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That's very interesting. I agree that effect is there. Passing down incorrect cultural knowledge about C is another I counter with my Pastebin. There's others l
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
That's very interesting. I agree that effect is there. Passing down incorrect cultural knowledge about C is another I counter with my Pastebin. There's others like SPARK, Rust, and ATS countering concept that safety equals too slow or nothing low-level. Many things.
Back to your analogy, it seemed to start with both types of drivers: IBM vs Burroughs; C vs Wirth languages. The puddle jumper style got pretty popular with most roads and Interstates being built between their cities. The safer drivers have to be on those roads, too, but fewer in number since "Move Fast and Break Things" wasn't popular with small town folk. Got to point that majority of traffic and causes of accidents are puddle jumpers who mostly don't see their cars and driving styles are the problem.
And now we gotta find a way to re-design roads and cars to make their style less damaging while encouraging others to drive more wisely. Wow, put it in your analogy and I suddenly have less hope. ;)
- kbenson 11y agoThe analogy breaks down the deeper you go, but there are some interesting parallels when you consider driving habits in other cultures. In the US (and probably most western countries) we have highly standardized and policed roads to prevent injury and accidents. I would argue this provides for a more efficient system overall, where in the end more people are able to get to their destination not just safer, but also faster, because the lack of accidents and assurance about other's likely actions on the road allow for mostly smooth operation. With computers, how much less (less, because it would never be none) hardware, software, CPU time and memory would need to be devoted security (firewalls, IDS, malware/virus detection and cleanup) if we had sacrificed a small amount of performance to ensure a more secure operating environment most the time? We've achieved this with some aspects of society by making rules that hamper some for the benefit of all (traffic laws, employment laws, etc), because we've recognized in some places the failure of individual people and groups to be able to correctly assess risk and danger at wider levels and at longer time frames. These laws and regulations can go overboard, but they're needed to some degree because people are very poor stand ins for rational actors with good information, which in a pure market economy could make these decisions correctly. We've had little to nothing like this for software engineering, which has led to great advancements in short times, but I think we are nearing the point (if we haven't already passed it) when our past decisions to prioritize efficiency and performance over safety are resulting in a poorer relative outcome than if we have made different choices in the past.
- nickpsecurity 11y ago"but also faster, because the lack of accidents and assurance about other's likely actions on the road allow for mostly smooth operation." Yes, yes. It would seem so. There was a counter-point here that showed eliminating traffic controls reduced crashes and congrestion because people paid more attention. Was done in quite a few cities. I'd agree some standardization on behavior and design definitely improves things, though, as you know what to expect while driving. "how much less (less, because it would never be none) hardware, software, CPU time and memory would need to be devoted security (firewalls, IDS, malware/virus detection and cleanup) if we had sacrificed a small amount of performance to ensure a more secure operating environment most the time?" BOOM! Same message I've been preaching. My counterpoint to Dan Geer gave a summary of examples with links to more specific details. "We've had little to nothing like this for software engineering, which has led to great advancements in short times, but I think we are nearing the point (if we haven't already passed it) when our past decisions to prioritize efficiency and performance over safety are resulting in a poorer relative outcome than if we have made different choices in the past." Total agreement again. It's time we change it. We did have results with Walker's Computer Security Initiative and are getting them through DO-178B. Clear standards with CompSci- and industry-proven practices plus financial incentives led to many products on the market. The Bell paper below describes the start, middle, and end of that process. Short version: NSA killed market by competing with it and forcing unnecessary re-certifications. Anyway, I've worked on the problem a bit. One thing is a modern list of techniques that work and could be in a certification. Below, I have a list I produced during an argument about no real engineering or empirical methods in software. Most were in the Orange Book but each were proven in real-world scenarios. Some combo of them would be a nice baseline. Far as evaluation itself, I wrote up an essay on that based on my private experience and problems with government certifications. I think I have solid proposals that industry would resist only because they work. :) The DO-178B/C success makes me think it could happen, though, because they already do it piece by piece with a whole ecosystem formed aroud re-usable components. Of course, I'd be interested in your thoughts on the empiracle stuff and security evaluations for further improvement. For fun, you might try to apply my security framework or empirical methods to your own systems to see what you find. Only for the brave, though. ;) Counter point to Dan Geer: Hardware architecture is the problem https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/dan_geer_on_hea.html#c5598568 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/dan_geer_on_h... Bell Looking Back http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-Back-Addendum.pdf http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-B... Essay on how to re-design security evaluations to work http://pastebin.com/9AwDLSTY http://pastebin.com/9AwDLSTY List of empirically-proven methods for robust, software engineering http://pastebin.com/xZ6m4T8Z http://pastebin.com/xZ6m4T8Z