The other big problem with Postel's law is that it makes enforcing security guarantees a nightmare. When each component in a system is "liberal in what it accep

The other big problem with Postel's law is that it makes enforcing security guarantees a nightmare. When each component in a system is "liberal in what it accepts", it's very easy to fall into a trap where component A thinks that component B is performing the security checks and component B thinks that component A is performing the check and as a result the security check is either never performed or trivially sidestepped. A good example of this was the vulnerability with null characters in SSL certificates [0]. In that vulnerability, both the browser and the certification authority interpreted the domain with the null character as "liberally" as possible, but their differing interpretations of what constituted "forgiving" made it trivial to spoof SSL certificates merely by including a null character in your domain. Another example is with guarding against XSS vulnerabilities. Browsers try to be liberal in what constitutes valid Javascript, and will attempt to execute even the most malformed scripts they encounter. This makes it unnecessarily difficult to shield against XSS - one must block a whole range of vectors, rather than just script tags. [0]: http://trevorjim.com/postels-law-and-network-security/ http://trevorjim.com/postels-law-and-network-security/