5 ms·

Maybe it is an example of the sunk cost fallacy. But ruminate on this for a moment: if we were having this conversation in 1996, you could have easily said some

Maybe it is an example of the sunk cost fallacy. But ruminate on this for a moment: if we were having this conversation in 1996, you could have easily said something like, "The F-22 is a $800 billion black hole; a stark lesson on the sunk cost fallacy. The F-15 exists, and works..." Maybe the F-35 is what you say it is, but when you look at the history of fighter development, I don't think the F-35 is significantly different, just a continuation and amplification of trends seen on previous programs. In other words, these kinds of problems aren't unique to the F-35. This is by no means an excuse, just a thinking point.

Aelinsaar 10y ago
The F-35 was inspired by the cost of F-22 production, an inspiration that has already proven to be wrongheaded. The rest of what you're saying is very reasonable, but spending 1.5 trillion to discover the answer isn't.
GVIrish 10y ago
Yes, to a degree, several modern fighter aircraft have run into significant cost and schedule overruns due to the additional complexity born of new advanced capabilities. However, the F-35's woes are particularly bad because of some disastrous decisions made early on with the project. First, the government decided not to start out with drafting detailed requirements for the JSF like they have for previous aircraft (and other weapon systems). The idea was that defense contractors know how to build planes so they could cut out some red tape. As it turned out, the result was a large number of oversights due to the contractors vision not lining up with the military's needs. There was also a large reliance on computer simulation in lieu of real world testing. Predictably there were some sizable problems simulation did not catch, which resulted in major revamps and retrofits. In the development of any weapons platform one would expect issues to be found in real-world testing with prototypes. But with the F-35 the government approved "concurrent production" which meant that production F-35's were getting built before all of the testing was complete. This resulted in extremely costly retrofits of existing aircraft everytime a major problem was identified (and fixed). Right now there are about 170 production F-35's out there, and operational testing is far from finished. Put all of these facets together and it's a much worse situation than what we had with the F-22. Cost is tracking at around 200% more expensive than anticipated, and that's assuming we won't see a big drop in the number of aircraft partner nations order.
- engi_nerd 10y ago
  Your substance is right and I have no major disagreements with any of your points. I do have some comments and a few very minor corrections which do not substantially change your argument, but which you may find useful. I'm going to assume that someone who wrote such a reasoned response would find these minor corrections of interest. On requirements: as an engineer I know how disastrous it is to write bad requirements. But having a thorough set of bad requirements is better than not having requirements at all. Without requirements, just about anyone is free to make them up as they go along. As you said, the government did decide that it didn't know how to build planes and the defense contractors did. But, also, the government has, by and large, shifted its engineering focus away from systems design and more towards systems engineering and integration. Also, in general, the government cannot pay the same kinds of salaries that contractors do. So, even if the government had wanted to take a more active role in systems design, it would have found itself lacking the right people to do so effectively. This doesn't excuse the lack of requirements, but it does offer an explanation as to why the government didn't take a more active role in design. > There was also a large reliance on computer simulation in lieu of real world testing. Predictably there were some sizable problems simulation did not catch, which resulted in major revamps and retrofits. Most notably, the government provided an incorrect computer model of the dynamics of the arresting gear found on aircraft carriers. The initial F-35C arrestment hook was designed against this incorrect model. When testing revealed this deficiency, the hook had to be redesigned. > But with the F-35 the government approved "concurrent production" which meant that production F-35's were getting built before all of the testing was complete. Yes, in large part because the government believed that improved computer simulation would eliminate the need for a separate engineering and manufacturing development phase. We've seen how that worked out. > Right now there are about 170 production F-35's out there From different production lots, so not even all production aircraft are the same. Later production lots include fixes that must be retrofitted on earlier lots. > and operational testing is far from finished. What the government calls Operational Testing (OT, what is also known and talked about in the linked document as Initial Operational Test & Evaluation, or IOT&E) is different than a layman's interpretation of the term. Traditionally, once the government completed a very detailed set of specifications and the contractor built a few prototypes, these prototypes were flight tested by the contractor (with government oversight, of course). Once the developmental testing was done, the completed aircraft and all its test results and paperwork were handed over to the government. "Here's your plane, it meets all your requirements." Then the government would conduct testing in environments representative of actual deployments and combat conditions. Operational Testing. The OT force for F-35 just stood up last year. OT has really barely even started. > Put all of these facets together and it's a much worse situation than what we had with the F-22. An amplification of previous trends, as I said earlier.

