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How secure are the chips?

by tarr11 10y ago

gambiting 10y ago
Well, they literally can't be read without an authentication code from the bank, so pretty secure. Anyone can copy a whole magstripe, but the chip can't be read directly.
PeterisP 10y ago
There isn't any publicized actual fraud based on cloning the chips or extracting data from them - out the whole huge amount of CC fraud. They are vulnerable to a set of physical attacks e.g. etching off the surface of the chip, scanning it with sensitive microscope and attempting to deduce stored data from that (IIRC there were some proof of concept videos posted on HN a few months ago) but it's not a major risk as it (a) requires physical possession of the card, (b) takes time and is destructive, and the result is useless once the owner reports the lost/stolen card, and (c) has significant costs (rare expensive equipment, specialized skills, lots of time) that far exceed the limits on normal credit cards.
- jevinskie 10y ago
  Does this count? http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-ring-defeated-the-secure-chip-and-pin-credit-cards/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-ri...
  - PeterisP 10y ago
    This one is interesting, I had not seen it. If I'm reading this right, it still doesn't compromise the data on chip (i.e., the card cannot be copied, the limits enforced by chip are kept, etc) but allowed to modify the chip so that a physically stolen card can be used without knowing the PIN because the POS erroneously accepts a PIN verification response from another chip. This described hack seems to be impossible in recent chip implementations as well, but I'm not eager to dig through specs to check. Still, it is still similar to the chip analysis vulnerability in risk as it (a) requires physically stealing the card and modifying it - thus it doesn't enable the far more common scenarios of skimming the card by an ATM device or a person e.g. waiter; and (b) doesn't allow to clone the card, so purchases must be made quickly by people physically close to the thieves and operators doing the chip-modification, so it means a much greater chance of arresting the whole team than in the currently common fate of stolen US card data where you can just sell the data to people anonymously over internet, and they themselves can easily make cloned cards to make the risky part of actually obtaining the money/goods. A skimmed card will just work on the first try. A card modified like this is still likely to trigger "stolen, call the police" message on the POS terminal.

How secure are the chips?

by tarr11 10y ago

How secure are the chips?

Well, they literally can't be read without an authentication code from the bank, so pretty secure. Anyone can copy a whole magstripe, but the chip can't be read directly.

PeterisP 10y ago

There isn't any publicized actual fraud based on cloning the chips or extracting data from them - out the whole huge amount of CC fraud. They are vulnerable to a set of physical attacks e.g. etching off the surface of the chip, scanning it with sensitive microscope and attempting to deduce stored data from that (IIRC there were some proof of concept videos posted on HN a few months ago) but it's not a major risk as it (a) requires physical possession of the card, (b) takes time and is destructive, and the result is useless once the owner reports the lost/stolen card, and (c) has significant costs (rare expensive equipment, specialized skills, lots of time) that far exceed the limits on normal credit cards.

jevinskie 10y ago
Does this count? http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-ring-defeated-the-secure-chip-and-pin-credit-cards/ http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-ri...
- PeterisP 10y ago
  This one is interesting, I had not seen it. If I'm reading this right, it still doesn't compromise the data on chip (i.e., the card cannot be copied, the limits enforced by chip are kept, etc) but allowed to modify the chip so that a physically stolen card can be used without knowing the PIN because the POS erroneously accepts a PIN verification response from another chip. This described hack seems to be impossible in recent chip implementations as well, but I'm not eager to dig through specs to check. Still, it is still similar to the chip analysis vulnerability in risk as it (a) requires physically stealing the card and modifying it - thus it doesn't enable the far more common scenarios of skimming the card by an ATM device or a person e.g. waiter; and (b) doesn't allow to clone the card, so purchases must be made quickly by people physically close to the thieves and operators doing the chip-modification, so it means a much greater chance of arresting the whole team than in the currently common fate of stolen US card data where you can just sell the data to people anonymously over internet, and they themselves can easily make cloned cards to make the risky part of actually obtaining the money/goods. A skimmed card will just work on the first try. A card modified like this is still likely to trigger "stolen, call the police" message on the POS terminal.