams the data into the model. While getting to a more secure state would be wonderful, I'm still working to reduce the number of outright blatant bugs I push into production every day due to the speed at which we need to iterate. :/
> Counter point to Dan Geer: Hardware architecture is the problem
This is interesting, and aligns quite well with the current discussion. We live with the trade-offs of the past, which while they may have made sense in the short term, are slowly strangling us now.
> Bell Looking Back
An interesting paper on the problems of security system development and how market changes have helped and hampered over time. I admit I skimmed portions of it, and much of the later appendix sections, as my time is limited. The interesting take-away I got from it is that our government security standards and certification are woefully inadequately provided for, where they aren't outright ignored (both at a software level and at an organizational policy level). I now feel both more and less secure, since I wasn't aware of the specifics of government security certification, so seeing that there are many and are somewhat well defined encourages me to believe the problem at least received rigorous attention. Unfortunately it looks like it's a morass of substandard delivery and deployment, so there that. :/ It is a decade old though, so perhaps there have been positive developments since?
> Essay on how to re-design security evaluations to work
and from that your "nick p on improving security evaluations" and
> List of empirically-proven methods for robust, software engineering
These all look quite well thought out, from my relative inexperience with formal computer security and exploitation research (I've followed it more closely at some times than others, and it's a path I almost went down after college, but did not). The only thing I would consider is that while these are practices for developing secure systems, and they could (and should in some cases) be adopted for regular systems, I think there is a place for levels of adherence to how strict you need to be, and how much effort needs to go into your design and development. Just as we require different levels of expertise and assurance for building a small shed, a house, an office building, and a skyscraper, it would be useful to have levels of certification for software that provided some assurance that specific levels of engineering were met.
- nickpsecurity 11y ago"While getting to a more secure state would be wonderful, I'm still working to reduce the number of outright blatant bugs I push into production every day due to the speed at which we need to iterate. :/" Interesting. What do you think about the tool below designed to handle apps like yours with low defect? http://opalang.org/ http://opalang.org/ It originally delivered server parts on Java I think. Switched to Node due to low uptake, client/server consistency, & all RAD stuff being built for Node. Main tool written in ML language by people that take correctness seriously. I doubt you can reboot your current codebase but it seems it should be applicable for a similar set of requirements or a spare-time app. Also, not a write-only language. ;) Jokes on Perl aside, you might find it fascinating and even ironic given current usage (eg UNIX hackery) to know that Perl only exists due to him working... on the first, high-assurance VPN for Orange Book A1 class (highest). Took me 10-20 minutes of Google-fu to dig it out for you: http://cahighways.org/wordpress/?p=8019 http://cahighways.org/wordpress/?p=8019 I'm sure you'll find his approach to "secure," configuration management entertaining. " We live with the trade-offs of the past, which while they may have made sense in the short term, are slowly strangling us now." Yep. Pretty much. Outliers keep appearing that do it better but rejected for cost or lack of feature X. Some make it but most don't. " I now feel both more and less secure..." "I think there is a place for levels of adherence to how strict you need to be" Very fair position. :) Early standard did that to a degree by giving you levels with increasing features and assurance: C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, A1. Really easy to understand but security features often didn't match product use case. ITSEC let you describe the features, security features, and assurance rating separately to fit your product. It was less prescriptive on methods, too. Common Criteria did that but knew people would screw up security requirements. So, they added (and preferred) Protection Profiles for various types of product (eg OS, printer, VPN) with threats specified, baseline of countermeasures, and minimal level of assurance applicable. You could do "augmented" (EAL4 vs EAL4+) profiles that added features and/or assurance. CIA's method more like Orange Book where it's simple descriptions on the cover but like this: Confidentiality 5 out of 5, Integrity 5 out of 5, Availability 1 out of 3. Specified level of risk or protection corresponding to each number with methods to achieving it up to manufacturer & evaluators. So, your expectation existed in the older schemes in various ways. It can definitely be done in next one. "different levels of expertise and assurance for building a small shed, a house, an office building, and a skyscraper" Nah, bro, I want my shed and house build with the assurance of an office building or skyscraper. I mean, I spend a lot of time there with some heavy shit above my head. I just need the acquisition cost to get to low six digits. If not, then sure... different levels of assurance... grudgingly accepted. :)