Aelinsaar 10y ago

The F-35 was inspired by the cost of F-22 production, an inspiration that has already proven to be wrongheaded. The rest of what you're saying is very reasonable, but spending 1.5 trillion to discover the answer isn't.

GVIrish 10y ago

Yes, to a degree, several modern fighter aircraft have run into significant cost and schedule overruns due to the additional complexity born of new advanced capabilities. However, the F-35's woes are particularly bad because of some disastrous decisions made early on with the project. First, the government decided not to start out with drafting detailed requirements for the JSF like they have for previous aircraft (and other weapon systems). The idea was that defense contractors know how to build planes so they could cut out some red tape. As it turned out, the result was a large number of oversights due to the contractors vision not lining up with the military's needs. There was also a large reliance on computer simulation in lieu of real world testing. Predictably there were some sizable problems simulation did not catch, which resulted in major revamps and retrofits. In the development of any weapons platform one would expect issues to be found in real-world testing with prototypes. But with the F-35 the government approved "concurrent production" which meant that production F-35's were getting built before all of the testing was complete. This resulted in extremely costly retrofits of existing aircraft everytime a major problem was identified (and fixed). Right now there are about 170 production F-35's out there, and operational testing is far from finished. Put all of these facets together and it's a much worse situation than what we had with the F-22. Cost is tracking at around 200% more expensive than anticipated, and that's assuming we won't see a big drop in the number of aircraft partner nations order.

engi_nerd 10y ago
Your substance is right and I have no major disagreements with any of your points. I do have some comments and a few very minor corrections which do not substantially change your argument, but which you may find useful. I'm going to assume that someone who wrote such a reasoned response would find these minor corrections of interest. On requirements: as an engineer I know how disastrous it is to write bad requirements. But having a thorough set of bad requirements is better than not having requirements at all. Without requirements, just about anyone is free to make them up as they go along. As you said, the government did decide that it didn't know how to build planes and the defense contractors did. But, also, the government has, by and large, shifted its engineering focus away from systems design and more towards systems engineering and integration. Also, in general, the government cannot pay the same kinds of salaries that contractors do. So, even if the government had wanted to take a more active role in systems design, it would have found itself lacking the right people to do so effectively. This doesn't excuse the lack of requirements, but it does offer an explanation as to why the government didn't take a more active role in design. > There was also a large reliance on computer simulation in lieu of real world testing. Predictably there were some sizable problems simulation did not catch, which resulted in major revamps and retrofits. Most notably, the government provided an incorrect computer model of the dynamics of the arresting gear found on aircraft carriers. The initial F-35C arrestment hook was designed against this incorrect model. When testing revealed this deficiency, the hook had to be redesigned. > But with the F-35 the government approved "concurrent production" which meant that production F-35's were getting built before all of the testing was complete. Yes, in large part because the government believed that improved computer simulation would eliminate the need for a separate engineering and manufacturing development phase. We've seen how that worked out. > Right now there are about 170 production F-35's out there From different production lots, so not even all production aircraft are the same. Later production lots include fixes that must be retrofitted on earlier lots. > and operational testing is far from finished. What the government calls Operational Testing (OT, what is also known and talked about in the linked document as Initial Operational Test & Evaluation, or IOT&E) is different than a layman's interpretation of the term. Traditionally, once the government completed a very detailed set of specifications and the contractor built a few prototypes, these prototypes were flight tested by the contractor (with government oversight, of course). Once the developmental testing was done, the completed aircraft and all its test results and paperwork were handed over to the government. "Here's your plane, it meets all your requirements." Then the government would conduct testing in environments representative of actual deployments and combat conditions. Operational Testing. The OT force for F-35 just stood up last year. OT has really barely even started. > Put all of these facets together and it's a much worse situation than what we had with the F-22. An amplification of previous trends, as I said earlier.